Speaking from the Heart: Mediation and Sincerity in U.S. Political Speech by Supp-Montgomerie, David
 
 
 
 
 
Speaking from the Heart: Mediation and Sincerity in U.S. Political Speech 
 
 
 
 
David Supp-Montgomerie 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
Department of Communication Studies in the College of Arts and Sciences. 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2013 
 
 
 
 
       Approved by: 
 
       Christian Lundberg 
 
       V. William Balthrop 
 
Carole Blair 
 
Lawrence Grossberg 
 
William Keith 
 
  
  ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2013 
David Supp-Montgomerie  
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
  
  iii 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
David Supp-Montgomerie: Speaking from the Heart: Mediation and Sincerity in U.S. 
Political Speech 
(Under the direction of Christian Lundberg) 
 
This dissertation is a critique of the idea that the artifice of public speech is a 
problem to be solved. This idea is shown to entail the privilege attributed to purportedly 
direct or unmediated speech in U.S. public culture. I propose that we attend to the ēthos 
producing effects of rhetorical concealment by asserting that all public speech is 
constituted through rhetorical artifice. Wherever an alternative to rhetoric is offered, one 
finds a rhetoric of non-rhetoric at work. A primary strategy in such rhetoric is the 
performance of sincerity. In this dissertation, I analyze the function of sincerity in 
contexts of public deliberation. I seek to show how claims to sincerity are strategic, 
demonstrate how claims that a speaker employs artifice have been employed to imply a 
lack of sincerity, and disabuse communication, rhetoric, and deliberative theory of the 
notion that sincere expression occurs without technology.  
In Chapter Two I begin with the original problem of artifice for rhetoric in 
classical Athens in the writings of Plato and Isocrates. Plato values immediate modes of 
speech because mediation, such as writing, is for him a fundamentally artificial 
construction of appearance. In contrast, Isocrates placed writing at the center of good 
thinking and defended the use of logography for the betterment of civil society. He 
presented a case for what I will call rhetorical literacy: the learned skill of creating and 
interpreting morally prudent persuasive discourse.  
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In Chapters Three and Four, I turn to two contemporary cases beginning with a 
context considered to be rife with artifice: political campaigns. In Chapter Three, I 
discuss how the problem of artifice prompts both a crisis of ēthos for political speakers 
and an opportunity for opponents to strategically point out the presence of artifice. 
Criticism of Governor Mitt Romney and President Barack Obama often attended to the 
artifice of their speech, while President George W. Bush’s speeches and the myth of 
unmediated speech indicate the tendency for some technologies to more successfully 
allow a speaker to conceal her or his rhetorical craft. Chapter Four examines how the 
appearance of unmediated communication in facilitated dialogue and deliberation 
requires active concealment and denial of technique. While Open Space Technology 
might appear to be less staged than National Issues Forums and, therefore, more natural, 
they both rely on the concealment of the artifice of their technique. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Almost from its very inception, the rhetorical tradition has confronted the critique that 
oratorical skill was a hodge-podge of techniques for persuasion more akin to deception than 
to a technê or art of deliberation.1 This critique maintains that rhetoric is little more than a set 
of parlor tricks that lends a speaker the appearance of virtue, good will, and credibility 
without any necessary relation to actual virtue, knowledge, or argumentative soundness. 
While critics argued that rhetoric was, at best, mere ornamentation, Aristotle took the 
criticism to heart but believed that rhetoric was a necessary, if insufficient, technê for 
prudence (phronēsis) in the absence of certainty.2 Furthermore, Aristotle sought a way to 
make rhetoric workable in an Athenian democracy that at times,was more akin to mob rule or 
soft oligarchy.3 While he lamented the insufficiency of logos to win the day, it did not stop 
him from theorizing the supplementarity of ēthos and pathos. He noted, for example, that 
when the artifice that produces ēthos becomes apparent, both speaker and speech lose 
                                                            
1 Plato, for example, avoided granting oratory the status of technê in Gorgias. Plato, 
“Gorgias,” in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including The Letters, ed. Huntington Cairns 
and Edith Hamilton (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 462c3. 
2 For Aristotle’s account of prudence and moral choice, see Nicomachean Ethics, trans. 
Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 3.3, 
6.4.3, 6.9.     
3 George Kennedy, commentary in On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, by Aristotle, 
trans. George Kennedy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 29.  
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persuasive force. Thus, Aristotle advised speakers to compose without being noticed.4 
Audiences, after all, become resentful if they perceive that a speaker is attempting to 
manipulate them, which Aristotle aptly compares to someone being caught mixing wines to 
make them more intoxicating.5 If an audience recognizes that it is the target of a speaker’s 
persuasive effort, uncertainty regarding the characteristics (hexeis) of the speaker emerges 
from a perceived cleavage between the appearance and reality of his or her character (ēthos).6  
This skepticism towards evident persuasion, what I call “the problem of artifice,” is 
the centerpiece of this dissertation. As political theorist Bryan Garsten asserts, “the reigning 
view of persuasion is that it is a disruptive force in politics and a threat to democratic 
deliberation.”7 Yet, as was the case during democracy’s early years, public speech also 
enjoys a cherished place for its role in making democratic governance accountable to the 
voice of the demos. Without speech, there is democracy in name only, but with speech there 
can be mob rule, ill-advised decisions, and so on. As a pharmakon for democracy, speech 
                                                            
4 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George Kennedy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 1404b17-18.  
5 Ibid., 1404b20.  
6 This is akin to the slippages between the literary author’s many voices. See Wayne C. 
Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 50-53, 169-
266. Unlike literary fiction, the presence of a “second self” poses a rhetorical problem in 
political speech. As Edwin Black remarks, “we have learned to keep continuously before us 
the possibility, and in some cases the probability, that the author implied by the discourse is 
an artificial creation: a persona.” “The Second Persona,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 56, no. 
2 (1970): 111. 
7 This skepticism towards evident persuasion was in effect in Renaissance Italy in the 
suspicion and unease concerning sprezzatura, a term for the skillful simulation of the natural 
graces of noble birth through the elegant performance of nonchalance. Harry Berger, The 
Absence of Grace: Sprezzatura and Suspicion in Two Renaissance Courtesy Books (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000); Heinrich F. Plett, Rhetoric and Renaissance Culture (New 
York: Gruyter, 2004).  
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resides in the ambiguity between medicine and poison. Perhaps it is this ambiguity coupled 
with its necessity that explains the persistent drive to ascertain the character of public 
speakers. Nevertheless, just as the Greeks of classical antiquity, contemporary audiences are 
unsatisfied by the appearance of character cultivated by speakers—they want the real thing. 
As such, public speech is both always artificial and under constant demand to hide all signs 
of artifice.     
In this dissertation, I challenge the primary response to the artificialness of public 
speech, namely, to concieve of it as a problem to be avoided or otherwise reconciled. I 
advocate thinking of artifice as a necessary precondition for all public speech. I examine the 
effects of these responses and support the latter by showing the failure of the former in three 
contexts of democratic speech—speech writing in Greek antiquity, contemporary political 
speech, and methods of facilitated deliberation.  
When artifice is thought of as a problem to be solved, speakers attempt to conceal 
their rhetorical craft through a rhetoric of anti-rhetoric.8 This common anti-rhetorical trope is 
the contrast of rhetoric with action wherein rhetoric is “mere” words without substance. For 
example, anticipating President Barack Obama’s jobs speech to Congress, Amy Tarkanian, 
Nevada Republican Party Chairwoman, summed up the anti-rhetorical impulse, “We're 
hurting. And we do need results. We don't need rhetoric.”9 When orators use the rhetoric of 
                                                            
8 Jon Hesk has documented some of the anti-rhetorical impulses in the classical Greek 
context. Deception and Democracy In Classical Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). 202-40. For the most part, the reasons for rejecting rhetoric have remained the 
same since Plato forcefully made them in the Gorgias: rhetoric is at best the appearance of 
truth and at worst the willful deception or flattery of an audience without regard for its 
goodwill. 453a2, 455a3, 457e, 502a6-c12.   
9 Amy Tarkanian, interview by John King, John King, USA, CNN, October 17, 2011, 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1110/17/jkusa.01.html. 
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anti-rhetoric, they imply that their speech is praiseworthy by denigrating the symbolic 
function of others’ language. Rhetorical form and artifice are disavowed as ornamentation 
while the rhetorical practices of the anti-rhetorical orator are purported to be only content 
without the trappings of rhetorical flourish. 
The problem of artifice is not only responded to through anti-rhetorical rejection. The 
problem of artifice may be avoided through attempts to circumvent it when a wholesale 
rejection of rhetoric is impossible. In fact, wherever an alternative to rhetoric is offered by 
carving out a domain that purports to be free of rhetorical artifice, one finds what I term the 
“rhetoric of non-rhetoric” at work.10 Such rhetoric conceals artifice so thoroughly as to deny 
the possibility of rhetorical craft altogether. This explains why the suspicion of rhetoric as 
artificial has functioned as counterpart to the trust of spontaneous speech as sincere.11 
Spontaneous speech is often thought to be beyond the reach of strategy and, as such, beyond 
the craft of the rhetor. Such is the ēthos effect of a rhetoric of non-rhetoric that is thought to 
be free of the calculation required for flattery.  
This rhetorical maneuver does not primarily rely upon the rejection of rhetoric. A 
speaker in a debate might begin by stating that before working to persuade the audience, she 
would first like to provide some basic information about the facts of the matter. In the case of 
political speech, even the most persuasive speakers avoid attention to their skill at 
persuasion. For example, while his skills as an orator were thought by many to be one of his 
most significant assets of his candidacy, Barack Obama strived to focus attention on the 
                                                            
10 Chapter Two documents how dialectic enables Plato’s rhetoric of non-rhetoric, but Bryan 
Garsten, using the phrase “rhetoric against rhetoric,” similarly observes how passion, 
patriotism, and public reason serve this role for Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant, respectively. 
Saving Persuasion, 11, 25-112.   
11 Miller, “Should We Name the Tools?,” 21-23. 
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content of his message rather than to the design of its form.12 It was Obama’s political 
opponents, both Hillary Clinton and John McCain, who drew attention to his skill at 
speaking.13 
When artifice is approached as a problem for democratic speech, its obvious presence 
risks a form of persuasive blowback. As a result, orators must carefully craft messages that 
accomplish their goals while appearing to do so without technique. Speakers deal with this 
paradox through the strategic use of sincerity in order to conceal the artistry of rhetoric.14 
Sincerity is the claim of correspondence between what one avows and what one belives to be 
                                                            
12 Consider the plagiarism flap of Obama’s 2008 campaign. It was discovered that 
Massachusetts Governor and close friend of Obama, Duval Patrick, had given a speech that 
largely resembled comments that Obama made on the campaign trail about the power of 
words and the promise of hope. While an obvious and swift answer might have been issued 
by the Obama campaign that they simply shared a speechwriter, the official line was that they 
were friends and commonly shared ideas. There was no explanation provided by the 
campaign that referred to a common logographer working behind the scenes. David 
Greenberg, “Friends, Romans, Countrymen, Lend Me Your Speech,” New York Times, 
February 24, 2008. 
13 Hillary Clinton accused Obama of flattering his audience and using several pollsters to 
design his message. Jeff York, “Not So Fast, Clinton Says About Obama Momentum,” New 
York Times, January 7, 2008. John McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign released an 
advertisement called “Celeb” that featured large speech audiences chanting “Obama.” John 
McCain, “Celeb,” YouTube video, :32, posted by “JohnMcCaindotcom,” July 30, 2008, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oHXYsw_ZDXg.  
14 Political theorist Elizabeth Markovits documents how the “sincerity norm” is a condition 
of the discourse ethics that underwrites most of deliberative democratic theory. “The Trouble 
with Being Earnest: Deliberative Democracy and the Sincerity Norm,” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 14, no. 3 (2006); The Politics Of Sincerity: Plato, Frank Speech, And 
Democratic Judgment (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), 13-46. 
Markovits argues that sincerity is a poor standard by which to judge political discourse. She 
traces a rhetoric of sincerity and irony to Plato, but, while noting his use of irony, diminishes 
his own use of rhetoric in order to establish a sincere voice. Ibid., chaps. 3-4. While she 
notices Plato’s Socrates undermining the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric, I argue in Chapter Two 
that he replaces it with a more insidious rhetoric of non-rhetoric. She sees Plato as 
appreciating rhetoric and celebrates Socrates for subverting parrhesia. Yet it is Plato (through 
the voice of Socrates) who reinforces the sincerity demand by regularly concealing his 
artifice and revealing the artifice of his opponents.  
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true. Because sincerity implies access to and representation of what is authentic, it 
counterbalances the problem of artifice; the sincere speaker is representing what is real as 
opposed to creating an artificial appearance.  
The rhetorical effect of this sincerity demand produces a double bind: on one hand, it 
is powerfully persuasive because it is understood to be natural, non-technological, and pre-
rhetorical, and on the other hand, it prompts a crisis for the speaker if artifice is revealed. In 
this dissertation, I will analyze the function of sincerity in contexts of democratic speech; 
more than pointing to purportedly sincere statements and revealing them to be factually 
inaccurate or insincere, I seek to show the performativity of sincerity, demonstrate how 
claims that a speaker employs artifice have been employed to imply a lack of sincerity, and 
disabuse rhetoric and communication theory of the notion that sincere expression occurs 
without the mediation of artifice.   
The “problem” response to the artifice of public speech is prompted by a desire to 
know the strangers who address us and a belief that this knowledge can be ascertained 
through unmediated forms of communication. In rejecting this response, this dissertation 
forms a critique of the privilege attributed to purportedly perfect communication. This study, 
therefore, focuses on the notion of immediacy and distinguishes between two primary 
definitions. One conception of immediacy holds that it is the perception of a close connection 
between people that results from certain communication behaviors.15 Examples of this 
conception of immediacy include self-disclosure, talking about commonalities, and 
                                                            
15 In the field of communication studies, “immediacy” is most often used in studies of 
interpersonal communication to refer to behaviors that tend to communicate attention, feature 
an increase in sensory stimulation, and produce the perception of closeness. Andersen et al., 
153.  
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maintaining eye contact.16 This dissertation critiques a second mistaken conception of 
immediacy as that of the lack of mediation, that is, the unmediated connection between a 
person’s soul and a person’s speech or between speaker and audience. I would like to 
emphasize the ways that immediacy is a perception forged from the successful concealment 
of rhetorical artifice and not a lack of artificial mediation. As a human activity, immediacy is 
necessarily mediated. The task here will be, in each subsequent chapter, to describe the 
formal elements and conditions of mediation in different contexts of public deliberation 
primarily using the resources of rhetorical theory and criticism.  
The prestige of forms of communication thought to be unmediated is made possible 
by a negative theology of communication wherein perfect communication is fixed through 
the work of negation: it is not mediated, not distant, not dissemination, and so on. This 
negation will echo in the case of facilitated deliberation and definitions of dialogue as 
essentially not debate. However, so-called perfect forms of communication, such as dialogue, 
are mediated. Beginning with the assumption that dialogue involves an immediacy of 
presence, John Durham Peters locates “distortions” of dialogue that allow for communication 
across physical and cultural distances.17 While he presses for the good in other forms of 
                                                            
16 Peter A. Andersen, “Immediacy,” in Encyclopedia of Communication Theory, ed. Stephen 
W. Littlejohn and Karen A. Foss (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009).  
17 John Durham Peters, Speaking Into The Air: A History Of The Idea Of Communication 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 34. Peters sets out to expose the impossibility 
of immediate connection between human souls, but he maintains the problematic division 
between forms of communication (e.g., dialogue and dissemination) in terms of mediation 
and its absence. This buttresses the very moral privilege that Peters attempts to undermine. 
Arguing for an appreciation of dissemination, for example, he concludes, “open scatter is 
more fundamental than coupled sharing; it is the stuff from which, on rare, splendid 
occasions, dialogue may arise.” Ibid., 62. In this formulation, one-way communication, such 
as mass media dissemination, is relegated to the role of catalyst for the more exceptional and 
difficult to attain dialogic moment.   
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communication—“the marriage of true minds via dialogue is not the only option”—Peters 
holds firm to the status of dialogue as unmediated communication.18 Against this line of 
argument, I contend that perfect communication is impossible because all communication is 
mediated, including those forms that we take to be unmediated. “Dialogue,” for example, is a 
form of mediated communication marked chiefly by the performance of immediacy of 
presence. Because he maintains dialogue’s status as unmediated communication, Peters 
leaves the door ajar for a rhetoric of non-rhetoric that gestures toward dialogue as a non-
rhetorical horizon.  
I share a point of departure with much of contemporary rhetorical theory in moving 
away from the sole focus on “persuasion” and the formation of public judgements. Often 
organized around the alternative keyword, “identification,” such a definition of rhetoric is at 
once more expansive and more specific.19 As Jeffrey Walker notes, defining rhetoric broadly 
as persuasive discourse (implying an opposition with nonpersuasive discourse) is problematic 
for the academic discipline of rhetoric because it is too general and can “make ‘rhetorical 
studies’ the study of all signification and human behavior, a task performed already by a 
range of other disciplines.”20 More problematic, and germane to this study, is the way in 
which these traditional definitions of rhetoric actually enable the devaluation of rhetoric by 
reifying the category of the non-rhetorical. As Walker makes clear, such definitions of 
                                                            
18 Ibid.  
19 See Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric Of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1969), 49-69; Maurice Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case Of The Peuple 
Québécois,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 73, no. 2 (1987).  
20 Jeffrey Walker, The Genuine Teachers of This Art: Rhetorical Education in Antiquity 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2011), 1-2.  
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rhetoric reduce it to “something added to communication,” which, I would add, implies that 
rhetoric can be something taken away from communication as well.21  
There is no zero-degree speech that is a direct representation of a referent.22 Because 
direct representation is impossible, I am attending to the consequences that ensue from the 
necessary performativity of subjects as they assume public personae. This implies a more 
expansive notion of what constitutes “persuasion,” but it is also a specific focus among 
human behavior and signification. As Blair, Dickinson, and Ott define it, rhetoric is “the 
study of discourses, events, objects, and practices that attends to their character as 
meaningful, legible, partisan, and consequential,” and they add, involves “what it means to 
be ‘public.’”23 A “public persona” is the constructed appearance of a subject. Persona was 
originally a Latin term that referred to the masks worn by actors in ancient Greece.24 Today 
                                                            
21 Ibid., 2. Walker lists the four most common modalities for defining rhetoric as: persuasive 
discourse or practical oratory, persuasive practices and the devices of persuasion, critical 
analysis, description, or theory of persuasive practice, and teaching persuasion or the 
cultivation of rhetorical capacity. Ibid., 1. 
22 Christian Lundberg draws upon a rhetorical theory of Jacques Lacan to argue that all 
discourse is tropological. Trope, for Lacan (and the ancient Greek tropos), is a “turn” instead 
of a direct pathway. Lundberg, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric: 
79. While I focus on speech practices in public deliberation, rhetoric is more than speech. 
Contemporary rhetorical study examines the rhetorical effects of a wide range of 
communication modalities, including photographs, writing, cinema, music, art, architecture, 
cultural practices, and so on.  
23 Carole Blair, Greg Dickinson, and Brian L Ott, “Introduction: Rhetoric/Memory/Place,” in 
Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of Museums and Memorials, ed. Greg Dickinson, 
Carole Blair, and Brian L Ott (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010), 2-3. 
Importantly, rhetoric is also pedagogical. As Jeffrey Walker demonstrates, the critical-
theoretical agenda is set and the objects of rhetorical study are selected in order to “critique 
practices and articulate general principles” in service of training rhetors and equipping 
citizens to be better consumers of rhetoric. Walker argues that what makes rhetoric rhetoric is 
its pedagogical project. The Genuine Teachers of This Art, 3.  
24 Robert C. Elliott, The Literary Persona (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 19. 
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the term is often used to distinguish a constructed appearance of an author or speaker in 
contrast to the real author or speaker, as in the example of Mark Twain’s writing persona that 
may or may not correspond to the author Samuel Clemens.  
Real or constructed, or both, the speaker is made textually present through ēthos 
appeals. The stable and unique characteristics (hexeis) of the individual are displayed through 
ēthos as the habits of body and mind. 25 As such, ēthos is the character of a persona as 
opposed to a person insofar as ēthos is the representation of that which the audience does not 
have direct access.26 As a supplement to logos and pathos as means of persuasion, ēthos 
underscores how the arrangement of discourse may be particularly moving for a given 
audience by demonstrating the habits (ethos) of intellectual and moral virtue (aretē). Thus, 
even when speech is thought to emerge unmediated from a speaker’s soul, the speaker comes 
to foreground a particular ēthos that is quite different from a speaker whose rhetorical artifice 
is more pronounced. 
In the case of public deliberation, we have such an aversion to persuasion that we 
invent tortured ways of denying the rhetorical basis of speech that only elevates the role of 
concealment to the extent that artifice must be concealed for rhetoric to be effective. That 
effectively addressing others in public requires an element of concealment has always been 
                                                            
25 Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins, glossary in Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle, 306. 
Aristotle considered ēthos to be the most effective means of persuasion. On Rhetoric, 
1356a8. An audience would have confidence in the speaker's character if what they said 
produced a belief regarding three items: practical wisdom, good moral character, and 
goodwill. Ibid., 1378a6.  
26 Ēthos is often considered along with “source credibility.” These are attributes, such as perception of intentions, 
expert status, and trustworthiness, affect how persuasive the source of the message is. Others have identified factors such 
as competence, trustworthiness, good will, or how similar the sender is to an audience. 
Roderick P. Hart, The Sound Of Leadership: Presidential Communication In The Modern 
Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 292-93. 
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central to rhetoric and led Plato to compare the art of rhetoric to arts such as cosmetics, 
seduction, enchantment, hunting, and military strategy.27 The need to conceal the work of 
rhetoric emanates, in part, from a general sense of suspicion about the use of language. 
According to rhetorical theorist Carolyn Miller, this suspicion emanates from the notion that 
language is an adversarial game—one must be vigilant about someone trying to gain 
advantage through words. Spontaneity is thought to be more worthy of trust in this rubric 
because those statements that come easily and without planning, it is thought, are less likely 
to be crafted for the sake of gaining advantage. However, public communication is technê, so 
apparently spontaneous action actually emerges from “learned repertoires of possibility.”28 
What is held to be spontaneous is the product of rhetorical labor just as that which is held to 
be figural because spontaneity, as rhetorical form, produces an ēthos effect. Rather than 
escape rhetoric, we need to understand its effects in constituting the conditions of public 
speech.  
There is an alternative response to the artifice of public speech that better responds to 
the demands of democratic speech. Rather than viewed as a problem to be solved (or 
avoided) artifice is best conceptualized as a necessary condition for public speech. This helps 
us tell a better story about speech for democracy by avoiding the metaphysical trappings of 
the pursuit of perfect communcation and the problematic political implications it entails. I 
propose that we attend to the ēthos producing effects of rhetorical concealment by asserting 
that all public speech is constituted through rhetorical artifice. Rather than disparaging 
                                                            
27 David Roochnik, Of Art and Wisdom: Plato's Understanding of Technê (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996). 
28 Jonathan Sterne, “Communication as Techné,” in Communication as—: Perspectives on 
Theory, ed. Gregory Shepherd, Jeffrey. St. John, and Theodore G. Striphas (Thousand Oaks, 
Calif.: Sage, 2006), 94.  
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rhetorical practice, this view promotes rhetorical literacy for the delicate interplay between 
concealment, ēthos, and persuasion. In many ways, this is a more realistic approach to the 
warp and woof of quotidian political discourse than either aggrandizing rhetoric or rejecting 
it offers.  
 The approach to artifice as a necessary condition of democratic speech encourages us 
to consider the conditions of speech’s mediation—as both content and form. As medium 
theorists would remind us, it is impossible to arrive at message content without mediation.29 
Rhetorical artifice is a form of mediation and the rhetoric of non-rhetoric is an attempt to 
erase this fact. The problem of rhetorical artifice, then, is a problem of mediation insofar as 
mediation reminds audiences of the distance between them and the speaker. In so doing, the 
appearance of mediation undercuts the dream of perfect communication that provides a 
direct, unmediated connection between subjects.30 The pursuit of unmediated communication 
is part of a larger cultural rejection of mediation that occurs paradoxically in the midst of the 
proliferation of forms of mediation. In the words of media theorists Jay Bolter and Richard 
Grusin, “our culture wants to both multiply its media and to erase all traces of mediation.”31 
                                                            
29 For exemplars of medium theory, see Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The 
Extensions of Man (New York: New American Library, 1964); Eric Alfred Havelock, The 
Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1982); Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: the Technologizing of the Word 
(New York: Routledge, 2002); Harold Adams Innis, The Bias of Communication (Toronto, 
ON: University of Toronto Press, 2008).  
30 “The Force” in George Lucas’ Star Wars series epitomizes this dream. This metaphysical 
ether is ubiquitous, powerful, and difficult to master. Those persons that achieve a mastery of 
it are no longer bound to imperfect communication. They have direct access to others’ 
thoughts and feelings, can teleport, and can even communicate from the grave. Because it 
portrays perfect communication, the power of the Force is fundamentally about distance and 
our desire to conquer it.  
31 Jay D. Bolter and Richard A. Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 5. 
  13 
Contemporary public culture is characterized by the dual demands for mediation beyond 
face-to-face address and mediation as if it were face-to-face address. In efforts to locate a 
mode of deliberation that provides a direct connection between participants, as we will see in 
the case of facilitated deliberation, mediation is a problem to be dealt with—a barrier to be 
overcome. Communication theorist Rob Anderson argues that a “mediated culture” makes 
dialogue more difficult to achieve.32 Technological innovation, for Anderson, improves a 
medium until it becomes less media-like; technology in Anderson’s view helps achieve 
dialogue only when it removes the markers of technological mediation (read: concealed).33 
The demand to speak without artifice in the context of public deliberation is a demand for 
direct access to a speaker. 
Dissertation Overview 
I would like to argue that despite our preference for “authentic speech”—that is, 
speech that lacks artifice—all public speech is artificial. In this study I will both demonstrate 
this claim about the inevitability of artifice, and, further, I will specify the strategies that 
speakers employ in pursuit of erasing artifice. Finally, I describe the implications of these 
strategies for democracy. To support my contention, I engage limit cases: those examples in 
which it is widely thought that speech is highly artificial and those examples in which it is 
thought that speech is very natural. I have selected vignettes that help me tell stories about 
rhetorical practices rather than demonstrate a historical cause-and-effect relation. “The task is 
                                                            
32 Rob Anderson, “Anonymity, Presence, and the Dialogic Self in a Technological Culture,” 
in The Reach of Dialogue: Confirmation, Voice, and Community, ed. Rob Anderson, 
Kenneth N. Cissna, and Ronald C. Arnett (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, 1994), 91. However, the 
solution is found, in part, in the problem because some technology that emerges from out 
mediated culture has the potential to create the presence needed for dialogue through 
interaction. Ibid., 92. 
33 Ibid., 98. 
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to construct addresses out of the fabric of mediated experience,” Raymie McKerrow writes, 
by bringing together “disparate scraps of discourse which, when constructed as an argument, 
serve to illuminate otherwise hidden or taken for granted social practices.”34 These limit 
cases provide useful evidence to warrant my claims about the problem of artifice in public 
deliberation because they represent moments when public audiences are most relentless in 
their quest to root out the false appearance of natural speech. In this section, I first discuss 
several key words that are integral to the problem of artifice for public deliberation. Second, 
an overview of the three chapters that form the body of this dissertation—speech writing in 
Greek antiquity, contemporary political speech, and methods of facilitated deliberation—is 
provided. 
Sincerity and the Figure of the Sincere Speaker 
There is little doubt that sincerity is in vogue in American politics even as it seems to 
be very elusive. During the height of the 2012 GOP primary, CNN even proposed a “Political 
Sincerity Test” to evaluate candidates. Points reflecting insincerity were awarded for faux-
folksy behaviors such as “taking off your jacket mid-sentence,” “insisting you're not a 
politician,” using the phrase “humble roots,” “eating fried food in front of cameras at a fair,” 
and “speaking within kicking distance of a bale of hay.”35 Derived from the Latin word 
sincerus, sincerity initially referred to a condition of purity. One could refer to a wine that 
was sincere—meaning, Lionel Trilling conveys, “that it had not been adulterated, or, as was 
                                                            
34 Raymie McKerrow, “Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis,” Communication Monographs 
56, no. 1 (1989): 101.  
35 Dan Szematowicz, Emma Lacey-Bordeaux, and Steve Brusk, “American Sauce: Political 
Sincerity Test,” Political Ticker (blog), CNN.com, August 23, 2011, 
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/23/american-sauce-political-sincerity-test/.  
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once said, sophisticated.”36 It is here that we see the connection between efforts to create an 
appearance through sophistry and adulterating wine. Plato lamented that the sophists created 
the appearance of truth as opposed to demonstrating its actuality. In politics, as in wine, one 
expects to get what the label promises. 
To understand the nature of rhetoric as technê in the context of contemporary politics, 
it is helpful to distinguish between the demand for sincerity and the demand for the 
appearance of sincerity. It is obvious that political messages and campaigns are constructed. 
It is highly unlikely that people are dupes who think that their favorite politician is the only 
one that does not use talking points issued by political consultants. The vast majority of 
people know that while some politicians may be motivated more or less by self-interest, there 
is always an attempt to invent certain appearances (e.g., hardworking, caring, ordinary). 
However, we are less critical in certain situations and more attendant to the mediation of 
speech in others.37 As I will show in the case of ancient Greece, we too are steadfast in our 
pursuit to root out deceptive performances, and in addition, we demand that the truth be told 
with the performative posture of sincerity.  
                                                            
36 Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity (New York: Harcourt, 1980), 13.  
37 The presence of artifice, even when it is fully obvious, does not always lead to distrust and 
suspicion. For example, some of President Obama’s most celebrated speeches were highly 
scripted and ornate affairs. His speech about race during the 2008 campaign and his victory 
speech in Grant Park after his 2008 election did not appear unscripted but still garnered 
positive appraisals. In part, attention to artifice is prompted as a political strategy when 
opponents sense a value in revealing artifice. In the above examples, there was little 
opportunity to benefit from calling attention to Obama’s artifice. In addition, there are 
generic expectations that fuel the reception of given messages. In the example of acceptance 
speeches and formal occasions, scripted speech is less noteworthy. If there is a more general 
change historically, it might be the changes in news media, inn particular, the 24-hour 
political punditry that obsesses over minutia such as verbal blunders. Commentators pay 
attention to technique, strategy, and tactic as a way of explaining the news to viewers. See 
Dan Schill, Stagecraft and Statecraft: Advance and Media Events in Political 
Communication (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009).  
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Sincerity is such a prominent feature of American political culture because, as a 
virtue of democratic speech, it is used to assert immediacy between the speaker and the 
audience. In response to a demand to publicly present the self, sincerity is a strategy for 
signaling a lack of artifice. As Lionel Trilling notes, “society requires of us that we present 
ourselves as being sincere… we play the role of being ourselves, we sincerely act the part of 
the sincere person, with the result that a judgment may be passed upon our sincerity.”38 The 
fact that sincerity is a primary means of managing the suspicion of political speech reveals a 
cultural assumption connecting sincerity, understood as immediate speech, and the speaker's 
true self. Sincerity is a particular mode of rhetorical performance and not a transcendent 
relation to truth. Bill O'Reilly's “No Spin Zone” employs the cultural work of sincerity with 
or without his belief that he faithfully represents issues and speaks frankly. Regardless of our 
lack of access sufficient to verify the correspondence between thoughts and speech acts, 
sincerity as a rhetorical technique exerts real effects in public speech. 
Sincerity and authenticity are closely related yet conceptually distinct. Sincerity is a 
subset of authenticity that relies upon a notion of ēthos. Sincerity presupposes authenticity 
and adds a condition of avowal; to be sincere is to represent what is authentic. Part of 
President Bush’s ēthos, for example, stemmed from his success at concealing the mediation 
of his speech. He helped to cultivate a sincere dwelling place for his rhetoric, an ēthos rife 
with the earnestness of frank speech.39 When applied to speech, sincerity expresses what one 
believes rather than what an audience wants to hear. Thus, the embrace of the sincere speaker 
occurs with a strong moral inflection. As Jay Magill suggests, “judgments of insincerity, 
                                                            
38 Ibid., 10-11.  
39 For a reconceptualization of ēthos as “dwelling place,” see Hyde, “Introduction.”  
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hypocrisy, and fake authenticity float like hyper-charged electrons around the ancient moral 
nucleus of sincerity, nodding to its decline with a kind of resentful remorse.”40 There is a 
sense that sincerity is a struggle to throw off the yoke of social influence and risk baring 
yourself in society. Lionel Trilling observes that references to both sincerity and authenticity 
frequently suggest a “strenuous moral experience.”41 For example, Holden Caulfield in J. D. 
Salinger's novel, Catcher in the Rye (1951) launches the persistent insult of “phony” upon his 
least favorite people.42 What irked Caulfield was a perceived lack of correspondence between 
the interior self and the exterior appearance.43 As Cheever argues, the notion of phoniness 
requires a certain model of authenticity and selfhood wherein the self is composed of an 
inner core and outer façade.44 The phony does not faithfully represent an interior core self but 
makes an appearance of an exterior self for a social audience. Moreover, the phony is not 
merely someone who is uncomfortable in her own skin or is not in touch with his interior 
self; “phony” is reserved as a bad word for someone who has self-knowledge and 
purposefully misrepresents who they are.45 
                                                            
40 R. Jay Magill, Sincerity: How a Moral Ideal Born Five Hundred Years Ago Inspired 
Religious Wars, Modern Art, Hipster Chic, and the Curious Notion That Ae All Have 
Something to Say (No Matter How Dull) (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012), 18. 
41 Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity, 11. 
42 “Phony” was a popular epithet during the postwar period in the United States. Abigail 
Cheever, Real Phonies: Cultures of Authenticity in Post-World War II America (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2010), 2.  
43 Ibid., 1-2. 
44 Ibid., 2. 
45 The term “phonies” compares to the less anachronistic notion of being “real” today. Being 
“real” is analogous to being sincere because it signals a rejection of appearances and outer-
motived behavior. Herman Cain’s 2012 presidential campaign attempted to leverage his 
status as “real” by releasing one of the oddest political ads of all time, what Conor 
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One effect of valorizing the performance of sincerity is the mythologizing of the 
sincere agent in public culture. The sincere speaker deviates from a prepared script when it 
deviates from what he or she knows to be true. In the cinematic cliché, the speaker might 
throw the script aside or tear it into pieces to dramatize the moment of going “off” script.46 
The ideal political actor, then, is captured by Frank Capra’s Mr. Smith Goes to Washington 
and public memory of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt sitting by the fireside to chat 
intimately with Americans. Such performances and their public remembrances capture our 
imagination by appealing to a heroic notion of political agency: it is the political actor 
motivated not by self-interest but by sincerity—nothing more than the virtuous desire to be 
true to oneself. 
Technology 
This dissertation observes that a significant component of rhetoric’s negative 
reception in public deliberation is fueled by its implication in a related set of terms: 
technology, technique, and technê. Thinking rhetoric as technology requires conceptual 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Friedersdorf in The Atlantic referred to as a “Dadaist Meta-Western.” Titled, “He Carried 
Yellow Flowers,” the advertisement provides a story within a story and is an attempt to use 
the frame of performance to highlight Obama's artifice while contrasting it with Herman 
Cain's lack of artifice and real, as opposed to apparent, accomplishments. The video begins 
as a western film when a fight breaks out. Off screen, a director yells “cut,” and the cowboy, 
the main character, walks off the movie set, is handed a drink, doted on, and then speaks to 
the camera. Nick Searcy introduces himself and says that, while he has played many tough 
guy roles, “looking cool and saying lines that somebody else wrote for me doesn't make me a 
real tough guy, anymore than looking cool and reading lines off a teleprompter that someone 
else wrote makes a community organizer a real leader. But Herman Cain is a real leader.” 
The character then goes on to list the many ways that Cain is “real.” “Herman Cain's 'Yellow 
Flowers' Ad Is a Dadaist Meta-Western,” The Atlantic, October 26, 2011.  
46 Cinematic examples of a speaker deviating from the script include Listen to Me (1989), 
West Wing, “The Contender” (2000), The American President (1995), Network (1976), 
Wedding Crashers (2005), Dave (1993), Legally Blonde (2001), Milk (2008), Hoosiers 
(1986), Scent of a Woman (1992), Hook (1991), Up Close and Personal (1996), Love 
Actually (2003), The Great Debaters (2007), and The Verdict (1982). 
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clarity; it is more common to consider rhetoric and technology. For example, by asking how 
different forms of technology influence the persuasiveness of messages, or how technological 
change creates new social meanings. In order to understand rhetoric as technology, it is 
helpful to consider the root of “technology” in the Greek term, technê. Rhetoric has, from its 
ancient Greek origin, been viewed as a technê. Technê is a Greek word associated with craft 
production and practical knowledge.47 As a decidedly human skill, technê shifts agency from 
the gods toward humanity.48 In this way, technê is inherently tied to artifice because it signals 
human intervention. In tracing the problematization of speech artifice, this dissertation 
describes public speech practices in democracy as technê that are constituted, in part, through 
their rejection. 
As a result of suspicion and uncertainty in the context of public deliberation, there are 
particular symbolic consequences for the use of technê. The character of rhetoric as human 
craft is a problem insofar as it is held to mark artificiality in contrast to the more natural 
immediacy of connection and authenticity of presence. The articulation of rhetoric, 
mechanical technology, and artificiality is tidily made by U.S. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
taking issue with President Wilson’s proposal for a League of Nations, “The mechanical 
appliances of the rhetorician designed to give a picture of a present which does not exist and 
of a future which no man can predict… are as unreal as… the artificial lights on the stage.”49 
                                                            
47 As Eric Havelock argues, the term is not readily translatable to English, but benefits from 
the fusion of “technology” and “art” into one concept. Literate Revolution, 269. In the 
rhetorical tradition, technê also refers to the extensive handbook tradition that today is akin to 
technical manuals and public speaking textbooks. Janet Atwill, “Techné,” in Encyclopedia of 
Rhetoric and Composition: Communication From Ancient Times to the Information Age, ed. 
Theresa Enos (New York: Garland, 1996), 719.  
48 Atwill, “Techné,” 719. 
49 Quoted in Leroy G. Dorsey, The Presidency and Rhetorical Leadership (College Station: 
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 Anxiety regarding the appearance of technê in public deliberation causes 
practitioners to go to great lengths to conceal their work. I will illustrate, for example, how 
theorists and practitioners of dialogue and deliberation conceal technique in order to appear 
natural.50 The denigration of rhetoric as a technology for human craft has been manifest in 
the denigration of the entire realm of the technical vis-à-vis the denigration of handbooks and 
how-to manuals in antiquity. This denigration persists to this day in anxieties regarding 
communication technologies that fail to conquer the distance between people. After the 2008 
U.S. presidential election, conservatives and Republicans frequently cited a national speech 
that Obama delivered from a grade school classroom using a teleprompter. Minnesota 
Governor Tim Pawlenty mentioned the speech while addressing the Conservative Political 
Action Committee in the wake of 2008's wave of Democrat victories, “Did you see, by the 
way, the other day?... President Obama was in a grade school classroom… speaking to 
elementary children, and he was using teleprompters. I mean, you've got to be kidding me. 
That's not a joke. That's a real story.”51 This is the view of the technical sphere as dystopia: 
the ideal communal past destroyed by the artifice of technology. In the cold and heartless 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Texas A&M Univeristy Press, 2002), 5.  
50 Rob Anderson, Ken Cissna, and Ron Arnett claim that technology and technique are facets 
of culture that stand in the way of immediate connection and authentic presence. “Dialogue's 
Limits,” in The Reach of Dialogue, 54. 
51 Steven Thomma, “Pawlenty Repeats False Tale About Obama Teleprompter.” McClatchy 
(blog), February 19, 2010, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/02/19/86508 /pawlenty-
repeats-false-tale-about.html#.UjObeGTwKQk. 
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technological future imagined in films in which robots have taken over humanity, this vision 
of technê as cold calculation destroys the soul of humanity.52 
 Jonathan Sterne claims that there is a tendency in accounts of communication to 
consider speech to be non-technological. The “primacy of speech” assumes that technology 
is added to speech in order to produce mediated forms of communication.53 As Sterne notes, 
this “add technology and stir” model of communication tends to blame technology for 
individuals’ alienation and communities’ decline. To reject rhetoric because it is 
technological and, therefore, artificial in the pursuit of unmediated communication imagines 
an extra-rhetorical pipeline between humans. This is unscripted speech as self-presence and 
tends to mistakenly entail the assumption of what Walter Ong describes as the “prior 
presence of an extramental referent which the word presumably captures and passes on 
through a kind of pipeline to the psyche.”54  
Speech/Writing/Presence 
 Understanding rhetoric as technological helps to explain anxieties regarding artifice 
and human agency in speech. Anxiety regarding written speech scripts is a persistent 
rehearsal of the metaphysics of presence that Jacques Derrida sought to deconstruct.55 In 
addition to the ontological question of presence, there is a discourse of presence (e.g., 
                                                            
52 In describing the dystopic role of technology for a society in need of dialogue, William 
Barrett laments the technical sphere because true genius and creativity are beyond the reach 
of technique. “Technique, Technicians, and Philosophy,” in The Reach of Dialogue, 58. 
53 Sterne, “Communication as Techné,” 96. 
54 Ong, Orality and Literacy, 163. 
55 For Derrida, the metaphysics of presence, wherein “to be” is to be present, leads to the 
unnecessary dichotomy of the privileging of speech over writing because the speaker is taken 
to be more present in the speech than the author of a written text. See Jacques Derrida, Of 
Grammatology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 
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“speaking from the heart”) that governs audience expectations of persuasive speech and 
writing. Western civilization since the Greeks has been characterized by a near-total fixation 
on “presence” that implies a particular notion of human voice that wells up from the soul of 
the speaker unless it is obscured by a technological mechanism that controls what may be 
avowed. Such an emphasis on presence leads to the unnecessary privileging of speech over 
writing; the speaker is taken to be more present in the speech than the author is in the written 
text.56 For example, Walter Ong refers to the “mask” of a writer that must always address a 
fictional audience. “Oral communication,” Ong writes, “has within it a momentum that 
works for the removal of masks.”57 He continues, “no matter what pitch of frankness, 
directness, or authenticity he [sic] may strive for, the writer’s mask and the reader’s are less 
removable than those of the oral communicator and his hearer.”58  
Lurking within this discourse concerning the primacy of speech is the aforementioned 
dream of perfect communication. However, speech is also necessarily mediated by distance. 
When we rid ourselves of the notion of perfect communication, we recognize that the 
speaker, too, always wears a mask. This is because all public speech involves the use of 
artifice; there can be no direct encounter of the speaker’s soul. The mask of the speaker may 
be less visible but all the more powerful as a result. Considering writing to be less direct, 
Ong maintains that speech is nobler because, without the indirections of writing, the true 
nature of the human can be found.59 
                                                            
56 Ibid.  
57 “The Writer's Audience Is Always a Fiction,” PMLA 90, no. 1 (1975): 425.  
58 Ibid., 426.  
59 “Writer's Audience,” 427.  
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Rhetoric, Deliberation, and Democracy 
 Rhetoric plays an essentially ambivalent role in democracy by both allowing 
democracy to actualize its ideals and threatening those ideals. Rhetoric can enable citizens to 
exercise their rights and responsibilities and can limit these rights or violate these 
responsibilities. As Garsten observes, persuasive speech is prone to two corruptions because 
of its necessary relation to democracy: a speaker may manipulate an audience and a speaker 
may flatter an audience. “The two vices thus arise from the dual character of persuasion 
itself,” he explains, which, like democracy, “consists partly in ruling and partly in 
following.”60 As a result, rhetoric is, to evoke Derrida’s use of an ancient Greek term, a 
pharmakon: an elixir caught in the ambiguity between medicine and poison.61 This 
dissertation does not clarify this ambiguity but uses it to account for the persistent 
concealment of rhetoric in public deliberation. I seek to understand the conditions of what 
American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey suggested was the central problem of the 
American public: the sorry state of “the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and 
persuasion.”62 Ultimately, I am defending the role of rhetoric in democracy and rejecting the 
overvaluation of immediacy.  
The cleavage between mediation and immediacy is foundational to the development 
of the discipline of communication studies. In the terms of interpersonal research, immediacy 
is the perception of physical and/or psychological closeness as indicated by behaviors such as 
                                                            
60 Saving Persuasion, 2.  
61 Derrida’s notion of the pharmakon is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two.  
62 The Public and Its Problems (Denver: Swallow, [1927] 1957), 208.  
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eye contact, smiling, vocal expressiveness, and so on.63 In communication pedagogy, there is 
a challenge to cultivate a sense of immediacy in the context of digital learning—the mediated 
classroom introduces both physical and psychological distance between teacher and 
student.64 In performance studies, liveness refers to a dimension of immediacy, one that is in 
crisis in a mediatized culture.65 Rhetoric has a long tradition of training speakers how to 
overcome the suspicion that their speech is mediated by self-interest, ideology, or ill will and 
how to achieve a sense of closeness with an audience. These disciplinary examples indicate a 
general tendency to value certain speech practices that are thought to offer immediacy; 
immediacy has acquired a normative quality that can limit the critical potential of 
communication research and teaching. The discipline of communication studies has 
historically borne a deep commitment to deliberation and privileged immediacy. In the early 
days of communication departments, almost every class related to the practice of public 
                                                            
63 Janis F. Andersen, Peter A. Andersen, and Arthur D. Jensen, “The Measurement of 
Nonverbal Immediacy,” Journal of Applied Communication Research 7, no. 2 (1979); Scott 
A. Myers and Megan F. Ferry, “Interpersonal Communication Motives and Nonverbal 
Immediacy Behaviors,” Communication Research Reports 18, no. 2 (2001); Paul L. Witt, 
Lawrence R. Wheeless, and Mike Allen, “A Meta-Analytical Review of the Relationship 
between Teacher Immediacy and Student Learning,” Communication Monographs 71, no. 2 
(2004); Barbara M. Montgomery, “Verbal Immediacy As a Behavioral Indicator Of Open 
Communication Content,” Communication Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1981); Timothy P. Mottet 
and Virginia P. Richmond, “An Inductive Analysis of Verbal Immediacy: Alternative 
Conceptualization of Relational Verbal Communication,” Communication Quarterly 46, no. 
1 (1998); Graham D. Bodie and Susanne M. Jones, “The Nature of Supportive Listening II: 
The Role of Verbal Person Centeredness and Nonverbal Immediacy,” Western Journal of 
Communication 76, no. 3 (2012). 
64 Lori J. Carrell and Kent E. Menzel, “Variations in Learning, Motivation, and Perceived 
Immediacy Between Live and Distance Education Classrooms,” Communication Education 
50, no. 3 (2001). 
65 Philip Auslander, Liveness: Performance in a Mediatized Culture, 2nd ed. ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2008).  
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speech and modes of deliberation such as debate.66 Democratic speech is thought to offer 
immediacy between citizen and society. 
 Embracing natural style and sincere expression functions to obviate ideological 
critique. Sincerity is ideological in that it denies ideology by promising direct representation 
without mediation and, therefore, without the possibility of distortion. In the terms of 
rhetorical theory, the invention of sincere expression (e.g., unscripted speech) accomplishes 
this by functioning as an artistic means of persuasion that announces itself as “non-artistic.” 
Non-artistic proofs work in large part because they are regarded as direct evidence, such as 
eyewitness testimony in a courtroom. A representation that is considered to naturally emerge 
is valorized as being extra-rhetorical and beyond the reach of ideological distortion. Sincerity 
is also often regarded as being naturally emergent or non-artistic as opposed to being 
invented by speakers and audiences through performances and their receptions.  
We need to recover discursive space for rhetorical criticism by noting the rhetorical 
character and effects of that which is purported to be non-rhetorical. In the case of public 
deliberation, this is often packaged as the sincere speaker. The cinematic moment of the 
speaker tearing up the script or looking away from the teleprompter and speaking from the 
heart works for staging a dramatic moment, but sincerity is not a natural result of a speaker 
giving an audience unmediated access to interior substance.  
Chapters 
                                                            
66 Gustav W. Friedrich and Don M. Boileau, “The Communication Discipline,” in Teaching 
Communication: Theory, Research, and Methods, ed. John Daly, Gustav W. Friedrich, and 
Anita L. Vangelisti (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1999), 7. However, debate was not sufficient, 
and, as William Keith has detailed, the fact that debaters were taught how to advocate both 
sides only fueled the suspicion that speakers only seem to speak from the heart. William 
Keith has detailed the 1930s and 1940s rise of discussion in speech pedagogy from disquiet 
regarding intercollegiate debate. See Democracy as Discussion: Civic Education and the 
American Forum Movement (New York: Lexington, 2007), chapter 1. 
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In Chapter Two I begin with the original problem of artifice for rhetoric in the 
classical period in Athens (ca. 508 – 322 BCE). I note that artifice needs to be carefully 
practiced and hidden and that Plato and Isocrates work out this paradox differently. Plato 
values immediate modes of speech because mediation, such as writing, is for him a 
fundamentally artificial construction of appearance. Plato’s rejection of rhetoric and writing 
emanates from his understanding of the relation between truth (aletheia) and knowledge 
(gnōsis), in particular, the highest form of knowledge (epistēmē): to know the truth is to 
unconceal it. In contrast, Isocrates placed writing at the center of good thinking. Isocrates 
defended the use of logography for the betterment of civil society and presented a case for 
what I will call, “rhetorical literacy”: the learned skill of creating and interpreting morally 
prudent persuasive discourse. Isocrates was keenly aware of the performativity of public life. 
Rhetorical literacy allows a speaker to become aware of public performances and their 
receptions.  
I argue that the battle between philosophy and rhetoric, here represented by Plato and 
Isocrates, was prompted in part by an anxiety over mediation in the emerging technological 
frontier of writing.67 Their different approaches to rhetorical technê change the role of the 
citizen and take differing views on the nature of communication agency. Because Plato (427 
– 347 BCE) is concerned with the attainment of transcendent, absolute Truth, he is invested 
in immediacy as a method for the unmediated relation to the forms. Because Isocrates (436 – 
338 BCE) seeks the perfection of civic life through moral and prudent political wisdom, his 
philosophy is concerned with effective public performance and civic education. For 
                                                            
67 As Robert Hariman describes, Plato’s denigration of rhetoric also served to elevate his 
philosophical program. “Status, Marginality, and Rhetorical Theory,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 72 (1986): 40.  
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Isocrates, rhetoric is a new technology for public communication in the nascent context of 
democracy. While Plato, suspicious of public speech, sought to deny rhetorical mediation, 
Isocrates valued rhetoric as a critical tool for civic life. He was critically aware of the 
importance of ēthos and believed firmly in the capacity for rhetoric to reflect a speaker’s 
virtuous character.68  
In Chapters Three and Four, I turn to two contemporary cases beginning with a 
context considered to be rife with artifice: political campaigns. In this context, where 
audience attention to artifice is vigilant, there arises a set of normative conditions that govern 
the use of artifice. In Chapter Three, I discuss how the problem of artifice prompts both a 
crisis of ēthos for political speakers and an opportunity for opponents to strategically point 
out the presence of artifice. To illustrate what is here termed “high-tech style,” the 2012 
presidential election is employed. Popular criticism of Governor Mitt Romney and President 
Barack Obama often attended to the artifice of their speech. Discourse concerning Obama’s 
teleprompter indicates a broader denigration of technological mediation and the dream of 
unmediated communication. Finally, I illustrate low-tech style in speeches in which there is 
little or no attention to artifice. I focus on President George W. Bush’s speeches and the myth 
of unmediated speech in the use of the bullhorn as an allegorical tool to indicate the tendency 
for some technologies to more successfully allow a speaker to conceal her or his rhetorical 
craft. 
Chapter Four examines a context that promises more direct communication: dialogue 
and deliberation. I examine how the appearance of unmediated communication in facilitated 
dialogue and deliberation requires active concealment and denial of technique. From their 
                                                            
68 Hyde, “Introduction,” xv.  
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inception, the two methods that are examined in this chapter are quite different. Open Space 
Technology (OST) begins without any written agenda while National Issues Forums (NIF) 
structures interaction with prefigured topics and questions. While OST might appear to be 
less staged than NIF and, therefore, more natural, they both rely on the concealment of the 
artifice of their technique. OST conceals technique through the themes of simplicity, 
voluntary action, and ordinariness. As a method, it is framed as the absence of complex and 
overbearing structures that impede human creativity. Instead, OST purports to be a natural 
way of self-organization. NIF is more formal and structured and conceals through the use of 
questioning, naming, and framing. The formal apparatus that NIF deploys in deliberations is 
designed to divert attention away from its deliberative form and the choices that were made 
in framing the issue at hand. 
While all three cases (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) include examples of speech that are 
purportedly less artificial, all rhetorical practice involves artifice. However, the demand to 
appear without artifice raises a critical paradox for political speech: an orator does not appear 
unmediated without mediating speech with techniques that produce that appearance. I argue 
that whenever speech is valorized as being immediate, direct, or unmediated, a concealed 
form of mediation is at work. Valorizing speech as immediate is itself a form of rhetorical 
mediation—albeit one that functions by attempting to conceal the presence of artifice. 
Because of the successful concealment of mediation, these speech practices are less likely to 
be analyzed critically by citizens and rhetorical critics alike. I will argue that more thoughtful 
analyses of the techniques of sincerity and other forms of immediacy will enable better 
participation in a democracy that depends on persuasive communication. 
  
 
CHAPTER 2: LOGOGRAPHY IN ATHENS: PLATO VS. ISOCRATES 
In Greek antiquity, when a King needed unadulterated advice, he often turned to an 
oracle. The oracle offered wisdom not through intellectual or moral excellence but divine 
inspiration made possible by an immediate connection to the gods. Similarly, the Muses of 
Greek mythology represented the inspired sources of human knowledge. A poet, for 
example, was eloquent if and only if the gods smiled upon him. The oracle and the poet 
benefited from eudaimonia, literally “being moved by a good spirit.”1 For centuries of Greek 
culture, human knowledge was thought to be a gift from the gods. What held true for kings 
and poets did not extend to the political sphere, where public speakers did not enjoy the 
notion of divinely inspired eloquence and were often met with great distrust. In the context of 
Athenian democracy surging and retreating with the fits of political victory and loss, Greeks 
feared that an unscrupulous speaker could employ technê (craft knowledge) to imitate 
eudaimonia, bolster ēthos, and gain the public’s assent.2 As a decidedly human skill, technê 
                                                            
1 Eudaimonia is often translated as “happiness,” but it signifies more than a positive feeling 
or sentiment—it encompasses the best of human life which, for the Greeks, was possible 
through the will of the gods. See Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins, “Introduction,” in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan D. Collins (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011), x.      
2 See Richard Leo Enos, Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle (Anderson, SC: Parlor Press, 1993), 
1. Negative attitudes toward persuasion and charming speech in ancient Greece were 
common. See Hesk, Deception and Democracy. The gift of an eloquent tongue was both 
cherished and reviled—there was an awareness that persuasion was a great force, and one 
that could be overwhelming. The myth of Peitho, the feared Greek goddess of persuasion and 
seduction, represents these attitudes. The notion that an eloquent speaker’s persuasiveness 
was a coercive force is indicated by the common depiction of Peitho fleeing the scene of a 
rape, carrying a ball of binding twine. Aaron J. Atsma, “Peitho: Greek Goddess of 
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enables craft production and invention and represents a shifting balance of power between 
humanity and the gods.3 
As secularity emerged in Greek antiquity, truth (aletheia) was not divinely inspired 
but discovered through human creative invention. In the absence of divinely inspired 
knowledge, individual opinion (doxa) became a legitimate form of knowledge.4 Attention to 
rhetoric as a technê for persuasion emerged from this shifting source of truth.5 The 
assumption was that inspired speech did not rely upon any technology to mediate the divine; 
the speaker was not applying technique or showing their mastery of a certain technê (craft). 
Alternately, with the aid of rhetoric, the fear that a speaker could inauthentically evidence 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Persuasion,” in Theoi Project, accessed October 25, 2013, http://www.theoi.com/Daimon/ 
Peitho.html. Isocrates claims that those who are envious of good speakers are disrespectful to 
Peitho. He says that while they regard her as a god, those who wish to share her power are 
being corrupted by evil desire. Isocrates I (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), 15.249. 
The notion of evil desire being at the base of persuasion is found in contemporary approaches 
to rhetoric, too. Wayne Brockeiede argues that rhetors rape, seduce, or love their audiences. 
The first two alternatives are motivated by the rhetor’s desire to gain assent at any cost, 
including manipulation and trickery. The lover, however, implies immediacy in that the 
loving rhetor treats the other as equal and values the relationship at stake more than the goal 
of gaining assent. “Arguers As Lovers,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 5, no. 1 (1972). For the 
ancient Greeks, a silver tongue was known to be seductive, but unlike a lover, the persuader 
might not be motivated by goodwill. 
3 Atwill, “Technê,” 719. 
4 Takis Poulakos and David J. Depew, Isocrates And Civic Education, 1st ed. (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2004). 46-47. the term is used by literary figures such as Homer to 
refer to skill and art—and even deception. For Aristotle, technê refers to productive 
knowledge (poesis). As such, Aristotle compares medicine, architecture, poetics, and rhetoric 
because they all are associated with “making.” In the history of rhetoric, the term refers to 
“the extensive handbook tradition of rhetoric that reportedly goes back to Corax and Tisias in 
the fifth century B.C.E.” Janet Atwill, “Technê,” 719.  
5 Rhetoric became the practice of honing one’s thoughts and communicating them for a 
desired effect. In fact, we can separate rhetoric from earlier forms of public speech by noting 
the self-aware use of technique published in fifth-century handbooks, as opposed to the 
earlier focus on divine inspiration as the source of persuasive effect.  
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good will was only made worse by the introduction of a new media technology: writing. The 
introduction of writing highlighted an already fraught relationship between technê and 
authentic speech. The written script was a visible reminder of the strategy that came between 
what orators thought and what they said.  
In this chapter, I will take up the problem of writing in Greek antiquity to discuss how 
the emergence and denigration of rhetoric during the classical period in Athens (ca. 508 – 
322 BCE) relates to the privileging of immediacy in political speech (politikoi logoi). 
Athenian culture lay in the shadow of tyranny and perched at the precipice of democracy 
while simultaneously making the critical transition from orality to literacy. I argue that the 
battle between philosophy and rhetoric, here represented by Plato and Isocrates, was 
prompted, in part, by an anxiety over mediation in this emerging technological frontier of 
writing. Plato and Isocrates offer different rhetorical programs based on their notions of the 
ideal civic life. Because Plato (427 – 347 BCE) was concerned with the attainment of ideal 
forms, he was invested in immediacy as a method for the unmediated relation to the forms. 
Isocrates sought the perfection of civic life through moral and prudent political wisdom, and, 
therefore, his philosophy was concerned with effective public performance and civic 
education. For Isocrates (436 – 338 BCE), rhetoric was a new technology for public 
communication in the nascent context of democracy.  
The mediation of speech is a problem for the cultivation of knowledge if it is assumed 
that true knowledge, under natural conditions, wells forth from the speaker’s soul like pure 
wine from an unadulterated bottle. Under such a Platonic rubric, the mediation of speech by a 
script is a barrier to the highest form of knowledge (epistēmē) because the script signaled a 
separation of speech from the form it attempted to represent. Plato favored the Socratic 
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dialectical method over logography because, he insisted, it allowed an interlocutor to 
discover truth rather than create the appearance of truth.6 For Plato, the dialectical method 
did not rely upon imitation, persuasion, and lower forms of knowledge such as common 
sense and popular opinion (doxa).  
Scholars have long noticed the fact that Plato’s denigration of rhetoric was itself 
rhetorical. Famed Roman orator Cicero (106 – 46 BCE) remarked, “What most surprised me 
about Plato… was that it seemed to me that as he was in the process of ridiculing rhetors he 
himself appeared to be the foremost rhetor.”7 Scholars have noted Plato and others in 
antiquity using a “rhetoric of anti-rhetoric” that functioned to bolster their persuasiveness by 
denigrating rhetoric.8 This scholarship helps critics understand the anti-rhetorical notion of 
“mere rhetoric,” but it fails to provide a complete image of the rhetorical tradition by 
appreciating how rhetoric is also derided through its quiet obliteration. Rhetorical scholarship 
has overlooked the persistent and pernicious effect of the rhetoric of non-rhetoric that, I 
argue, stems from Plato’s pursuit of unmediated communication for his philosophical project.  
Isocrates valued the role of human agency in the cultivation of a good society. He 
believed in the morally prudent possibility of communities to design and implement just 
policies that required design of effective rhetoric. Isocrates defended instruction in rhetoric 
                                                            
6 Plato, “Gorgias,” in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including The Letters, ed. 
Huntington Cairns and Edith Hamilton (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 
448d10, 57e-58a, 59d-e.  
7 W. Kendrick Pritchett, “Commentary,” in On Thucydides, ed. W. Kendrick Pritchett 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 1.11.47.  
8 Hesk, Deception And Democracy, chap. 4; Markovits, The Politics Of Sincerity, 74-77. The 
rhetoric of anti-rhetoric is an ēthos strategy that constrasts one’s message with messages 
designed to persuade. The implication, or explicit statement, is that the speaker is to be 
trusted because they do not practice rhetoric and the speech at hand is frank speech as 
opposed to a designed appeal. 
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because he believed that training in the arts of language (logos) was central to humanity. He 
challenged his students to achieve more than good ends and to perceive how all individual 
ends are tied to a greater social good. He advocated for a public rhetoric capable of 
moralizing Athens by instructing its citizens. He defended his school as a place where future 
leaders would learn to speak about important civic matters. He had such a high standard for 
rhetorical literacy that his defense of the civic role of rhetoric required writing as a means for 
careful and deliberate design.  
Isocrates’ defense of rhetoric prefigures his defense of the mediation of writing 
because logography allowed for the careful design of civic rhetoric that he believed was 
essential for Athenian society. He defended the use of logography by presenting a case for 
what I will call rhetorical literacy: the learned skill of creating and interpreting morally 
prudent persuasive discourse. Isocrates embraced the contingency of rhetoric, insisting that 
those who developed good opinions (doxai) to guide their behavior acted more justly than 
those who claimed knowledge (epistēmē). Rhetorical literacy is essential for citizens to make 
public judgments and evaluate others’ opinions. For Isocrates, rhetorical literacy was 
essential for political life because decisions regarding the most important matters could never 
be based on certainty.  
For Isocrates, writing was an essential technê because it allowed for good thinking on 
complex public issues. In this way, rhetoric was not only compatible with philosophy; it was 
philosophy because it was the art of deliberate thought. While he lamented speech writing 
geared toward self-interested strategies, such as flattery, he valued the critical reflection that 
writing afforded. His method sought a balance between the morally desirable and politically 
possible. One of the problems with Isocrates in the rhetorical tradition that has required some 
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recovery is that, in part because he lived in the midst of the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric, he rarely 
used the term “rhetoric” to describe his own work, instead referring to it as “instruction in 
philosophy” (though he does occasionally use the adjective form, “rhetorical” (rhētorikos).9 
Isocrates emerged at a time when a rhetorician was taken to be a profiteering fraud. I use 
“rhetoric” to describe his professional pursuit because Isocrates was a teacher, first and 
foremost, and a center piece of his subject was how citizen-leaders could craft oratory 
capable of improving Athenian society through the craft of persuasion.  
 Because the goal of this study is to provide a robust account of anxieties about the 
scripting of speech, classical Athens, which saw the inception of writing as a mechanism for 
public rhetorical exchange, is a useful place to focus if we would like to grasp the 
relationship between writing as a sign of technê and means of exercising technê and anxieties 
about insincere and unethical speech.10 Writing exploded during the classical period, in the 
midst of democratic reforms, and had a profound impact on Greek life and culture.11 In this 
                                                            
9 David C. Mirhady and Yun Lee Too, “Introduction to Isocrates,” in Isocrates I, ed. David 
C. Mirhady and Yun Lee Too (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), 8.  
10 The relationship between orality and literacy is even more complicated for this study 
because in classical Athens, there is no neat division between written texts and oral 
performances. It was common for written works to be designed for oral performance. See 
Rosalind Thomas, “Prose Performance Texts: Epideixis and Written Publication in the Late 
Fifth and Early Fourth Centuries,” in Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in 
Ancient Greece, ed. Harvey Yunis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 163.  
11 There is some disagreement regarding how best to think about these impacts. Eric 
Havelock represents a broad and universalizing approach to thinking about the effects of 
writing in antiquity. Preface to Plato (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963); 
Literate Revolution; The Muse Learns to Write: Reflections on Orality and Literacy From 
Antiquity to the Present (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986). In particular, he 
argued that the abstraction of the Greek alphabet promoted abstract thinking. I follow Harvey 
Yunis and others who find that Havelock’s approach is too general to be properly supported 
and to account for specific cultural practices. “Introduction: Why Written Texts?,” in Written 
Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece, ed. Harvey Yunis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9. 
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moment of cultural change we are able to observe discourse that reflects the anxieties of the 
emergence of a new media technology.12 As is common for new media technologies, the 
arrival of writing as a technology for political community spurred debate regarding its 
normative status.  
Democratic Speech in Athens 
 By the time that Plato and Isocrates were opening their schools (ca. 387 BCE and ca. 
392 BCE), Athenian oral culture was beginning the transition to literate culture, but the 
public square was thoroughly organized around spoken addresses. A simple fact illustrates 
the oral nature of classical Athenian public life: there were no lecterns in the agora.13 It was 
unthinkable for speakers to have a script in their hand while they were addressing the polis.14 
As classicist Johan Schloemann explains, the presence of the written text was too “closely 
connected with a suspicion against an intellectual specialization and expertise that was 
associated with the use of books and writing.”15  
 In the time period that Plato and Isocrates were teaching and writing, the protracted 
Peloponnesian War ended (404 BCE) and the Thirty Tyrants were expelled (403 BCE). At 
                                                            
12 As Carolyn Marvin notes, it is useful to return to the site of emergence, before anxieties 
have been internalized and tensions have been incorporated. When Old Technologies Were 
New: Thinking About Communications in the Late Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988).  
13 Johan Schloemann, “Entertainment and Democratic Distrust: The Audience's Attitudes 
Towards Oral and Written Oratory in Classical Athens,” in Epea and Grammata: Oral and 
Written Communication in Ancient Greece, ed. Ian Worthington and John Miles Foley 
(Boston: Brill, 2002), 135; George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1963). 3-9. 
14 Schloemann, “Entertainment And Democratic Distrust,” 136. 
15 Ibid. 
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the start of the fourth century, Athens lay bruised and battered, but democracy was restored.16 
Athenian democrats valued speech and rejected the ways that the tyrants had silenced them. 
The Athenian legal concept of isegoria (equality of speech) protected the right of citizens to 
address the assembly (ecclesia). While political speech—the kind of civic discourse that was 
referred to as politikoi logoi, was a cherished component of democracy, it was unnerving 
enough that it was common for each assembly meeting to begin with a herald proclaiming a 
curse against anyone who would come to the speaker’s platform and deceive the people.17 
Athenians were highly concerned with the techniques of political speech and were relentless 
pursuers of deceptive performance.18  
As a result of this suspicion and uncertainty regarding democratic speech, various 
protocols were designed to prevent deceitful, unwise, or insincere advice by punishing the 
speaker in question.19 These speech protocols still demanded oratorical skill, for the right to 
                                                            
16 Prior to the Peloponnesian War, there had been numerous democratic institutions in 
Athens. John V. A. Fine, The Ancient Greeks: A Critical History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1983), 383. Notably, more census classes were eligible to hold public 
office, and for the first time in recorded history, pay for government service allowed the non-
wealthy to pursue public service. Ibid., 391-92. In addition, a large number of officials were 
appointed by lot. Ibid., 403-05.    
17 Ibid., 409.  
18 Hesk, Deception And Democracy, 203-04. Hesk suggests that the anti-rhetorical reflections 
of orators explain why democracy survived for as long as it did because this helped to 
prevent deception. But rhetoric is not the same as deception, and what is ironic about these 
anti-rhetorical speeches is that they are deeply rhetorical. I would disagree with Hesk, and 
instead say that there is a benefit, to a point, to the diligence that democratic culture employs 
in rooting out deception. However, this benefit is outstripped because eventually we have just 
invented rather tortured ways of denying the artifice of public speech. Schloemann argues 
that this duel demand for entertaining performances and a mistrust for persuasive technique 
created an ambivalence in the Athenian public culture that both sustained and mistrusted 
rhetoric. Schloemann, “Entertainment and Democratic Distrust,” 135. 
19 Susan Monoson, Plato's Democratic Entanglements: Athenian Politics and the Practice of 
Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 59. 
  37 
speak did not mean that the several thousand, often unruly men would listen.20 Such 
protocols sought to constrain the ill effects of deceptive speech in the hands of a self-
interested speaker who might pander to the demos.21 Yet these protocols were insufficient for 
controlling democratic speech and a set of virtues emerged from the context of democratic 
suspicion. These virtues were meant to reflect good character, and good character was 
expected to secure good speech practices (speech that was wise, thoughtful, and so on).  
In general, these virtues reflected the prevailing value afforded to conditions of 
immediacy: virtuous speakers had a close connection to their audience, cared for their 
audience, and presented their true selves to their audience. These virtues implied that 
speaking subjects were endowed with the agency to speak, access to their unmediated 
thoughts and feelings, and morally compelled them to speak the truth despite any danger 
posed.22 Sincere expression, in the form of frank speech (parrhesia) thusly became the 
hallmark virtue of democratic speech.  
 Attendant to the right to speak (isegoria) was the duty to speak boldly. It was 
common for orators to defend harsh advice because flattery would be a disservice to their 
role as advisor to the demos.23 According to political theorist Susan Monoson, “to speak with 
parrhesia was to confront, oppose, or find fault with another individual or a popular view in 
                                                            
20 Ibid., 58-59. 
21 Ibid., 59. 
22 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001), 
15.  
23 Monoson, Plato's Democratic Entanglements, 53. In the world of theatre, parrhesia was 
more common in comedy than drama, where characters would insult real, elite figures as well 
as Athenian society. 
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a spirit of concern for illuminating what is right and best.”24 It described speech that was not 
reserved, overly ornate, or designed for personal gain.25 Parrhesia implied a relationship of 
sincerity between the speaker and the utterance because, among other things, the speaker was 
not expressing only selected thoughts.26 As Michel Foucault explains, the parrhesiastes 
(frank speaker) claims to use the most direct expression possible to communicate, eschewing 
any technical device, such as rhetoric, that might help to gain assent: 
The speaker [avoids] any kind of rhetorical form which would veil what he thinks. 
Instead, the parrhesiastes uses the most direct words and forms of expression he can 
find. Whereas rhetoric provides the speaker with technical devices to help him prevail 
upon the minds of his audience (regardless of the rhetoricians own opinion 
concerning what he says), in parrhesia, the parrheriastes acts on other people's minds 
by showing them as directly as possible what he actually believes.27 
 
As Foucault’s explanation of parrhesia illustrates, parrhesia is highly compatible with a 
rhetoric of non-rhetoric because it purports to demonstrate opinion without rhetorical form. 
In the anti-technological contrast of rhetoric’s “technical” status, parrhesia promises a direct, 
immediate connection. 
Writing and Logography 
 Before it became widespread, writing was mostly restricted to dedications inscribed 
on monuments and religious artifacts.28 Even as its use became more widespread in the 
fourth century, large sections of the populace had little reason to learn to read or write; oral 
                                                            
24 Ibid. 
25 Markovits, The Politics of Sincerity, 65. 
26 Monoson, Plato's Democratic Entanglements, 53. 
27 Foucault, Fearless Speech, 12. 
28 Yunis, “Introduction,” 4. It is no wonder, then, that one of the first uses of written speech 
was commemorative speeches. The permanence of writing, it seems, was almost immediately 
appealing. 
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communication still allowed them to be aware of public matters, written texts were often 
performed aloud, and key rituals were oral.29 Citizens who could read usually performed 
aloud, allowing anyone in earshot to share in the experience.30 Only about one-third of 
citizens could read and write.31 The literate class included both elites and slaves, so, at one 
time, writing was specialized but not exclusively elite.32 During this period of expansion, oral 
communication persisted in a stable form while the complexity of written texts increased 
rapidly.33  
 Parrhesia in classical Athens was a dividing line between good and bad speech, 
rather than indicating a quality of writing. The crisis of parrhesia for writing does not arrive 
until logography, as the confluence of the new technology of writing and the old practice of 
public speaking. The term “logography” originates with early efforts to record history in 
                                                            
29 Ibid., 6. 
30 Rosalind Thomas, “Literacy,” in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed. Simon Hornblower 
and Anthony Spawforth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
31 Ibid. Athenian democracy is thought to be a high water mark of literacy in the classic 
Western world. 
32 See Yunis, “Introduction: Why Written Texts?,” 6. Slaves often worked as scribes and 
accountants while elite citizens wrote, read, and shared texts regarding politics, art, science, 
and philosophy. This was elite in that writing was not just about functionality, but the ability 
to reflect on writings and distribute copies. 
33 See ibid. By the late sixth century BCE, inscriptions on stone regarding laws, honors, and 
memorials were more common. In addition, documents were recorded on easier-to-transport 
papyrus so that Athens proud culture could be communicated abroad. Literary documents 
were collected in a new institution: libraries. Technical treaties were printed on various 
topics, such as medicine, music, and rhetoric, but they were circulated more to demonstrate 
the skill of the teacher than to train a student. Letters both public and personal became more 
popular. New media specialists known as scribes were used to write contracts in order to hold 
people to their inscribed word. Still, Greek communities mostly relied upon face-to-face, 
public settings for the transmission of oral discourse such as the theatre, the agora, and the 
assembly. Ibid., 4. 
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written form and denotes the use of a writing instrument. Even at its inception, logography 
was met with suspicion. Historical logographers used prose style, but kept certain poetic 
devices, such as the use of myth and legend, leading some to claim that the focus was on 
beauty instead of accuracy. Writers gained a reputation of sacrificing “historical accuracy” 
for the pleasing effects of style.34 Not everyone found the Ionian historical logographers to be 
manipulative, however. Writing in the first century BCE, Dionysius of Halicarnassus referred 
to their style as lucid, clear, pure, concise, and “not revealing any elaborate art in 
composition.”35 This effort to depict early logography as unaffected historical accounts is the 
subject of extensive debate and reveals a chief strategy for defending artifice: the use of 
sincerity.36 As an extension of the aforementioned rhetoric of anti-rhetoric, this effort was a 
strategy for elevating some historical accounts as sincere in contrast to those designed for 
effect by an author. In this way sincerity gets deployed to discipline the exercise of rhetorical 
art in the context of human invention. By claiming that the Ionian style is unaffected, 
Dionysius asserts that there is no gap between what is observed and what is recorded, writing 
that their historical accounts are delivered “just as they [are] received… without adding 
thereto or subtracting therefrom.”37 
The suspicion of early historical logography carried on to the later use of writing for 
political speeches. The specialized training required to master the new technology of writing 
resonates with the general tendency of new media technologies to bring with them a 
                                                            
34 Enos, Greek Rhetoric, 25. 
35 Ibid.; Dionysius, On Thucydides, trans. W. Kendrick Pritchett (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975). 
36 See Pritchett, “Commentary,” 54n20. 
37 Dionysius, On Thucydides, 331; Enos, Greek Rhetoric, 25. 
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suspicion or unease with technical experts.38 The new generation of politicians were hiring 
logographers or learning how to write speeches in order to fulfill their own political 
ambitions.39 When written speeches became prominent around 430 BCE, attention to the 
techniques being employed increased.40 Speakers were taught to mix ordinary language with 
complex phrases so as not to seem overly prepared. The written speech also exacerbated this 
problem of appearance through false expertise wherein people could read about a topic and 
feign having experience. In addition to the problem of fake knowledge through written craft, 
logography also highlighted the problem of insincere relationships between speakers or 
authors and their audiences. The use of writing for speech, it was feared, allowed a speaker to 
feign immediacy with the audience. The appearance of friendship could be strategically 
cultivated, but a true friend says what is needed, not what is pleasant to hear. A speaker could 
pose as a friend, flatter the audience, and make them feel close enough to trust.  
 The denigration of logography occurs in tandem with the denigration of rhetoric and 
the sophists. While “rhetor” had referred broadly to someone who spoke in public, by the late 
fourth century, the notion that rhetoricians were a suspect class was common, and they were 
associated with written speeches. By then, it was a common tactic to charge that an opponent 
was reading a speech that had been practiced beforehand.41 It was at this time that sophists 
became a suspect class, and they were associated with the practice of logography. 
Logography was so completely associated with rhetoric and the sophists that Isocrates, never 
                                                            
38 Marvin, When Old Technologies Were New. 
39 Yun Lee Too, The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates: Text, Power, Pedagogy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 90, 115. 
40 Schloemann, “Entertainment And Democratic Distrust,” 137. 
41 Hesk, Deception And Democracy, 210n26. 
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calling himself a rhetor, distanced himself from the sophists while defending the practice of 
writing.  
 The suspicion of oratorical practice and the power of its persuasive effects produced a 
“rhetoric of anti-rhetoric,” wherein speakers lambast rhetoric in order to achieve a persuasive 
effect of their own.42 This practice of concealment worked to draw attention away from the 
speaker’s craft and reveal the craft of an opponent. Jon Hesk argues that this rhetoric of anti-
rhetoric helped to discipline what counted as proper communication and to reward the 
concealment of elite speech training in favor of the image of the ordinary citizen (idiotai).43  
 Concealing elite training in rhetoric might help a speaker display character habits 
more consistent with the intellectual virtue of an ordinary person’s common sense wisdom 
and intution, but it does more than this. By drawing attention away from one’s own craft, 
such rhetorical maneuvers tend to naturalize speech and suggest a constellation of moral 
virtues associated with good speech. The courage to speak one’s mind, the altruistic spirit of 
an individual who cares about public issues, the valor of a citizen willing to voice an 
unpopular idea—these virtues associated with public speech are rendered more visible under 
a condition of suspicion regarding the true motive of speakers.  
Plato and Immediacy 
 In this section, I will first describe the epistemological commitments that led Plato to 
disdain logography, and then I will explain how this leads him to invent a rhetoric of non-
rhetoric, concealing his artifice by embracing parrhesia. Plato’s approach to philosophy 
entails a suspicion of mediation and a desire for immediacy. He likens philosophy, at its best, 
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to the stripping away of appearances, which conceal the true nature of reality. This leads to a 
valuation of immediate modes of speech because mediation, for Plato, is fundamentally an 
artificial construction of appearance. In particular, his concern was that mimesis (imitation) 
would persuade audiences through the appearance of truth rather than the actuality of truth.44 
The central distinction that Plato draws is between true knowledge (epistēmē) and mere 
opinion (doxa). For Plato, audiences are susceptible to the appearance of truth because doxa, 
as a low form of knowledge, is fallible. This perspective is found in the Republic in his 
allegory of the cave.45 In order to understand more about the role of the problem of 
knowledge for Plato’s case against rhetoric, I will explain this allegory as it reveals his views 
on knowledge and its appearance. 
 In Republic, Socrates describes a group of slaves who are chained to a wall so deep 
inside of a cave that there is no sunlight. Their chains allow them to see only a wall upon 
which a fire casts a shadow. Hidden from view, people are using various objects like shadow 
puppets so that strange shadows dance across the cave wall. Socrates notes that the slaves 
will assume the shadows they see are the real objects themselves, and that any echoes they 
hear from the puppeteer’s distorted voices will be real sounds that those shadow objects are 
making. As philosopher Kenneth Dorter distinguishes, these slaves have access only to the 
lowest form of doxa: eikasia, which are expectations based on images and past 
associations.46 Facing the shadows, they are trapped in the realm of appearance—they are 
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only able to notice the effect, and are unaware of the cause. As a result, doxa is fallible and 
susceptible to appearance. Though still fallible, a higher form of doxa, pistis, is represented 
by a slave who is released from bondage and is able to see the objects that are casting 
shadows on the wall.47 While this slave is able to notice the fire that causes the shadow, the 
slave’s perspective is still limited to the inside of the cave. Next, Socrates reflects on a slave 
who is taken out of the cave entirely and is able to see the sun. The slave will not be able to 
see the sun right away, and will be angry at being forced to take the difficult journey out of 
the cave.48 Eventually, this slave discovers true knowledge (epistēmē) because he is aware of 
the entire cause and effect system. Unfortunately, access to epistēmē will not secure social 
comfort or standing. If the slave returns to the cave, Socrates suggests, the others will doubt 
his true account and try to kill the slave.49 Thus, we notice in this story that Plato views 
parrhesia as noble because speaking the truth is often met with danger; the realm of 
appearance intoxicates humans and leads them to reject truth when it is unflattering or 
conflicts with what appears to be true. He views his moral imperative as a philosopher to, 
first, know the truth, then be willing to tell the truth to others. 
Plato’s disdain for sophists emanates from his understanding of the relation between 
truth (aletheia) and knowledge (in particular, the highest form of knowledge, epistēmē): to 
know the truth is to unconceal it. Plato denigrates rhetoric not only for being unconcerned 
with aletheia but for actively promoting its concealment. For example, in Euthydemus, Plato 
directly attacks Isocrates, claiming that rhetoric is an inauthentic pursuit of wisdom that 
                                                            
47 Plato notes that the slave will suffer pain when released and will think that the shadows 
were more real than the objects now seen. Ibid., 286; Plato, Republic: 515c. 
48 Plato, Republic, 515e-16a.  
49 Ibid., 517a.  
  45 
provides a false portrayal of itself as philosophy. While orators seem to be wise, divine, and 
lofty, this is, for Plato, just their power of enchantment.50 For Plato, sophists use images and 
beliefs (doxa) to create the appearance of aletheia, but it is the philosopher’s use of dialectic 
that is able to discover epistēmē by uncovering aletheia. In allegorical terms, the slave who 
exits the cave and sees the sun has escaped the realm of appearance and is no longer limited 
to doxa. Rather than persuaded that the shadows within the cave were an illusion, this slave 
discovered this epistemic knowledge once the concealment of appearance was lifted.  
These epistemological problems are manifest in Plato’s understanding of writing. He 
laments that writing cannot be fully custom-fit to the soul of its audience. Writing only 
claims to address its reader in particular.51 The written speech is like a ventriloquist’s puppet: 
it “speaks” but cannot defend itself and requires its master’s support.52 For Plato, the speaker 
might be physically present but unable to respond to questions because either they did not 
write the speech or because they are too caught up in reading their speech to listen for a 
question.53 This ability to be responsive signals the immediacy of presence indicative of 
interaction. The exchange of question and answer is an immediate speech practice because 
the appropriateness of a response depends, in part, upon a connection between dialogue 
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participants. In addition, the response allows for interlocutors to advance through an 
argument carefully rather than by simply exchanging individual opinions.54 There was 
already an awareness that some speakers responded as if reciting from a written book rather 
than responding to the immediate context of the question and issue at hand.55 
In contrast, Plato finds virtue in speaking without the benefit of technological aid. 
This notion is demonstrated most clearly in the sequence of the three speeches in Plato’s 
Phaedrus (the first is Phaedrus and the next two are Socrates). In this dialogue, Socrates 
meets Phaedrus, an Athenian aristocrat on a road outside of the city. They walk through the 
pastoral landscape, and eventually sit under a shade tree while they discuss the definition of 
love. Phaedrus has just heard Lysias speak about the subject, and conceals a script of Lysias’ 
speech underneath his cloak. After hearing Phaedrus read it, Socrates states that Lysias 
repeats himself too much, and that “there is something welling up within my breast, which 
makes me feel that I could find something different, and something better, to say.”56 
Phaedrus goads him into speaking, and after calling the “clear-voiced Muses” to help him, 
Socrates delivers his first speech extemporaneously.57 While there is no physically present 
script to signal mediation, he speaks with his face veiled, a visible technology that presages 
his lack of immediacy.  
Something crucial occurs after Socrates’ first speech that reflects on the moral duty of 
sincere speech and the notion of divine inspiration as the source of true knowledge. As 
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Socrates is starting to walk back to Athens, he encounters a divine sign and hears a voice 
telling him to atone for the sin he has just committed.58 This was his daimôn (divine spirit), 
and its intervention is a theme in Plato’s dialogues. In Apology, Socrates says that his 
daimonion frequently warned him against making mistakes, but never told him what to do.59 
After he is warned from letting his speech remain, Socrates admits to Phaedrus that he had 
“felt disturbed some while ago as I was delivering that speech” but sinned by continuing to 
speak what he did not actually believe.60 Socrates then prepares to give a speech inspired by 
his natural surroundings that will spring forth naturally from his soul.61 He was compelled by 
his virtuous character to speak once more, this time from the heart.  
These three speeches, ostensibly about love, form a metaphor regarding mediated 
speech that privileges unscripted speaking in three different performances of the speaker’s 
relation to a script. In the first example, Phaedrus reads the written speech script that is 
physically present, though its author is not.62 In the second speech, Socrates speaks without a 
script, but he does not provide an immediate connection to his soul, for he does not truly 
believe what he says. The final speech is the best, Plato implies, in part because its author is 
more immediate than in the other two speeches.  
One crucial element of Phaedrus is the relationship of memory and knowledge that 
Socrates believes is corrupted by writing. Socrates tells Phaedrus of the Egyptian god Thoth 
                                                            
58 Ibid., 242c.  
59 Plato, “Socrates' Defense (Apology),” 31d.  
60 Plato, “Phaedrus,” 242d.  
61 Ibid., 244a.  
62 Ibid., 230e.  
  48 
who offered King Thamus several inventions.63 Thoth believed that the greatest was writing, 
which can serve as a remedy (pharmakon) for people’s memory. Socrates recalls,  
When it came to writing, Thoth said, “This discipline, King, will make the Egyptians 
wiser and will improve their memories: my invention is a recipe for both memory and 
wisdom.” But the King said, “… The fact is that this invention will produce 
forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it. They will not need to exercise 
their memories, being able to rely on what is written, calling things to mind no longer 
from within themselves by their own unaided powers, but under the stimulus of 
external marks that are alien to themselves. So it’s not a recipe for memory, but for 
reminding, that you have discovered. And as for wisdom, you’re equipping your 
pupils with only a semblance of it, not with truth. Thanks to you and your invention, 
your pupils will be widely read without benefit of a teacher’s instruction; in 
consequence, they’ll entertain the delusion that they have wide knowledge, while they 
are, in fact, for the most part incapable of real judgment. They will also be difficult to 
get on with since they will have become wise merely in their own conceit, not 
genuinely so.” (275b-c) 
 
In discussing Phaedrus, Derrida begins from the conceptual ambiguity of the term 
pharmakon and notes that it can also mean a drug, recipe, charm, spell, paint, or poison.64 
King Thamus declines to allow writing because of its normative ambiguity; rather than a 
remedy for memory, he believes it could also serve as a poison that would destroy memory 
and lead to forgetfulness. For Derrida, the normative ambiguity of “pharmakon” illustrates 
the reception of writing more generally.65 “The ‘essence’ of the pharmakon lies in the way in 
which, having no stable essence, no ‘proper’ characteristics, it is not, in any sense 
(metaphysical, physical, chemical, alchemical) of the word, a substance…It is rather the prior 
medium in which differentiation in general is produced.”66  
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This sort of ambiguity in the normative status of writing, and rhetoric more broadly, 
was deeply unsettling for Plato. As Robert Hariman writes, “rhetoric’s marginal placement 
transforms it from a comprehensible practice to the condition of disorientation that must be 
corrected by the authorized practice of philosophy.” 67Writing, as mediation, introduced an 
interface that stood as a threshold between authors and readers. This threshold was 
necessarily normatively ambiguous; an author could not control who read his writing or how 
they interpreted it, and from the other side of the threshold, despite shibboleth and wax seals, 
no reader could be certain that a text was written by the author as signed or that the only 
readers are those formally addressed. Plato rejects writing as pharmakon because mediation 
is disorienting by introducing a normative ambiguity inconsistent with transcendent Truth.  
 Plato, Parrhesia, and Non-Rhetoric 
The emphasis on the virtue of non-scripted speech produced a discursive space in 
Athenian democracy that was thought to be beyond the reach of the rhetorical. This rhetoric 
of non-rhetoric originates with the aforementioned notion of inspired speech, wherein some 
speech was thought to be beyond reproach because the speaker was merely a medium for the 
gods. We can see its rhetorical deployment in antiquity in the tendency for speakers to claim 
inexperience in speaking and to deny careful training in rhetoric in order to sidestep the 
prevailing anti-rhetorical sentiment.68 This rhetorical strategy exploits the status of rhetoric as 
artifice. Rhetoric is artifice insofar as it reflects human designs upon the world. By carving a 
space for discourse that is beyond the reach of rhetoric, the rhetoric of non-rhetoric arrests 
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critique by displacing agency altogether. If speech is not artificial, then it does not bear the 
mark of design; it is pure expression.   
A central component of Plato’s rhetoric of non-rhetoric is parrhesia. His character, 
Socrates, explains it this way: the three ingredients for a serious study of the good life are 
knowledge, goodwill, and parrhesia.69 In this formulation, knowledge and goodwill are 
necessary but insufficient to securing the good life because they lack a critical public voice. 
As Foucault explains, parrhesia implies more than the private attainment of truth; “it has the 
function of criticism: criticism of the interlocutor or of the speaker himself.”70 This 
disposition reflected a willingness to reveal one’s thoughts as opposed to a desire to conceal 
them for competitive advantage.71 Parrhesia as a concept has changed since antiquity, yet 
Plato’s distinction between philosophy as revealing truth and rhetoric as concealing artifice 
has endured.72 For example, political theorist Arlene Saxonhouse writes that parrhesia is “a 
practice of opening and revealing one’s true beliefs, not hiding them or abandoning them” 
while the “sophists... used speech to hide through the art of rhetoric.”73 The central 
assumption that underwrites Plato’s condemnation of speechwriting, echoed by 
Saxonhouse’s description of sophists, is sincerity; it is presumed that a written text has a 
meaning that originated in the interior of the author, and that, absent the author’s presence, 
we are unable to get at such interior truth. In Symposium, Socrates notes how eloquent the 
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speaker before him was, and that he misunderstood the point of the symposium. He states 
that he had come prepared to speak the frank truth about love, while others had planned to 
flatter the god of love.74 In Apology, Socrates begins by noting that his prosecutors spoke so 
persuasively they almost convinced him, were it not for the facts of the case. He says that he 
will not use “flowery language… decked out with fine words and phrases,” and will only 
speak the truth, “I have not the slightest skill as a speaker—unless, of course, by a skillful 
speaker they mean one who speaks the truth.”75 In these examples, Plato’s Socrates points 
toward the artifice of other speakers and mentions that he, conversely, simply speaks from 
the heart.  
Plato condemns speechwriting for the absence and nonresponsiveness of the author 
but never appeared as a character in his dialogues.76 There is an irony, then, in Plato’s 
determination to hide himself as the author, thereby obscuring his own absence from his 
writing. He does not appear as a character, he includes no overt or subtle gestures to the 
differences he might have with Socrates.77 As classicist Harvey Yunis indicates, Plato 
mastered the art of concealment by securing and then obscuring his own absence as author.78 
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For Yunis, Plato solved “the problem of the absent author” through his writing style. The 
question at stake is, how does a writer guide the reader’s interpretation?79 One approach that 
is taken is to lessen the burden of interpretive work by making the message obvious through 
a plain style. Yunis suggests that it is possible for messages to be so immediate so as to 
require little interpretation—it may be “simply understood when it is read.”80  
Isocrates and Rhetoric 
 Son of an artisan flute maker, Isocrates was educated by some of the brightest minds 
of his day, possibly including Gorgias, Tisias, and even Socrates.81 While he distinguished 
himself from the sophists—characterizing Gorgias, for example, as a glib nihilist 
unconcerned with ethics, he did value writing and the craft of what others would call 
rhetoric.82 In fact, Isocrates was one of the first intellectuals to place writing at the center of 
good thinking. In Isocrates’ school, logography was a central discipline, and rhetoric was an 
esteemed component of law, history, and civic life, forming the core of Isocratean 
pedagogy.83 If Plato dealt with the problems of bad rhetoric, such as flattery, by denying the 
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conditions of the artifice of his own rhetorical strategies, then Isocrates dealt with the 
problems of bad rhetoric by advocating for citizens to become wise producers and consumers 
of texts and speeches. In this section, I will describe Isocrates’ epistemological approach to 
rhetoric, and then I will explain his case for rhetorical literacy. 
Isocrates’ approach to knowledge was akin to neither Plato’s nor the sophists’. 
Isocrates thought that Plato was too transcendent and that the sophists were too formulaic. He 
faulted both, for different reasons, for missing the central character of civic life.84 He 
lambasts philosophers such as Plato for abandoning public life for more theoretical matters.85 
Isocrates wants philosophy to get away from “hairsplitting” and “educate their students about 
the affairs in which we act as citizens…. It is much better to conjecture reasonably about 
useful things than to have precise knowledge of what is useless.”86 Isocrates counseled his 
students to offer novel advice on pressing public issues.87 
Because he considered important matters for Athenian society to be complex, his 
approach to education was broad-based, leading many to name Isocrates as an early pioneer 
of liberal arts education. “Just as we see the bee settling on all the plants, taking the best from 
each one,” Isocrates wrote, “in this way those who desire an education must also leave 
nothing untried but must collect advice form everywhere. For through this discipline one may 
slowly overcome the failings of nature.”88 This broad based approach to education ran 
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counter to Plato’s pedagogy because he viewed individuals as destined for particular trades 
and offices in life. Plato lamented the rhetor’s practice of speaking on any subject because to 
have true knowledge of a subject was to be an expert in that profession.89 But for Isocrates, 
well-rounded leaders would make the best decisions, especially if the flowers they pollinated 
gave them the ability to convince the people of the moral and prudent course of action.  
Isocrates’ critique of the sophists lies in the poor quality of the advice that they 
offered the public. He also claims that they were insufficiently philosophical; their speeches 
promised too much, and “they write speeches that are worse than private citizens might 
improvise.”90 In addition, Isocrates finds that sophistic teaching is too formulaic, treating 
speechwriting like spelling words using the alphabet. “While the function of letters is 
unchanging,” Isocrates explains, “the function of words is entirely opposite.” What one 
person says is not useful in a similar way for the next speaker.91  
Isocrates believed that the height of human wisdom is the intellectual virtue of 
prudence or practical knowledge (phronēsis). “Take concern for everything in life,” he wrote, 
“but train your practical wisdom especially, for a good mind in a human body is something 
very great in something very insignificant.”92 While Plato tends to transcend the scene of 
Athens, Isocrates embraces it, defending speech by noting the ways Athenian rhetorical 
leaders have benefitted their community.93 According to classicist Yun Lee Too, Isocrates 
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marks out a different notion of philosophy in this embrace of phronēsis. Classicist Yun Lee 
Too notes that Isocrates figures philosophy as “skill at using language in a public context 
such that an individual can function for the good of his society.”94  
Isocrates even dispenses with Plato’s cherished epistemological distinction that 
elevated epistēmē above doxa, insisting, “Those who follow their own opinions (doxai) live 
more harmoniously and are more successful than those who claim to have knowledge 
(epistēmē).” Isocrates celebrated humans’ application of agency and creative intelligence to 
form judgments. That position represents a substantial confrontation with Plato’s devaluation 
of doxa, and underwrites Isocrates’ interest in teaching rhetoric. Rhetorical literacy is 
essential when phronēsis and doxa are privileged instead of epistēmē because citizens must 
make contextually-bounded judgments without the certainty and stability of epistēmē. In 
contrast, rhetorical literacy is not essential to civic life if epistēmē is privileged above 
phronēsis and doxa because the enlightened philosopher-king will make the best decisions 
and leave it to rhetoricians to craft stories that encourage virtue.95 For Isocrates, rhetoric was 
neither a necessary evil nor a secondary function but a key precursor to political life because 
political decisions regarding important matters could not be based on certainty.  
While both Plato and Isocrates believed that an individual’s potential was limited by 
natural endowments, Isocrates saw a wider set of offices that an ambitious student could 
come to fill.96 While Isocrates thought that the most important factor in the education of 
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speaking is natural endowment, he believed strongly in rhetorical training. For Isocrates, it 
takes ability and exercise. The ideal student of rhetoric must have “a mind capable of 
inventing, learning, working hard and memorizing; a voice and clarity of speech that has the 
capacity to persuade audiences not only by what he says but also by his harmonious diction; 
and furthermore, courage that does not signify shamelessness but pairs the soul with 
moderation that it has as much confidence in addressing all the citizens as when deliberating 
with himself.”97 There was a different notion of memory at work in antiquity such that 
memory played a central role for Isocrates’ in augmenting a student’s nature through the 
study of nmeonic devices such as lists of maxims.98 These gnomic texts (gnomoi) sharpen the 
pupil’s memory, not as a source of information storage but as a source of ethical invention 
when encountering contingent situations and wanting a prudent and ethical response.99 
Isocrates placed special value on training in the arts of language (logos) for self-
improvement and a healthy civil society. “Since we have the ability to persuade one another 
and to make clear to ourselves what we want, not only do we avoid living like animals, we 
have come together, built cities, made laws, and invented arts (technê).”100 For Isocrates, 
humans can civilize themselves through the study of language and he laments the popular 
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slander of such a project of self-improvement. “You have led the most promising of them to 
spend their youth in drink, social gatherings, amusements, and games, while neglecting the 
serious business of self–improvement, and those with baser natures to pass the day in the sort 
of undisciplined behavior that no honest slave would have previously dared.”101 Rather than 
accepting one’s lot as a static entity, Isocrates viewed the soul like the body of a gymnast. 
Teaching philosophy improved the soul in the same way that teaching athletics improved the 
body. Since the soul is greater than the body, being excellent in philosophy is greater than 
being excellent in gymnastics.  
Isocrates’ Defense of Rhetorical Literacy 
 A curious biographical fact about Isocrates reverberates throughout his writings and 
might provide a motivating force for his insistence on the use of written speech: Isocrates 
was born with a weak voice; he was unable to speak to large audiences. It is the use of 
writing, then, that allows Isocrates to participate in Athenian civil society. But in order for 
this new form of participation to be fully intelligible, a new kind of literacy is required. In 
this next section, I expand upon Isocrates’ defense of rhetoric, attempting to identify the 
ways that his corpus offers an argument for rhetorical literacy. 
Isocrates argued that education in rhetorical invention was a method for perfecting 
individual and social virtues. Through instruction in public speech, he reasoned, citizens 
would know how to act properly by practicing praising the good actions and condemning the 
poor actions of others.102 Isocrates defends public speaking by noting that it is odd for anyone 
to complain about public speaking because some speakers lie. The same people who 
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complain about public speaking do not complain about wealth, strength, or courage, even 
though those virtues get abused too.103 Describing a principle of rhetorical literacy, Isocrates 
says that we should “blame individuals who use good things badly and try to harm their 
fellow citizens using means that could benefit them instead.”104 Isocrates sought to inculcate 
virtue through rhetorical instruction. 
According to Isocrates, learning the general forms of speaking is easy, but the 
execution is difficult. He argues that instruction in rhetoric is necessary because natural talent 
must be cultivated by education in order to be effective:  
It is not all that difficult to gain a knowledge of the forms (ideai) that we use in 
speaking and composing all speeches... But to choose from these the necessary forms 
for each subject, to mix them with each other and arrange them suitably, and then, not 
to mistake the circumstances (kairoi) but to embellish the entire speech properly with 
consideration (enthymēmata) and to speak the words rhythmically and musically, 
these things require much study and are the work of a brave and imaginative soul.105 
 
He expected his students to synthesize and apply phronēsis so that it was clear they had a 
secure understanding of what they were learning and how to adapt doxa to the right situations 
at the right moments. More than just careful study, this takes practice because what makes an 
opportune moment (kairos) can elude exact knowledge in terms of epistēmē.106 
Isocrates argued that good leadership—indeed all pursuits of wisdom—required 
rhetorical education. However, he was clear that there was a normative valence to rhetorical 
training and that only good rhetoric could ameliorate society. The point of rhetorical 
education is to judge orators not by their ability to achieve ends but by their ability to see the 
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ends as tied to the greater social good.107 Isocrates argues for rhetorical literacy because he 
acknowledges the danger that speech can play, but this danger is due to people not 
recognizing the craft of what is being said. Because speech can be so useful, and in fact is 
necessary for society, Isocrates wants us to be able to recognize bad speech so that we may 
fully celebrate good speech. 
 In the Antidosis, Isocrates presents a dramatized courtroom defense of his profession 
as a logographer. That he wrote a defense of his profession indicates a low opinion of rhetors, 
specifically logographic rhetors, prevailing in Isocrates’ Athens.108 The character Isocrates 
asks the clerk of the court to read from several of his speeches that have given him his great 
reputation. In the case, he stands charged with corrupting the youth that he has taught. He 
presents his character, activities, and entire life as a charitable offering for the public. In this 
fictional case, Isocrates stakes his life on the importance of teaching speech.  
 Antidosis offers its Athenian audience lessons in Isocrates’ approach to philosophy. In 
his self-defense, Isocrates wants Athens to give credit to the culture of speech, which is made 
possible by the important role that rhetorical education plays in Athens’ vibrant political 
culture. While the common practice in Athens at the time was for the richest, wealthiest 
citizens to provide funds for the public good, Isocrates claims that his life teaching the 
citizens of Athens was an application of his wealth toward the good of the public. Teaching 
rhetorical literacy makes his students better citizens.109  
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 Isocrates also justifies logography in terms of the power of well-crafted speech to 
guide public memory. Writing at the end of his career, he regards his speech as something to 
leave behind as a memorial, “much finer than bronze statues.”110 In To Nicocles, Isocrates 
explains why good speeches are better memorials that statues. Not only can a speech travel 
far and wide, but also they are able to demonstrate more than a great physique. “Statues of 
bodies are fine memorials, but ... images of deeds and of character are worth much more, and 
one can observe these only in skillfully produced speeches.”111 He notes that no one can 
make his body resemble that of the statue, but that he can take steps to practice the virtues 
that we hear about in speeches.112 Elsewhere, Isocrates asks his jury to consider how many of 
their ancestors are forgotten because they did not have poets and speechwriters to sing their 
praises. He asks them not to despise speechwriters, but to trust them in order to secure their 
own good reputation.113  
While Plato laments the realm of appearance and the power of mimesis, Isocrates 
values writing for helping to manage positive appearances. He is keenly aware of the 
performativity of public life, and trains his students not only to act morally, but also to be 
seen as such. “Those who wish to engage in public life and be well-liked must choose the 
best and most useful deeds, and the truest and most just words; in addition however, they 
must consider carefully how they can be seen by others to say and do everything graciously 
and benevolently, for those who give little thought to these matters appear to their fellow 
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citizens to be rather difficult and intolerable.”114 He says that things such as plausibility and 
other forms of proof only work for the part of speech in which they appear, but that 
reputation applies to the entire speech; if the audience thinks that one is a gentleman, then his 
speech will be more persuasive, and the actions of the gentleman are thought to be more 
honorable. “Intelligent men must covet this more than anything else,” Isocrates advises.115 
Isocrates argues that it is important to gratify people so that they judge everything that one 
does in a positive light. In this way an audience may overlook mistakes because of one’s 
goodwill.116  
Another reason why rhetorical literacy was critical for Isocrates was that citizens 
needed the ability to appreciate good speech and to spot flattery. In To Demonicus, Isocrates 
gives advice to a wealthy young lord interested in pursuing a position of political leadership. 
His introduction distinguishes between flattering words of encouragement and the nobler task 
of philosophy, which is to give tough advice to assist “in the constitution of their 
character.”117 According to Isocrates, we should “hate flatterers as much as deceivers, for if 
trusted both do injustice to those who trust them. If you accept into friendship those who 
gratify for the worst reasons, your life will lack friends who will risk animosity for the best 
reasons.”118 
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Isocrates promotes his school as a place where people will learn to speak about 
important civic matters. These speeches of “general import” take many forms, involve many 
situations, and are more difficult to learn than speeches about simple or frivolous topics. 
“The greatest indication of this,” Isocrates writes, “is that no one wanting to praise 
bumblebees and salt has ever been at a loss for words, but those who have attempted to 
discuss subjects that are commonly agreed to be good or noble or excellent in arête 
(achievement) have all fallen short of the possibilities when they have spoken.”119 Clearly, 
Isocrates takes ideas and speech very seriously—important enough to carefully craft with 
writing. “It is rare to discover something that no one has said before about well-known 
subjects, but about base and insignificant matters, whatever one happens to say is entirely his 
own.”120 Speaking without the use of writing, for Isocrates, decreases the likelihood that the 
orator is addressing significant matters in complex or novel ways, and Isocrates perceived 
this to be the moral duty of any citizen speaking to the polis.  
Rhetorical literacy allows a speaker to become aware of his performance and its 
reception. Isocrates was keenly aware that the effect of a speech was tied not only to its 
inventional content but also to the audience’s appraisal. Accordingly, some of the advice that 
Isocrates gives concerns how one should act, not only for the sake of virtue, but for the good 
favor accrued from the appearance of virtue. For example, he writes, “imitate the manners of 
kings and follow their habits, for you will be thought to approve and emulate them and will 
thus achieve more distinction in the eyes of the multitude and more reliable goodwill from 
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kings.”121 Elsewhere, Isocrates calls for measured speech, warning speakers against the 
perception of being senseless by engaging in “uncontrolled laughter.”122 
Isocrates sought a high moral standard for all oratory—indeed, he was of the mind 
that all oratory should have a clear moral purpose and should contain either praise or blame 
(epideictic). It would be irresponsible to speak without thoughtfully preparing speech to 
direct moral attention. Thus, historians in his school were taught to try for historical 
accuracy, but not at the expense of a well-crafted moral lesson. His contribution to the art of 
logography was to tailor speech to the tastes of the public and morally modify the public’s 
tastes in the same breath. 
Conclusion 
Both Plato and Isocrates pursued a program in rhetoric. Plato’s lived in the discursive 
space he carved out and marked “non-rhetorical.” As the epitome of “speaking from the 
heart,” this space is the distinction between the inner landscape of the soul and the outer 
appearance of doxa.123 It offers a persuasive system built upon the denial of persuasion. 
Guided by epistēmē, the soul that knows aletheia releases it for discovery when barriers to 
sincere expression are lifted. The space that Isocrates carves out is a stage upon which the 
citizen speaks. These rhetorical performances of citizenship are performative because the 
trained speaker is aware of their relationship to the audience, and respond as such. For Plato, 
there is a stable, transcendent self, which, in turn, may be presented to others. Isocrates, in 
contrast, uses the technology of rhetorical writing to self-reflexively project a public identity. 
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In so doing, he encourages attention to the performativity of rhetoric and an embrace of the 
constructedness of public speech. There are several implications of the differing approaches 
that Plato and Isocrates take for the larger project of understanding the effect of favoring 
speech that we consider immediate. In particular, this paired set of examples provides three 
crucial insights for the contours of a critical mode of civic engagement funded by rhetorical 
literacy: the association of immediacy with the virtues of democratic speech, the importance 
of decentering rhetorical agency in a democratic context, and the demand to conceal one’s 
rhetorical mediation.  
It is clear from the example of rhetoric in antiquity that the immediacy of unscripted 
speech is closely associated with virtue. Plato rejected the mediation of rhetoric because he 
considered this to be a veil of appearance that would prevent the discovery of true 
knowledge, which for Plato was akin to virtue. Rather than human invention, Plato sought 
divine inspiration for the search of absolute Truth. Democracy was an insufficient method for 
arriving at truth because it was prone to rhetoric. It was a democratic court, after all, that put 
his beloved mentor, Socrates, to death. Decisions should be made based on knowledge, and 
Plato believed that democracy rewards only the appearance of knowledge. Isocrates’ example 
sharply contrasts with this pursuit of unmediated expression that purports to bring a speaker’s 
true self closer to the audience. He offers a method that questions the assumption that less 
mediation is necessary for ethical communication. Instead, Isocrates presented a case for the 
virtue of rhetorical mediation because he saw carefully crafted moral pleas to be a central 
demand for a healthy civic sphere. In this way, Isocrates’ case for writing was a case for 
democratic participation. He believed that rhetoric could help citizens voice their concerns 
and interests and shape their polis.  
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In addition, Plato and Isocrates offered opposing treatments of the agency of the 
virtuous speaker. Speech that was authorized by divine inspiration, such as Socrates’ last 
speech in Phaedrus, staged its persuasive appeal upon the displacement of the agency of the 
speaker by the agency of its divine source. With the arrival of the mediation of rhetoric, 
parrhesia came to stand in for the claim to authority based on immediate communication. 
The expectation of direct access to the soul of the speaker assumes that the speaker has this 
access to give, and we are left with a highly romantic notion of the ideal speaker as one who 
has rhetorical agency and the courage to use it.  
Like Plato, Isocrates employs the trope of parrhesia, but rather than authorizing this 
moral plea based on a lack of mediation, Isocrates authorizes it as a moral technique for the 
formation of community. Isocrates’ embrace of technique locates the agency and authority of 
rhetoric in the social space between citizens. While Plato denies his use of rhetorical 
technique, Isocrates embraces it, and in so doing, opens up space for virtuous speech to be 
more than the disclosure of inner truth. “Technique” is not the willful dissemination of 
knowledge so much as an internalized and naturalized practice that only appears spontaneous 
after enough training. In this formulation, agency is distributed across the social field because 
the speaker is not the sole author of the technique being practiced, and the moral weight of 
speech is determined not by its correspondence to inner thoughts but its social effect because 
it is grounded in social learning processes. This underscores the importance of memory for 
Isocrates as a method for applying social intelligence to an individual’s deliberation.124 
A final lesson that this pairing offers is that immediacy, understood as sincere 
expression, is a judgment produced through rhetorical concealment. As I have discussed, 
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Plato concealed the rhetorical mediation of his philosophy by using parrhesia. He staged his 
approach to philosophy upon the project of revealing false appearances, and portrayed the 
Socratic dialectical method as a way to penetrate the concealment of oratory and leverage the 
immediacy of responsive interaction. I have argued that his was the highest form of 
concealment because, by producing the appearance of immediacy, he erased the conditions 
for rhetorical invention. The demand to conceal the work of rhetoric continues in the 
contemporary moment, and the case for rhetorical literacy that Isocrates made is as relevant 
as ever. The demand to conceal rhetorical artifice has only increased even as the 
technological and social conditions have made it more difficult. Literacy in the art of 
rhetoric, both as speaker and audience member, can help instantiate a critical attitude 
regarding the appearance of immediacy and the markers of virtuous democratic speech. 
  
 
CHAPTER 3: THE TELEPROMPTER AND THE BULLHORN 
Robert Rossen’s “All the King's Men” (1949) tells the story of Willie Stark, a frank-
speaking politician who takes on a corrupt political establishment. When Stark takes the 
stage to address a political rally for his gubernatorial run, his powerful political party bosses, 
standing behind him, expect that he will deliver the written speech he carries in his hand. 
“My friends. I have a speech here. It's a speech about what this state needs,” Stark begins. A 
turning point occurs as he looks out at the crowd and tells them, “there's no need in my 
telling you what this state needs. ...No, I'm not gonna read you any speech.”1 Much to the 
chagrin of the party bosses seated behind him, Stark casts his speech aside and begins to tell 
the story of how those bosses tried to corrupt him.2 “They fooled you a thousand times, just 
like they fooled me. But this time, I'm gonna fool somebody. I'm gonna stay in this race. I'm 
on my own and I'm out for blood.”3  
Let us consider how Stark assumes the posture of an idyllic speaker who, despite the 
danger of frank speech, refuses to deceive his audience with carefully prepared rhetorical 
artifice. This rehearsal of the cinematic cliché, found elsewhere in Frank Capra’s Mr. Smith 
Goes to Washington, provides entry into a constellation of issues related to modern anxieties 
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in U.S. political culture concerning political speech and corresponding notions of the ideal 
democratic speaker.4 The cliché reveals a strand of the populist discourse of democratic 
speech—the notion that ordinary people are exploited by the rhetorical technê of elite 
politicians. It provides an image of the ideal political candidate as a renegade who bucks the 
party bosses who fool and mislead ordinary people. He is a candidate for the people rather 
than a member of the elite who flatters voters. As an ideal speaker, Stark forsakes the 
carefully crafted script that was to control his speech; we notice the significance of this as the 
camera cuts to a female audience member, who, unsure of what to make of things, says, 
“hey, what's he up to?”5 If we imagine the fear of public speaking as stemming from feeling 
exposed before an audience, Willie stands stark naked without the cover of his speech script. 
In the imaginary of our political mythology, throwing the script away allows him to forge a 
direct connection with his audience through the speech that wells forth from his soul.  
Two items are notable in this example. First, throwing the speech away has an effect 
on Stark’s ēthos by changing how his discourse may be particularly inviting and moving for 
his audience.6 When speech is thought to emerge unmediated from a speaker’s soul the 
                                                            
4 Jimmy Stewart’s character (Jefferson Smith) in Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (1939) 
demonstrates a similar articulation of unscripted speech and civic virtuousness. After Smith, 
a Boy’s Club leader with no desire for political leadership, discovers political corruption and 
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5 Ibid.  
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of ēthos. The effect of throwing a script away is not captured in accounts of political 
communication and public deliberation that focus too closely on “the text” wherein meaning 
is reduced to content. Content analysis necessarily forgoes the powerful effect of speech 
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speaker comes to foreground an ēthos that is very different from a speaker who reads a 
formal speech written by bureaucrats. Returning to the metaphor of adulterated wine, the 
public speaker must invent an ēthos sufficient to persuade a sober audience. Second, the 
written script that Stark throws away is part of an assemblage of technologies that enable 
public address. Part of the effect of his throwing the script away is that it changes his relation 
to rhetorical artifice as a technology. “Throwing the script away” functions as an allegory 
that draws our attention to the materiality of technology and the dream of the sincere speaker. 
Attending to the materiality of rhetorical practices is an established facet of contemporary 
rhetorical theory and criticism, and points toward the effects of mediation.7 As Blair, 
Dickinson, and Ott explain, “the materiality of the signifier itself” is a “mode of mediation.”8 
Such mediation, rhetorician Barry Brummet argues, “conveys the content or information in a 
message” while also referring to “a technology of communication plus the ways the 
technology is habitually used.”9 What I want to accomplish in this chapter is to understand 
more fully the processes of mediation in political speech: how is an ambivalent relationship 
to technology performed, and to what end? 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
performance, and this is particularly pronounced in the ēthos of a speaker who an audience 
regards as too scripted or as being unscripted. 
7 As Carole Blair notes, part of the difficulty in theorizing the materiality of rhetoric is that 
“we lack an idiom for referencing talk, writing, or even inscribed stone as material.” 
“Contemporary U S Memorial Sites as Exemplars,” in Rhetorical Bodies, ed. Sharon 
Crowley and Jack Selzer (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999), 17. In this chapter, 
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8 Blair, Dickinson, and Ott, “Introduction: Rhetoric/Memory/Place,” 3. 
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 The material presence and the present absence of speech technologies affect 
judgments about a speaker’s character because they influence a speaker’s ability to forge 
immediacy, which is the perception of a close connection and is often taken to indicate a lack 
of mediating distance. Rather than subtracting mediation, effective speakers conceal their 
mediation (which may include avoiding certain forms of mediation). In order to render this 
rhetorical concealment more visible, and thus more amenable to critique, we need an account 
of persuasion that incorporates the ēthos forming effects of communication technologies. The 
total effect of rhetorical invention includes the material effect of a given rhetorical medium. 
In order to consider the paradox of rhetorical artifice (how can a speaker construct a message 
while concealing her craft?) we must understand the message, and its effects, beyond textual 
content. In rhetorical studies, this central thesis of medium theory is the canon of elocutio 
(style).10 If we reject this radical distinction between content and style, as Jasinski remarks, 
“we must learn how to look at, rather than through, the style or texture of a text so as to 
discover how it works and what it might be doing.”11 Our understanding of the ēthos that 
emerges from a speaker’s message, to bring Marshal McLuhan’s well-worn phrase into 
rhetorical theory, must reckon with the medium-as-message.12 In particular, let us consider 
how a performed relation to technology is also a message.  
While the trope of the sincere speaker is prevalent in contemporary U.S. public 
discourse, the clichéd act of throwing the script aside is rarely seen. Instead, speakers adopt 
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other means of distancing themselves from the technology of the script. For example, 
President Barack Obama has been derided for his extensive use of a teleprompter to project 
his script beyond view and appear to be without a written script, while opponents have 
flaunted their non-use of the device, even showing off handwritten notes as proof of their 
low-tech credibility.13 While these examples suggest a negative view of how media 
technologies augment the possibility and promise of the presence of the speaking subject, it 
is not simply that any technology signals insincerity. Some technologies fail to trigger such 
suspicion or undercut the virtue of the user. Americans have developed a sophisticated 
lexicon of mediation in which some technologies appear to block immediacy in the 
relationship of the political speaker to the public while others seem to facilitate immediacy. 
The central distinction, I argue, is the attention to artifice. For example, one of President 
George W. Bush’s finest rhetorical moments came on the rubble of Ground Zero, as he used 
a bullhorn to amply his extemporaneous speech to rescue workers.14 One of the reasons for 
this positive reception, I will argue, is that “voice” draws attention to hiddenness. The 
bullhorn focuses audience attention on the amplification of the speaker’s voice, unlike the 
teleprompter that draws attention to the presence of a written script. It is the interplay of the 
teleprompter and the bullhorn through their differential form and cultural reception that I use 
to organize this chapter. In what follows, I take political campaigns focusing on the U.S. 
presidency as a context of public deliberation. I argue that the effects of contemporary U.S. 
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Hall of India’s Parliament. “Teleprompter to Make its Debut in Parliament When Obama 
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political speech acts are governed, in part, by the way that audiences makes sense of the 
technological mediation of speech.  
I will first discuss the crisis of ēthos for political speech arguing that effective speech 
must conceal its artifice while balancing several stylistic demands. I propose that attention to 
technological artifice is a productive way to analyze the differential reception of politicians’ 
speeches. To illustrate what I term “high-tech style,” I turn to the 2012 presidential election. 
Criticism of Governor Mitt Romney and President Barack Obama often attended to the 
artifice of their speech. I use discourse concerning Obama’s teleprompter to indicate a 
broader denigration of technological mediation and the dream of unmediated communication. 
Finally, I illustrate low-tech style in speeches in which there is little or no attention to 
artifice. I focus on President George W. Bush’s speeches and the myth of unmediated speech 
in the use of the bullhorn as an allegorical tool to indicate the tendency for some technologies 
to more successfully allow a speaker to conceal her or his rhetorical craft.  
Technological Styles and Techniques of Concealment 
Part of the cultural milieu of contemporary public deliberation is the suspicion of 
speech that repeats the Greeks’ problem with artifice. In the context of the 2012 presidential 
election, conservatives poked fun at Barack Obama's use of the teleprompter, while liberals 
lambasted Governor Mitt Romney for being out of touch and robotic. Each of these speakers 
exhibits a unique style with differential effects, but the common thread that underwrites the 
aforementioned critiques is that judgments of speakers are based, in part, on attention to 
artifice. This may take the form of disquiet regarding the hidden or visible written script as 
indicating artifice and its concealment. In that case, the material technology refers to 
mediation as a subset of artifice. In other cases, it is not the materiality of a device but the 
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failure of a technique to remain concealed that reminds an audience that the speaker is 
working to persuade them. Here rhetorical technique and communication technology are 
brought together as technological artifice. We might consider technique and technology to be 
the software and hardware of persuasion, to borrow a way of conceptualizing the relation of 
technique and technology from philosopher of technology Val Dusek.15 Considering 
rhetorical artifice as technology, we can perceive a performed relation to technological 
hardware given the traditional conception of technology as mechanical device.16 Technique 
as “software” follows Jacques Ellul’s conceptualization of technology as patterns of rule-
following behavior.17 I combine these notions in order to draw attention to rhetoric as a 
means for understanding the relation of technology and technique in communication. A 
particular communication technology, such as the teleprompter or the bullhorn, is of little use 
without technique, and technique cannot be fully understood outside of the technological 
form by which it functions.  
In such an approach, both software and hardware—technique as practice and 
technology as material tool—are artifice that speakers work to conceal. In place of suspicious 
persuasion, effective political campaigns substitute immediacy as a promise of sincerity. In 
this way, immediacy is not a natural disposition but a political strategy. There is a 
constellation of terms used when attention is paid to how a speaker’s delivery indicates a lack 
of immediacy and disquiet regarding his or her character: plastic, wooden, robotic, and so on. 
It is noteworthy that these terms draw attention to artifice, either in the machinery of the 
                                                            
15 Val Dusek, Philosophy of Technology (Malden, MA: Oxford Blackwell, 2006), 31-32. 
16 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963). 
17 Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Knopf, 1964).  
  74 
robot or in the sense that plastic and wood are materials that one uses to construct objects. In 
contrast to a natural human essence, these terms highlight candidates’ failed attempts at 
constructing their appearance: unlike the ordinary person who speaks with words that 
naturally spring from their soul, this person bears the marks of design. Rather than an 
unmediated or direct connection between the speaker and the audience, as in the way that the 
speech errors of President Bush were taken to reveal a speaker who offered audiences 
immediacy, these figures reveal a speaker who is unnatural and relies upon technology to 
mediate their speech.  
The demand to conceal rhetorical technique is perhaps best seen at the point of 
failure—when artifice is the center of the audience’s attention. The political stakes of failing 
to appear ordinary are illustrated by a widely panned 2009 speech by Louisiana Gov. Bobby 
Jindal. Providing the Republican response to Obama's budget speech, Jindal represented a 
rising star in the Republican Party.18 The morning after his speech, conservative 
commentators joined mainstream accounts of the speech as “wooden” and “animatronic.”19 
Writing in the Washington Post, Kathleen Parker locates the problem of delivery in terms of 
dissonance between the speaker and his speech, “Jindal did not write his own speech 
Tuesday, and he's wearing a choke collar… Jindal seems to be handicapped by handlers.”20 
Commenting on Jindal’s failed artifice, acting coach Howard Fine observed, “In trying to 
sound human, he sounds fake. In attempting to convey everydayness, he comes across as an 
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extraterrestrial.”21 These commentaries suggest that oratory fails when an audience notices 
the effort put into constructing an appearance. Jindal failed in this speech because he failed to 
conceal his technology of speech.  
In contrast, President Bill Clinton provides an excellent example of how the 
concealment of rhetorical techniques is associated with virtues of speech. Clinton has a 
reputation as a skillful speaker both in face-to-face settings and with scripted speeches when 
he uses a teleprompter.22 Before conservatives used the teleprompter as a synecdoche for 
more general claims against Obama's character, the electronic device was rarely the subject 
of news, staying literally and figuratively out of view, with the exception of the most famous 
example of a snafu with a teleprompter. President Clinton already had a reputation as a 
skilled orator when he took the stage for his 1993 address to the joint session of Congress to 
promote his health care reform bill. Unbeknownst to the president, the wrong speech had 
been loaded into the teleprompter. While the correct tape was loaded, he spoke 
extemporaneously for several minutes.23 He was so familiar with his speech and skilled at 
                                                            
21 Ibid. Acting coach Howard Fine, founder of the Howard Fine Acting Studio, explained 
what caused Jindal's speech to be such a disaster. Regardless of who writes a particular 
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epitome of “robotic.” Howard Fine, “What Caused Bobby Jindal's Speech to Be a Disaster?,” 
Huffington Post (blog), February 26, 2009. 
22 Nathaniel Stein, “Conversations With a Teleprompter,” New Yorker Online, September 7, 
2012. 
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speaking without a script that no one in his audience knew that the wrong speech was being 
projected.  
Even when the correct speech is loaded into his teleprompter, Clinton displays great 
extemporaneous skill. He gave a celebrated speech at the 2012 Democratic National 
Convention that made frequent deviations from the projected script. As Nathaniel Stein 
suggested in the New Yorker, the drastic difference between Clinton's prepared script and 
delivered remarks suggests that he injects spontaneous or extemporaneous remarks into his 
prepared remarks. Clinton adds many colloquial expressions such as “wait a minute” and 
“let's just think about it,” and these phrases give a spontaneous feel to a prepared speech.24  
However, what passes as natural is the result of training in specific techniques. In the 
case of Clinton, the transformation is startling. People often forget that Bill Clinton is thought 
to have delivered “one of the worst speeches of all time” at the Democratic convention in 
1988.25 His speech went far overtime, and his delivery was not very engaging. At the end, 
when he said, “in closing,” the crowd cheered.26 He went on The Tonight Show with Johnny 
                                                            
24 As Stein points out, Clinton took lists provided by the teleprompter and inserted parallel 
structure. Knowing that the list was coming, he simplified that syntax to “it will” three times. 
He has a tendency to rephrase the script because he is comfortable that he will get the 
message across. When the teleprompter read, “The Republicans call it 'Obamacare' and say 
it's a government takeover of health care that they'll repeal,” Clinton knows the general ideas 
he needs to get across, and says, “The Republicans call it, derisively, “Obamacare.” They say 
it's a government takeover of health care, a disaster, and that if we'll just elect them they'll 
repeal it.” Stein, “Conversations With a Teleprompter.” 
25 Usborne, “The Right Stuff?.” Clinton spoke far longer than expected, and the crowd was 
very restless. It is possible they were booing him, though it is also possible that they were 
chanting “Duke,” which was Michael Dukakis's nickname, since he was to speak next. 
26 Bill Clinton, “Governor Bill Clinton Endorsing Mike Dukakis at the 1988 DNC,” 
YouTube video, 33:37, posted by “skcin7,” September 5, 2012, http://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=vvTRvTII40o  
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Carson to play the saxophone, laugh off the event, and recover his image.27 Between his 
1988 debacle and his rise to the presidency in 1992, Clinton worked hard to train in the skills 
of public speaking. In large part this work was with Michael Sheehan, a well-known media 
trainer, who has worked with the Clintons, Biden, and Obama, to name a few of his most 
prominent clients.28 Beyond his help with the use of the teleprompter, Sheehan teaches 
speaking techniques for extemporaneous style. For example, he uses the “Arthur Murray 
pattern.”29 This technique for debate answers is three-fold: describe the situation, explain 
how it will be worse under your opponent’s tenure, and then describe how it will be better 
under your tenure. Sheehan worked extensively with Clinton, and became a very trusted 
member of his inner circle.30 In this way, Clinton exemplifies how natural speech talent can 
be the result of effectively concealing rhetorical artifice. He succeeds because we do not 
notice his training in the techniques of oratory. 
Crisis of Ēthos 
The widespread suspicion of political speech poses a crisis of ēthos for orators in the 
contemporary mass-mediated age where campaigns must balance message clarity with the 
                                                            
27 Barak Goodman, “Clinton's Carson Appearance,” in Clinton (2012).  
28 John Heilemann, “Geithner’s Guru: The Turnaround Artist Who Made the Treasury 
Secretary Telegenic,” New Yorker, April 5, 2009; Hillary Rodham Clinton, Living History 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003). He is known to have a room in the basement of the 
Democratic Convention hall where he helps polish speakers before they go on. He is said to 
have helped Obama before his high profile national debut at the 2004 convention. 
29 John Heilemann and Mark Halperin, Game Change: Obama and the Clintons, McCain and 
Palin, and the Race of a Lifetime (New York: Harper, 2010).  
30 Clinton speechwriter Michael Waldman writes that on the day of his 1994 State of the 
Union address, “Clinton wanted to rehearse quietly with Michael Sheehan and me.” Michael 
Waldman, POTUS Speaks: Finding the Words that Defined the Clinton Presidency (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). 
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diversity of audience interests and perspectives. In the context of such suspicion, logos and 
pathos, as modes of persuasion, are preempted by suspicion regarding the speaker, their 
motivations, and their ethical commitments. Ēthos is a problem for political campaigns 
because it requires rhetorical artifice, but this artifice must be concealed in order to be 
effective. In addition, the construction of ēthos must not only appeal to voters; it must also 
resonate with candidates, their reputations, and what they are able to perform while seeming 
authentic (which is to say seeming not to be performing). Finally, ēthos poses a challenge of 
timeliness (kairos) because the kind of ēthos demanded changes as social and cultural 
conditions change. In terms of the ēthos of technology, different media technologies are read 
differently at different times and in different situations. Crafting an effective appeal requires 
constructing a suitable ēthos that translates to several culturally specific stylistic demands 
placed on orators. In this section, I will delineate the contemporary demands to appear 
ordinary and unscripted.  
In the case of political campaign communication scholarship, functional analysis of 
message content is predominant, and fails to capture the full persuasive effect because 
“message” is flattened to content.31 A consequence is that the rhetorical style and 
                                                            
31 A functional approach to political oratory understands the effect of messages as stemming 
from content that is strategically designed to address electoral exigencies via target 
audiences. Benoit's functional theory assumes that political messages are either about policy 
issues or character image. As a result, messages pertain to “governmental action (past, 
current, or future) and problems amenable to governmental action” and “characteristics, 
traits, abilities, or attributes of the candidates.” Communication in Political Campaigns (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2007), 44. This is in contrast to the limited effects model that downplays 
the effect of messages assuming that current events, party identification, and money are far 
more significant influences on voter behavior. See ibid., 3-18. Both of these accounts rely on 
too narrow an understanding of rhetorical effectivity.  
According to Benoit, political party affiliation, policy positions, and the perceived character 
of a candidate are all important factors in crafting voter beliefs, but they receive this 
information, in large part, through campaign messages. Ibid., 27-31. Benoit details how 
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technological mediation that help to enable concealment are rendered as external 
supplements to meaning.32 When media are considered in political communication literature, 
accounts tend to have a narrow focus on the function of technological devices and the effect 
of channel on message reception. For example, William Benoit’s functional theory of 
campaign discourse considers the role of the medium, but his attention is primarily focused 
on how media, as channels, provide different information to voters.33 Similarly, Judith Trent 
and Robert Friedenberg claim that technology has provided an “obvious transformation in 
political campaigns,” but they also focus on different technologies as channels, such as radio, 
television, or twitter, that make certain messages possible and other messages impossible.34 
For example, when they consider the Internet, it is primarily through a content analysis of 
campaign websites.35 In addition to the role of technology as channel, we should consider the 
message of the media itself as critical to persuasive effect. In the examples of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
campaign messages are not directly received and are frequently filtered through other voters 
and through mass mediated channels. As a result, he believes that the best account of 
political campaign discourse accounts for the instrumental role of communication. He argues 
that distinguishing oneself from one's opponents is a critical component of campaigning 
because elections are comparative decisions. A speaker is able to establish herself as the 
preferable choice by acclaiming herself, attacking an opponent, or defending herself. Ibid., 
36. But I return to the example of a speaker who is thought to be off-script. How are we to 
account for this effect? If “message” is to refer comprehensively to the information that 
affects voter decisions, then it should not be reduced to the content of an utterance. If we 
insist on mediation as a critical element of persuasive effect, then the ēthos of the speaker 
produced in tandem with the materiality of the technology being employed is a crucial facet 
for understanding how voters make sense of a message. 
32 There is a tendency to think that meaning resides in a text and that form or style is 
ornamentation external to meaning. Lanham, Analyzing Prose.  
33 Benoit, Communication in Political Campaigns, 64.  
34 Judith S. Trent and Robert V. Friedenberg, Political Campaign Communication (New 
York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). 13. 
35 Ibid., 399-408.  
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teleprompter and the bullhorn mentioned above, part of the effect relates to how each 
technology draws or deflects attention to the artifice of speech. While the teleprompter draws 
attention to its mediation of the script, the bullhorn signifies the speaker’s voice rather than 
its own form. This contributes to the ethos of a speaker because we have been habituated to 
associate moral virtue with the display of voice. In this way, technology has a persuasive 
effect not only because of what messages it enables but also because of how it guides 
audience attention to the entire media environment. 
When speech is thought to emerge unmediated from a speaker’s soul the speaker 
comes to inhabit a discursive space very different from a speaker who reads a formal speech 
written by bureaucrats. Even if Willie Stark proceeds with a memorized speech using a 
microphone to project his voice, perceptions of his relation to the audience have changed 
once he throws his script aside. The content of the message that follows might in fact be the 
same as what was written, but the boundary between speaker and audience is understood 
differently and influences the persuasive effect of speech. 
All too often, the ethos of the speaker is considered to extend solely from the content 
of speech not taking into account the effects of the mediation of speech for an audience. This 
second sense of ethos helps to explain how the materiality of media technologies effects 
persuasion in public deliberation. The materiality of media is part of the dwelling place that a 
speaker inhabits. Specifically, audience attention to the artifice of speech—the staging, 
scripting, and so on—influences the rhetorical style enacted. From this perspective, 
technologies and speakers are part of a complex pattern of communication from which ethos 
emerges. As such, the contribution of technology to the ethos associated with the speaker is 
both formal and symbolic: there is persuasive effect from the formal qualities of the 
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technology itself and from what the technology signifies in a given cultural formation. For 
example, the distinction between the ethos of the teleprompter and the bullhorn extends both 
from the devices themselves as well as their cultural significations.  
An account of rhetorical style can aid in understanding the relation of ethos and 
technology. Let us return to the earliest typology of rhetorical style in which classical 
rhetorical treatises regularly distinguish levels of style: plain, middle, and grand. These 
distinctions concern diction, linguistic form, and word choice.36 I argue that this “levels” 
aspect of style reflects audience attention to artifice corresponding to a quantity: low, 
medium, and high. As recurring patterns of communication, high-tech and low-tech styles are 
particular alignments of signs and situations, texts and acts, behaviors and places, and their 
effect depends upon both rhetorical invention and audiences’ aesthetic reactions.37 Each style 
reflects audience attention to mediation as artifice (as presence or as present absence) and as 
styles; contextual rules and cultural conventions govern what practices are considered 
appropriate. 
Ordinary Ethos 
The prevailing ethos demand for politicians today reflects a populist celebration of 
ordinary people and their attendant use of ordinary language. By ordinary person, I mean to 
evoke the agent of Americana, the political mythos of the middle class folk hero of the 
                                                            
36 This distinction is originally seen in the work of Aristotle’s pupil, Theophrastus. Patricia 
Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, “Anonymous,” 241. See also Rhetorica ad Herennium, ed. 
Harry Caplan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 4.8; Brian Vickers, In 
Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); George Alexander Kennedy, 
Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition From Ancient to Modern Times 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). 
37 My definition of style follows Hariman and is intended to be expansive. Political Style, 
187. 
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American Dream who employs virtuous behavior even while elite forces exploit her or him 
(usually him). One means of identifying the virtuous ordinary person is through the use of 
ordinary language (literal as opposed to figural).38 Insofar as a person is thought to be 
ordinary because of his or her use of ordinary language, he or she has been endowed through 
public judgment with the virtue of literal speech; she is sincere: she says exactly what she 
means as opposed to using figural speech designed not “simply” to convey her thoughts but 
to have a particular effect. But all speech is figural, so the virtue of ordinary speech functions 
as an invisibility cloak for the rhetoric of ordinariness. Concerted audience attention to the 
presence of artifice defines the ordinary; ordinary language is that which conceals the turn 
from literal to figural. Aristotle suggested that democratic settings called for a blending of 
ordinary and lofty words so the speaker could impress the audience while still not sounding 
artificial.39  
Ordinary speech requires the concealment of rhetorical mediation, not its absence. 
Perhaps one of the best examples of a president leveraging the ethos of ordinary speech 
practices is the Fireside Chats of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Designed to renew 
consumer confidence in the banking system, these talks focused on ordinary, nontechnical 
language and avoided stylistic ornamentation. FDR fostered a sense of intimacy because he 
was successful at speaking in a personal style to his public audience as they sat in their living 
                                                            
38 In formal literary theories, ordinary language is understood to contrast with poetic 
language because it is literal. Contemporary thought has more commonly rejected this 
distinction and found all language to be figural. Stanley Fish, “How Ordinary Is Ordinary 
Language?,” New Literary History 5, no. 1 (1973); Lundberg, Lacan in Public: 
Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric. 
39 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 3.1-4.  
  83 
rooms.40 Despite the fact that they were mediated through radio waves, the Fireside Chats 
were thought of as direct. FDR may be credited with the virtue of direct address and thought 
of as “chatting,” but the speeches were certainly not unscripted. As Daniel Boorstin explains,  
FDR was a man of great warmth, natural spontaneity, and simple eloquence, and his 
public utterances reached the citizen with a new intimacy. Yet, paradoxically, it was 
under his administrations that statements by the president attained a new subtlety and 
a new calculatedness. On his production team, in addition to newspapermen, there 
were poets, playwrights, and a regular corps of speech writers. Far from detracting 
from his effectiveness, this collaborative system for producing the impression of 
personal frankness and spontaneity provided an additional subject of news worthy 
interest.41  
 
It was at this time that journalists began reflecting on joint authorship in presidential 
speeches, wondering who was behind a particular phrase, and conjecturing about how much 
the president contributed to the speech. Even using the high-tech radio, FDR achieved a low-
tech ethos because his audiences’ attention was not at the level of artifice.  
Roosevelt was so successful at creating the perception of immediacy with the 
American people that the Fireside Chat became a trope signifying directness between 
president and the people. Shortly after taking office, President Jimmy Carter delivered what 
he called a “Fireside Chat” in order to “keep in close touch with the people of our country.”42 
And when President Obama, early in his first term, sat down with Jay Leno on “The Tonight 
                                                            
40 Amos Kiewe, FDR's First Fireside Chat: Public Confidence and the Banking Crisis 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 93.  
41 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America (New York: 
Atheneum, 1971), 21. 
42 Jimmy Carter, “Report To the American People - Remarks From the White House 
Library,” (The American Presidency Project, February 2, 1977), para. 1; Edward Walsh, “1st 
Carter Fireside Chat Scheduled for Wednesday,” Washington Post, January 28, 1977.  
  84 
Show,” the New York Times referred to it as “just a couple of average Joes” having a 
“fireside chat for the flat-screen age.”43 
Staging the Unscripted 
FDR may have achieved the mantle of ordinary speech through a series of scripted 
addresses. However, as I suggested at the outset of this section, the contemporary crisis of 
ethos is a demand of unmediated speech, and ordinary speech today is articulated with the 
present absence of scripted control. While audiences are uncomfortable with speech that is 
too controlled by the communication technology of the script, speech that is thought to be 
unscripted is often treated as a keystone for judging the virtue of a speaker. In the face of 
political polarization and suspicion regarding the motivations of political leaders, “unscripted 
speech” is figured as an escape route from self-interested rhetorical agents. As the previous 
chapter demonstrates, the notion that some speech provides a window to the soul of the 
speaker is nothing new. 
While unscripted speech can benefit orators by lending them the virtue of frank 
speech (parrhesia), it can also be dangerous. In the realm of politics, consider the example of 
the well-worn category of speech captured by the “hot” microphone. This is speech recorded 
when speakers do not know that the microphone is functioning. Similar to speech errors, 
these moments are thought to be windows into the candidate. By speech errors I mean flubs, 
faux pas, elisions, mispronunciations, Freudian slips, stumbles, and so on. In short, speech 
errors in campaigns are off-message; they are messages that go against the desired issue and 
image framing of a campaign.  
                                                            
43 Alessandra Stanley, “Just a Couple of Average Joes Having a Fireside Chat,” New York 
Times, March 21, 2011.  
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Unscripted speech poses a tension that campaigns must manage; it is both high risk 
and high reward. Without the control of a script to keep a candidate “on” message, the 
careful work of planning a persuasive campaign can be ruined. Within the 2012 Republican 
nomination contest, the Mitt Romney campaign used a perceived lack of control to undercut 
the ethos of former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. Romney surrogates, Former 
Missouri Senator Jim Talent and New Hampshire Governor John Sununu, questioned 
whether Gingrich could be trusted as Commander-in-Chief. Sununu stressed that Gingrich's 
tendency to make “off-the-cuff” remarks is reflective of his “off-the-cuff thinking.”44 
However, being perceived as too scripted can be a negative message itself. New Jersey 
Governor Chris Christie, known for his unscripted, frank speech style, argues that such 
moments are crucial for the successful politician, “if you avoid those unscripted moments, I 
don’t think the American people will trust their instincts about whether you would make a 
good president or not.”45 While the danger of failure is high, the demand for unscripted 
moments cannot be ignored. Contemporary U.S. audiences of political discourse flock to 
political debates for the possibility of unscripted moments and drool over politicians' flubs 
and gaffes for what they might reveal about the speaker. Errors of speech provide an 
especially powerful persuasive effect because they are unscripted speech that is also thought 
to evade concealment—they escape control and promise to reveal the true intentions of the 
                                                            
44 “Romney Surrogates: Gingrich Not Fit To Be Commander-in-Chief,” TPM Livewire 
(blog), Talkingpoints Memo, December 8, 2011, 
http://livewire.talkingpointsmemo.com/entry/romney-surrogates-gingrich-not-fit-to-be-
commander. 
45 Gabriella Schwarz, “Christie: I Was Not Criticizing Palin,” Political Ticker (blog), 
CNN.com, January 16, 2011, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/01/16/christie-i-was-
not-criticizing-palin/ 
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speaker. In the case of the “hot mic” (private comments recorded and made public), the lack 
of control concerns who receives the message, and in the case of speech flubs, the lack of 
control refers to what is said. 
The traditional interpretation of the role that flubs play in politics is distraction. Some 
work has extended this to reading attention to flubs as indicative of a broader ritual wherein 
audiences watch for signs of humility as a politician recovers from a mistake.46 In addition to 
this role, I argue that flubs point audience attention to the materiality or immateriality of the 
script. I take President George W. Bush as exemplar of how the flub can function as an 
organizing symbol for a speaker’s ethos. Before and during his presidency, liberals loved to 
mock him and draw attention to his poor speech. Yet, rather than showing the presence of 
artifice, his speech errors often suggested a present absence of strategic control, and a large 
portion of Americans reported that Bush's verbal blunders lent an authenticity to his speech 
lacking in other politicians.47 Bush’s rhetorical reputation came to reflect a characterological 
duality; he was seen as earnest but lacking intelligence. Bush’s ethos carved out a persuasive 
space precisely because it did not seem to carve out persuasive space for itself.  
                                                            
46 W. Lance Bennett argues that more than a distraction from policy deliberation, attention to 
flubs indicates a degradation ritual that is central to American politics. As degradation ritual, 
flubs and how they are responded to signal how an individual’s public persona fits into an 
existing social system and, if there is a problem, shows how the person is able to repair the 
breach indicating a mastery of their social role. “Assessing Presidential Character: 
Degradation Rituals In Political Campaigns,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 67, no. 3 (1981): 
313, 310. Bennett understands gaffes to function in two ways. First, a gaffe is a campaign 
issue when it can be defined in terms of general norms of leadership and democracy. Second, 
a gaffe may evolve and the event will reflect on practical judgments of the candidate. Ibid., 
312. He argues that the argument against using flubs to better understand candidates tends to 
romance the electoral process imagining that without such base fixations, candidates would 
be freer to espouse policy positions for public deliberation. Ibid.  
47 Michael Erard, Um—Slips, Stumbles, and Verbal Blunders, and What They Mean (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 2007), 12.  
  87 
 Thus, while speech mistakes refer audiences to a speaker’s character, some flubs 
matter much less or are taken to refer to positive traits such as a speaker who is willing to 
employ frank speech (parrhesia) via uncontrolled speech. In such a case, communication 
technology is thought to be materially absent. However, it is possible for a flub to point an 
audience to the material presence of a script. In the realm of theatre, it is the difference 
between a flub taken to be accidental and the stammering characters made famous by 
playwrights such as Eugene O’Neill, Samuel Beckett, and Edward Albee. If it is taken to be 
an accident, the flub refers an audience to the materiality of a script; if it is taken to be the 
natural speech practice of the character, it can provide verisimilitude to the performance.48 
The stammering of King George VI in The King’s Speech was consistent with the character’s 
persona, but cinematic blooper reels provide sufficient examples of flubs that are dissonant 
with a character and cause a scene to break down.49  
The priority placed on unscripted speech is known to campaigns, as is the need for 
control. As a result, they stage elaborately planned events that are designed to appear 
spontaneous.50 In his 1961 book The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America, Daniel 
Boorstin writes about the use of staging in politics. He refers to pseudo-events as “the new 
kind of synthetic novelty which has flooded our experience.”51 One of the central 
characteristics of a pseudo-event is that it is not spontaneous, “but comes about because 
                                                            
48 This is the epitome of the realist movement in twentieth century theatre, especially in the 
work of Russian Constantin Stanislavski. Jean Benedetti, Stanislavski: His Life and Art, 
1999. 
49 Tom Hooper, The King's Speech (2010).  
50 Schill, Stagecraft and Statecraft. 
51 Boorstin, The Image, 9. 
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someone has planned, planted, or incited.”52 In his book, Stagecraft and Statecraft, Dan 
Schill writes that seemingly spontaneous events are “scripted to look unplanned and spur-of-
the-moment.”53 This was a strategy deployed by Richard Nixon whose advance men were 
reminded to always have spontaneous stops planned along the motorcade route.54  
The pretense of spontaneity offers carefully crafted visual demonstrations of a 
candidate’s ability to relate to ordinary people. These events are designed around the central 
focus of portraying the candidate as comfortable with unmediated communication. The 
candidate hopping off the campaign bus and ducking into a local pizza shop, making an 
unplanned visit to a local diner, and chatting with locals during a campaign commercial are 
events staged to appear spontaneous and unscripted. A recurring example of this kind of 
event is the established practice of political campaigns to bring along members of the 
traveling press corps for the candidate's happy hour excursions. The “pub” as public house is 
home to spontaneous conversation and awful pickup lines. As a campaign setting, candidates 
use the pub to claim an ability to perform in an ordinary context of immediacy.55 The “beer 
test” asks one to imagine having an informal conversation with a given politician. This is a 
question of immediacy because it tests the comfort of closeness and the pleasure of 
                                                            
52 Ibid., 11. 
53 Schill, Stagecraft and Statecraft, 22. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Scott Horsley, “Obama Polishes His 'Regular Guy' Image With Beer,” All Things 
Considered, NPR, http://www.npr.org/2012/09/15/161200943/obama-polishes-his-regular-
guy-image-with-beer. Pictures showing the candidate drinking beer (responsibly) are 
captioned with the politician’s tap choice—domestic to be sure. Hillary Clinton took this one 
step further during the end of the 2008 Democratic primary when she ordered her beer with a 
shot of Jack Daniels. As with most of the machinations of campaign communication, these 
maneuvers are not totally invisible as indicated by the above NPR headline. 
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conversation.56 Richard Nixon recognized George H. W. Bush’s difficulty in this regard and 
told a biographer, “it's not that he doesn't like people; it's just that he's not very comfortable 
out there on the stump trying to connect with them. He tries too hard to be one of them, 
eating pork rinds and the rest, but he is not one of them, and it comes across. He's better off 
just being himself.”57 
The Script and High-Tech Speech 
What I term a “high-tech ethos” is principally characterized by audience attention to 
the artifice of political speech. Like the rafters and support beams of a building, ethos serves 
an architectural function for rhetoric and makes such a metaphor especially fitting. This is 
not the same as any appearance of cutting-edge technology in a campaign. Such new 
technologies do not always focus attention on the artifice of a campaign and may work to 
assist in the formation of an effective ethos (e.g., when new technologies help to make a 
campaign seem fresh and contemporary).58 
                                                            
56 Sam Kass, The White House Blog, September 01, 2012, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/09/01/ale-chief-white-house-beer-recipe. In part, 
“raising a lot of frosty mugs on the campaign trail” helped Obama draw a contrast to Mitt 
Romney, who, as an observant Mormon, did not drink any alcoholic beverages. The Obama 
campaign went a step further than the usual photo-op and handed out samples of homebrew 
beer made in the Obama White House, and released the recipe on the White House website. 
This is a far cry from dabbling in the art of winemaking. The class distinction of beer and 
wine is well established; to have happy hour at a wine bar would insinuate the candidate into 
the elite. 
57 Monica Crowley, Nixon Off the Record (New York: Random House, 1996), 46. 
58 As Trent and Friedenberg document, there is a long history to this in U.S. presidential 
campaigns. Ronald Reagan used vinyl records in 1968 to bring his voice into voter’s living 
rooms. Jimmy Carter had a leg up on Gerald Ford in 1980 when he used the rather new 
technology of telephone conferencing to allow voters in Iowa and New Hampshire to speak 
with him. Ronald Reagan used satellite transmissions in 1984, and in 1988 many candidates 
used videotape recordings to deliver messages to voters. Political Campaign Communication, 
12. 
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As I have argued, audience attention to artifice in the realm of political speech can be 
debilitating to an orator. The example of Mitt Romney will help illustrate the limit case of the 
overly controlled, robotic speaker wherein unwanted attention to the artifice of speech 
undercuts ethos. Writing in the Atlantic, Brian Fung explains Romney’s style problem in 
technological terms. “Mitt Romney is the storybook presidential candidate,” Fung observes, 
“he's successful, good-looking and a family man, to boot. Yet one of this political season's 
enduring puzzles has been the former governor's consistent inability to bond with voters.”59 
The explanation Fung provides for this puzzle is Romney’s robotic persona; just as “people 
are repulsed and disturbed by automatons that mimic humans closely but imperfectly, 
Romney turns voters off despite looking” the part.60 In the field of robotics, this unsettling 
effect is known as the “uncanny valley” and is observed when people respond negatively to 
an object that has close-but-not-quite human properties such as a prosthetic limb or a 
humanoid robot.61 Writer Alex Pareene draws on a set of related mechanical tropes when 
describing Romney’s not-quite-human style,  
He seems incapable of natural conversation and frequently uncomfortable in his own 
skin. He’s simultaneously dorkily earnest and ingratiatingly insincere. He suggests a 
brilliantly designed politician android with an operating system still clearly in beta…. 
All video of him attempting to interact with normal humans is cringe-inducing, as a 
cursory YouTube search quickly demonstrates.62  
 
                                                            
59 Brian Fung, “The Uncanny Valley: What Robot Theory Tells Us About Mitt Romney,” 
The Atlantic, January 31, 2012.  
60 Ibid., para. 1. 
61 Dolar situates a similar sense of the uncanny in terms of technologies of voice. A Voice 
and Nothing More (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006, 7. 
62 Alex Pareene, The Rude Guide To Mitt, e-book (Salon Media Group, 2012). 
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Indeed, examples of Romney being cited as awkward, inauthentic, weird, and so on 
abound.63 Highlighting Romney’s “weirdness factor” was an early strategy of the Obama 
campaign,64 but they backed away from overtly forwarding this strategy after it was 
suggested that “weird” was a dog whistle for Romney’s Mormon faith. However, Romney’s 
unnatural style was a persistent theme that dogged him. Humorous websites such as 
“Romney Is A Robot” (http://mittromneyisarobot.tumblr.com) and “Awkward Romney” 
(http://awkwardmittromney.tumblr.com) helped to ensure the near-constant and instant 
production of new memes when he said anything odd or unusual.65 Washington Post 
columnist Dana Milbank notes Romney’s struggle to perform, “in casual moments, such as 
Tuesday morning’s retail politics in New Hampshire, his weirdness comes through—equal 
parts ‘Leave It to Beaver’ corniness and social awkwardness.”66  
Paying attention to Romney on the campaign trail is uncanny because what first 
appears as an ideal form of politician melts away into a technologically dystopic horror. Akin 
to the partially melted face of the Terminator, Romney is a juxtaposition of the nonhuman 
and the human; being robotic is a terminal case of an unordinary dependence on technology 
concretized as an epithet against Governor Mitt Romney. Romney’s problem is that rather 
                                                            
63 See Meghan Neal, “Mitt Romney's Awkward Exchanges With Humans,” HuffPolitics 
(blog), Huffingtonpost.com, November 23, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/23/mitt-romneys-awkward-exch_n_1028663.html. 
64 “Weirdness factor” was a term used by an unnamed Obama campaign advisor. Ben Smith 
and Jonathan Martin, “Obama Plan: Destroy Romney,” 2012 LIVE (Blog), Politico.com, 
August 9, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0811/60921.html. 
65 These were paid for by the anti-Republican Party group, Political Action Committee 
American Bridge 21st Century. 
66 Dana Milbank, “A Day Of Awkwardness With Mitt Romney,” Washington Post, June 14, 
2011.  
  92 
than embrace his artificialness he tries to blend in but fails; and thus sticks out all the more. 
His behavior and language seem artificial in his attempt to seem natural. In the next section, I 
will focus on the teleprompter to illustrate how certain technological devices can exacerbate 
this effect. 
Technological Form 
Akin to the artificial speech of a robot, the battle to conceal and reveal artifice is 
staged beneath the slender stand of the teleprompter’s screen. In order to draw attention to 
the device, someone even went so far as to create a blog written from the perspective of the 
Teleprompter of the United States (http://baracksteleprompter.blogspot.com). Writing in Fort 
Wayne's News Sentinel, columnist Will Clark pays similar attention to the device lamenting 
Obama's use of the technology during his 2011 State of the Union Address: “What I long for 
is a president who speaks to us, like we were in the room with him. FDR did it in his fireside 
chats. But that was radio.”67 Clark wonders what would happen if the U.S. President 
addressed the world “with just his speech in front of him, or maybe just his notes, so the 
words would come straight from his heart, not via the teleprompter?”68 By invoking the 
example of FDR, Clark envisions a president who forges an immediate connection with the 
audience. As I have already illustrated, Clark’s technical critique is not an isolated response 
to Obama—who critics renamed the “Teleprompter-in-Chief.”69 These comments concern 
the rhetorical dwelling place of Obama’s speech suggesting that his comments should be 
                                                            
67 Will Clark, “Speech Not As Effective As it Might Have Been Without Teleprompter,” 
News Sentinel, February 3, 2011. 
68 Ibid.  
69 This term is a derogatory meme that emerged during Obama’s first presidential race.  
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materialized differently. In order to understand how the teleprompter technologically affects 
ethos, we will consider its form and cultural signification in turn.  
As a technological form, the teleprompter is a display device that projects a visual 
copy of a manuscript in view of a speaker. The device was originally invented for actors as 
they transitioned from radio to television but quickly found its way into the realm of political 
speech. However, it was not immediately adopted in a widespread fashion.70 Because it 
works through visual display, the teleprompter is a mnemonic device that uses the script 
itself to cue the speaker. Another person follows along off stage, scrolling the projected script 
in pace and rhythm with the speaker. A good prompter breathes along with the speaker and 
can help control a novice speaker's pace.71 As Republican strategist and former aide to 
George W. Bush, Bradley Blakeman explains, teleprompters are usually employed for 
televised events because in a “‘tight shot’ it looks like you are talking without the use of 
notes and gives a much better appearance. That, of course, is true until the camera pulls back 
                                                            
70 An electrical engineer, an actor, and a producer teamed up to make the device for a 1950 
soap opera, The First Hundred. The transition from radio to television meant that actors 
needed to memorize their lines as they would on the stage. The actor, Fred Barton, 
recognized that the rise of television, especially serial dramas such as the soap operas he was 
cast in, put actors under enormous pressure to memorize their lines in short spans of time. 
Because of the costs of time and money for extraneous retakes due to flubbed lines Barton 
worked with Hubert Schlafly Jr., an engineer with 20th Century Fox, to design a scrolling 
screen that would allow actors to maintain eye contact with the camera while seeing their 
script. The teleprompter's successful adoption in 1950s shows such as I Love Lucy ensured its 
continued use. Cory Franklin, “Uh, Uh, Oh Jeez: Let's Go To The Teleprompter,” Chicago 
Tribune, April 15, 2012. 
71 Michael Schulman, “Rolling Rhetoric,” The New Yorker, September 3, 2012. Schulman 
tells the story of Steve Carofalo, who, as general manager of QTV, regularly controls the 
teleprompters of major politicians. According to Carofalo, there is an intimate relationship 
between the teleprompter operator and the speaker. He tells the story of Sarah Palin forming 
a bond with her own private prompter who, to his chagrin, prompted her speech during the 
2008 convention. The prompter advanced the speech too quickly and Palin lost her place 
several times with a few awkward pauses. 
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and the audience can see the prompter ‘paddles’ on either side of the podium.”72 In the case 
of televised speeches, the speaker is able to look into the camera because the teleprompter’s 
display can be reflected in front of the camera’s lens. The device keeps a speaker’s face from 
being buried in a podium while reading, but its use still prevents the higher level of eye 
contact possible in less scripted modes of speech.  
A major formal function of the teleprompter is that it allows a campaign to control a 
speaker and keep them “on” message. Joking about Vice President Joe Biden’s propensity to 
deviate from talking points, Obama pledged at the 2009 White House Correspondents 
Association dinner that “During the second hundred days [of our term], I will learn to go off 
the prompter and Joe Biden will learn to stay on the prompter.”73 The conservative 
fascination with Obama's teleprompter is, in part, a reference to the fact that by controlling 
his speech, the teleprompter prevents him from making mistakes. And because these 
mistakes are thought to give a window into the speaker's true intentions, the teleprompter 
prevents audiences from knowing what Obama is “really” up to. In this way, conservatives 
use Obama’s occasional mistakes to point out the technological form that controls him; rather 
                                                            
72 Bradley A. Blakeman, “Is President Obama Tripping Over 'Idiot Boards'?,” The Arena 
(blog), Politico.com, Oct. 5, 2010, http://www.politico.com/arena/archive/a-minimum-wage-
trap.html. 
73 Barack Obama, President Obama at the White House Correspondents' Dinner, 
(Washington Hilton, Washington, D.C.: C-SPAN, May 9, 2009). Obama used humor to 
dispense with critiques of his use of the teleprompter (and birth certificate, college 
transcripts, etc.) Addressing the annual White House Correspondents Dinner, Obama began 
by saying, “I had an entire speech prepared for this wonderful occasion, but now that I'm 
here I think I'm going to try something a little different. Tonight I want to speak from the 
heart. I'm going to speak off the cuff.” As he said this, teleprompters began to rise to laughter 
and applause from the audience. The president continued, “Good evening. Pause for 
laughter.”  
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than a naturally virtuous President, the control of the teleprompter is argued to be responsible 
for Obama’s ethos.  
Conservative attacks on Obama’s use of the device echo criticism of Romney’s 
artificiality in that they both call into question the true thoughts of the speaker. In the case of 
Obama, the fact that the teleprompter keeps him on message fuels a panic regarding his true 
intentions. For example, during the 2012 general election, Obama made an unscripted ad lib 
remark. about business owners who forget about the government assistance that has made 
their success possible. Referring to the material they rely upon, Obama said, “you didn't build 
that.”74 A large part of the discussion after this event revolved around whether the comment 
indicated that Obama relied upon his teleprompter to avoid saying unpopular things while 
conservatives argued that this slip revealed his hostility to small businesses. Conservatives 
goaded the Obama campaign by speculating whether he would use his teleprompter more 
after that event. 
The total effect of the teleprompter form is unusual because the audience watches the 
speaker as the speaker watches the script. If the orator is skilled at using the device, the 
television audience may not be able to tell that the speaker is looking at the script while 
looking at the camera. Yet, as Bradley Blakeman explains, the desired “tight shot” is not the 
only angle that is provided to the television audience, and political opponents are quick to 
refer to the staging of speech events such as the “paddles” of the prompter.75 Clark's lament 
                                                            
74 Charlie Spiering, “Back on the trail, Obama clings to the teleprompter,” Washington 
Examiner (blog), August 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/back-on-the-trail-
obama-clings-to-the-teleprompter/article/2503841#.UBrqPa6aQws.email.; Amie Parnes, 
“‘You Didn't Build That’ Remarks Won't Change Obama’s Strategy on the Stump,” The Hill 
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of Obama's speech recalls the uncanny experience of watching ventriloquists throw their 
voice.76 Because Clark’s attention is devoted to Obama’s paddles, Clark’s concern is that 
Obama only appears “as if” he is looking at his audience while he actually is looking at the 
text of his speech. If one longs for sincere expression and expects it to be found in the avowal 
of unscripted speech, as Obama’s teleprompter critics imply, then the moment a speaker 
looks away from the script (or tosses it aside) and into the audience becomes pregnant with 
the possibility of sincerity. Such are the symbolic stakes, implicating the virtue of the 
speaker, that are rooted in the form of the teleprompter.  
Cultural Significance 
Beyond what the teleprompter enables and constrains as a result of its formal material 
attributes, it also produces meaning via cultural signification. While the teleprompter is 
ubiquitous in the American presidency, recent articulations of the technology have led to its 
use being derided. For example, running for president, Congresswoman Michele Bachmann 
claimed that she would never use the device, “I promise you there won't be any teleprompters 
in the Bachmann White House.”77 In this section, I describe three contemporary 
significations that make such comments possible: dependency, authorship, and intelligence.  
Dependency. Rory Cooper, of the conservative Heritage Foundation, frames the issue 
of dependence this way: while the device has been used for formal speeches by every 
president since it was invented, “the crutch needs to be dropped for more informal occasions, 
rallies and speeches where the passion and conviction of the president should be able to 
                                                            
76 As I will discuss in the next section, this invokes the problematics of voice. For a 
discussion of ventriloquism and voice, see Dolar, Voice, 70. 
77 Philip Rucker, “Republicans Mock Obama’s Teleprompter Use,” Washington Post, 
October 18, 2011.  
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guide him through remarks.”78 For Cooper, Obama relies upon the device because the 
courage of his conviction is not enough. It is true that Obama uses the teleprompter more 
than previous presidents and incorporates the device into his daily routine of short and minor 
speeches, but the critique of his use is not only about frequency—it’s also about dependency.  
As Bradley Blakeman puts it, Obama is “addicted” to the device and “needs to drop 
‘cold turkey’ the use of teleprompters and connect with his audiences,” because “you cannot 
connect with ordinary people if you talk past them.”79 Blakeman claims that Obama’s 
dependence is put into highest relief when he answers unscripted questions, because “his 
speech is very halted and you can see him take a lot of time to think about what he’s going to 
say.”80 
Being reliant on the teleprompter figures technology as a wedge that separates what a 
speaker avows from what would otherwise spring forth from her soul. As the humorous anti-
Obama blog written from the device’s perspective puts it, the teleprompter is “the hard drive 
of the machine that enables the voice of the Leader of the Free World.”81 In this formulation, 
the audience is separated from Obama’s authentic voice. The conservative, conspiracy-
peddling website CNS News made hay out of one such supposed mistake. “In two campaign 
speeches over the last two days, President Barack Obama has twice mistakenly mentioned 
‘my sons,’” Terence Jeffrey writes, “Obama, as noted, does not have sons. Nor was he born 
in Kenya. Nor is he a Muslim. But it is a fact, as the White House itself reported in its 
                                                            
78 “Is President Obama Tripping Over 'Idiot Boards'?,” The Arena (blog), Politico.com, Oct. 
5, 2010, http://www.politico.com/arena/archive/a-minimum-wage-trap.html. 
79 “Tripping Over 'Idiot Boards.’” 
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transcripts of his speeches, that on four occasions this year President Obama has rhetorically 
slipped up and mistakenly talked about ‘my sons’—nonexistent though they are.”82 In the full 
context, it is very plausible that it was not a mistake but a hypothetical statement. The point 
that Jeffrey makes, and the reason that this story would have any traction as news, is that he 
made this “mistake” several times, and the implication is that he will say whatever is on the 
screen even if it is wildly incorrect.  
Intelligence. Stemming from dependence is the teleprompter’s cultural association 
with intelligence. There is a wealth of examples in which dependence on the device for artful 
communication implies a lack of intelligence. Walter Mondale used the term “idiot board” in 
dispensing advice to President Obama during his first term. “He uses these idiot boards to 
read speeches on television and I think he loses the connection.”83 Obama's dependence on 
the Teleprompter, as constructed by conservatives, is made to indicate not only that he will 
reveal himself without it but also that his dependence on the script means he is actually far 
less intelligent than he appears. Drawing attention to Obama's use of the teleprompter is a 
means to offset what is often considered his strongest advantage: deft oratorical skill.84 
Rucker explains the GOP's argument: “If Obama can't give a two-minute speech without a 
screen telling him what to say, the critique goes, it's a sign that he doesn't know what he's 
                                                            
82 Terence P. Jeffrey, “Obama Twice Mistakenly Mentions ‘My Sons,’ While Defending 
Contraception Mandate,” CNS News (blog), May 25, 2012, http://cnsnews.com/blog/terence-
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83 “Mondale to Obama: Ditch the ‘Idiot Boards,’ Political Ticker (blog), CNN.com, October 
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84 As Philip Rucker writes in the Washington Post, “Republican presidential candidates are 
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talking about and can't be trusted to do his job.”85 In contrast to Bush’s false appearance of 
ignorance, Obama, they contend, only appears to be intelligent with the help of his assistive 
technology.  
Crisis of Authorship. The teleprompter poses a crisis of authorship because it has 
come to signify the presence of speechwriters and political advisors.86 Rory Cooper uses this 
presence to discredit Obama’s oratorical skill, “as a candidate, Obama was praised by the 
media for his speaking abilities, but the more he uses the teleprompter, the more people 
connect a speechwriter to those skills, and distrust Obama himself.”87 Rick Santorum went so 
far as to say that use of the teleprompter should be outlawed on the campaign trail. “I always 
believed that when you run for president of the United States, it should be illegal to read off a 
teleprompter,” Santorum said, “because all you're doing is reading someone else's words to 
people.”88 Santorum denounced the practice of using focus groups to refine one's message 
and preferred that the candidate design the words rather than “pollsters and speechwriters.”89 
Making the connection to immediacy explicit, Santorum went on, “it's important for you to 
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understand who that person is in their own words, see them, look them in the eye... hear 
what's [in his or her] heart.”90  
The teleprompter points toward the industry of campaign consultants and advisors 
and the role they may play in giving the candidate poll-tested talking points to say for effect 
rather than sincerely-held beliefs. Fred Davis, who advised both Senator John McCain and 
former ambassador Jon Huntsman Jr. during their presidential campaigns, notes that using a 
teleprompter has been associated with inauthenticity. “It's a sign that you can't speak on your 
own two feet. It's a sign that you have handlers behind you telling you what to say.”91 For 
Republican pollster and wordsmith Frank Luntz, the problem with Obama using the 
teleprompter more than other presidents is that the words are not his own, “they're somebody 
else's … [voters] want you to look them straight in the eye and say what you mean and mean 
what you say. It's the most important attribute.”92 
The crisis of authorship posed by the teleprompter is so acute that Obama’s advisors 
have made a concerted effort to conceal his artifice by asserting his authorship. By the time 
Obama took office, there was already reticence in talking about his use of the device. Unlike 
Bush's press secretaries, Obama's did not refer to his teleprompter practice before major 
speeches. In a press conference before his 2010 State of the Union address, Press Secretary 
Robert Gibbs was asked about Obama’s speech preparation practices. “Is he sitting down 
today, tomorrow with speechwriters? How much does he write? Does he practice with the 
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Teleprompter?”93 Gibbs responded by saying only, “they spent time over the weekend 
working on it.”94 When asked for more details, Gibbs clarified' that “they” were “the 
president and the speechwriters” and that the next day the president would do “some of the 
practicing that you talk about, as well as continuing to write and work through different 
sections of the speech.”95 Gibbs never used the word “teleprompter” and pivoted from the 
president practicing the speech to the president writing and working through the speech. 
In the lead up to his address to a Joint Session of Congress regarding healthcare 
reform, Obama advisor Valerie Jarrett was asked if there was a backup tape in case there was 
a problem with the teleprompter. Recalling the Clinton snafu, MSNBC Correspondent 
Andrea Mitchell asked, “Valerie, about 16 years ago, President Clinton gave a similar speech 
to a joint session and the teleprompter broke. Do you have backup tonight?”96 Jarrett’s 
response firmly indicates the strategy of using sincerity to deny the artifice of speech. “Well, 
you know what, I'm very confident the president knows exactly what he wants to say, that if 
something goes wrong, he'll speak directly from the heart and the American people will hear 
his message. This is really all about the American people. And I'm not worried about whether 
he needs a teleprompter or the text.”97  
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Obama’s advisors also were careful to depict his participation in writing the speeches 
that he delivered. For example, just before Obama’s 2012 State of the Union address, the 
White House released photos and a behind the scenes video of the process of preparing the 
speech. Photographic stills show him holding the speech script and portray him as instructing 
the speechwriter. One of the opening images features his own handwriting on a draft of the 
speech and an advisor mentioning how involved he is with the writing of the speech.98 His 
speechwriter mentions that Obama made “a lot of edits,” and then in the Oval Office, a video 
shows the President remarking, “the bad news is that it is not there yet.”99 Then his advisor 
David Plouff adds that Obama's participation is not just an exercise in editing. Rather, “he is 
involved from conception through kind of the development process and then you know he 
writes a lot of the speech himself.” The still images are of the President discussing a printed 
script or seated with his advisors standing. The speechwriters are described as weaving the 
speech together according to the President's direction. “But then he takes it and makes it 
his.”100 
Low-Tech Style: The Bullhorn and the Myth of Unmediated Speech  
In the realm of political campaign communication, we might imagine a stiff, even 
robotic candidate attempting to blend into a pastoral landscape. If the teleprompter reveals 
the struggle of technological style at the point when artifice is visually apparent, we might 
also observe the struggle over technological style in failed attempts to dispense with it. This 
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99 The video is 4:18 seconds long, and within the first 19 seconds of the video, there is 
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attention to efforts at augmenting a candidate’s technological style sheds new light on the 
example of Mitt Romney and allows us to ascertain what seemed like odd moments on a 
usually mundane campaign trail. Having suffered in 2008 from appearing too polished and 
plastic, the Romney of 2012 rarely wore a tie. He made a point of occasionally avoiding the 
use of a teleprompter, but it did not seem to work. In the face of a damaging high tech ethos, 
the Romney campaign worked to construct a low-tech ethos. They went to great lengths, not 
only to highlight his non-use of the teleprompter, but also to emphasize his use of low-tech, 
low-production value devices as in his use of a whiteboard during a press conference. After 
announcing Representative Paul Ryan as his running mate, funding for Medicare became a 
central issue. Ryan had previously proposed a budget that privatized some Medicare benefits, 
and the Romney campaign worked to distinguish their plan from Obama’s. Rather than a 
detailed policy speech, Romney called a rather odd press conference that was held outdoors 
and featured a whiteboard. He spoke extemporaneously and used the board to display a 
simple graph that compared “Obama” and “Romney” on “Seniors” and “Next Gen.”101 This 
graph was in Romney’s own handwriting and felt less like a political speech and more like a 
boardroom sales pitch. The deviation from political genre was noticed; Brett LoGiurato of 
Business Insider called it “one of the weirder moments on the campaign trail.”102  
In another example, Mitt Romney made a rather heavy-handed attempt to de-
technologize his ēthos. At a press conference explaining his new 59-point economic plan, he 
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displayed a one-page hand-written note proudly proclaiming, “I don't have a teleprompter 
here.”103 Later, seeking to distinguish his jobs plan from Obama’s, Romney took to a podium 
at a hastily called news conference, “Now, this is going to be a conversation today. I don't 
have a text written. You can actually see here what I've got. I've got notes. All right? I've got 
some notes of some things I want to tell you. I'm not going to be reading and I don't have a 
teleprompter here. Nothing wrong with that. I use it from time-to-time. I just want to talk to 
you…”104 
It is not enough to merely avoid the high-tech markings of Romney’s robotics and 
Obama’s projected speech script. While being too polished or controlled can be a downfall of 
the high-tech, artifice can also become apparent with too little control. As I will demonstrate 
in this section, it is not sufficient to eradicate scripted control. Even the enactment of a low-
tech style requires technique. While the teleprompter is a high-tech display device that 
enables attention to rhetorical artifice, other methods of technological control via script that 
do not operate via display can fail by drawing unwanted attention to the script. For example, 
the talking point is a technique for extemporaneous speech that works via memory instead of 
display. While the script is not physically present, it can still become apparent as artifice 
when blundered. When a talking point is apprehended as itself, it loses some of its persuasive 
force. Rather than a deeply held belief, it can seem like a poll tested sound byte designed for 
effect rather than expressed via sincere correspondence to internal thought.  
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For example, Texas Governor Rick Perry had a memory lapse during a November 
2011 GOP presidential debate in Michigan.105 Perry was struggling in the polls, and his 
debate performances were already under scrutiny. In what became known as his “oops 
moment” and quickly thought by many pundits to be the death knell of his candidacy, he 
began listing the three federal agencies that he would eliminate upon taking office. He listed 
the first two but then stalled, unable to name the third. He fumbled, looked around, tried to 
laugh it off, and then said that he could not remember the third one. “Sorry. Oops.”106 In a 
campaign commercial released after the debate, Perry joked about his flub as his campaign 
attempted some ritual atonement. The advertisement shows Perry watching a video of his 
memory lapse, and then correctly finishing the list he flubbed. “You know, we've all lost our 
train of thought before, but not many have done it on national TV. Now if you want a slick 
debater, I'm obviously not your guy. But if want to clean house in Washington... I'm your 
man. I'm Rick Perry a—what’s that line again? I'm Rick Perry and I approve this 
message.”107 Unfortunately for Perry, his attempt to play off the flub failed. The narrative 
that emerged was that his memory lapse was the “53 seconds that sunk his campaign.”  
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The conventional reading of this flub was one of negative image: people already 
wondered if he was stupid, and this moment would work to reinforce that image. I believe a 
better explanation of the effect of this and other similar flubs requires that one understand the 
talking point as a technique of speech. His response had to be in accord with the ritualized 
expectations of American politics.108 But more importantly, his flub was consequential to 
begin with because it drew attention to the presence of a talking point as a strategic 
construction rather than a deeply held moral belief. Because he was not able to remember the 
name of a federal department he wanted to eviscerate, audiences called into question the 
veracity of his belief that such a department was overregulating the energy industry and 
preventing America from being energy independent.109 Without the moral imperative, calling 
for such cuts sounds less like frank speech and more like political calculation. Perry’s ēthos 
diminished as the audience saw the actor practicing his lines. Seeing brushstrokes on a 
canvas draws attention to the technique of painting; this type of speech error—the belabored 
talking point—draws our attention to the artifice of speech and leads us to question if the 
policy position originates in the speaker’s soul or the advisor’s strategy.110  
Bush’s Low Style 
At the time when President George W. Bush was stumbling through official remarks, 
liberals loved to mock his intelligence (or lack thereof), and draw attention to his 
uncontrolled speech. Yet these flubs did more to bolster his character than undercut it. While 
                                                            
108 Bennett, “Assessing Presidential Character.” 
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the example of Perry’s flub shows that a speaker’s character can be undercut by errors, 
Bush’s demonstrate the ambivalence of flubs because it is possible that, rather than showing 
the presence of artifice, speech errors can suggest a present absence of strategic control.111 
Corresponding to low and plain is the realist style that Robert Hariman writes about in 
Political Style.112 This technê persuades audiences of the artlessness of Bush’s speech. 
Hariman quotes Machiavelli in a particularly realist moment, “I have not sought to adorn my 
work with long phrases or high-sounding words or any of those superficial attractions and 
ornaments.”113 Much to the chagrin of liberals that lampooned it during the 2000 and 2004 
elections, Bush's plain style was more asset than liability; a large portion of Americans 
reported that Bush's verbal blunders lent an authenticity to his speech lacking in other 
politicians.114  
Early in George W. Bush’s presidency, there was a joke circulating on the Internet. 
Al Gore and Bush were having breakfast after the election, and the waitress asked for their 
order. Gore said he would have oatmeal and applesauce, and Bush asked her for a quickie. 
She stalked off, and Gore whispered to the new president, “that's quiche.” What this joke 
relies upon for its humor is the juxtaposition of the oafish but endearing ignorance of Bush 
and the tightly wound sophisticated intelligence of Gore.115 The 2000 election epitomized 
                                                            
111 Speech, and voice as self-presence of the speaking subject, has long been caught in this 
ambivalence of being privileged and scorned. Dolar, Voice, 42-43.  
112 Hariman, Political Style, 5.  
113 Ibid., 18.  
114 Erard, 12.  
115 Michael Silverstein, Talking Politics: The Substance of Style From Abe to "W"  (Chicago: 
Prickly Paradigm, 2003), 75-76. 
  108 
this ambivalence of the medium of the script: Bush was a lovable stumbler while his 
opponent, Vice President Al Gore, was a scripted robot unable to connect with voters. Bush’s 
rhetorical reputation for verbal blunders came to reflect a characterological duality; he was 
seen as stupid but sincere, or put mildly, as earnest but lacking intelligence. Mark Miller 
argues that the Bush campaign, while not inventing the anti-intellectual strategy, represented 
its first full press; Bush’s first presidential campaign attempted to frame him as the second 
Andrew Jackson working against the elite “Prince Albert.”1 His thick tongue was a sign of 
unpretentiousness similar to the language of someone working long hours on a dock or in a 
field. Whether it was campaign strategy or individual accident (or both), Bush’s ethos was 
effective because it was taken to display habits of moral virtues (even if it also indicated 
intellectual vices). His child-like sincerity functioned to mute other character-based critiques 
even from his critics. Linguist and anthropologist Michael Silverstein does not hide his 
disdain for Bush’s “verbal slapstick,” but he simultaneously identifies an earnestness that, on 
balance, does more to recover Bush than his mistakes do to hurt him. Bush’s style,  
ranges hilariously over the whole gag kitbag. Doubletalk, malapropisms, the worst 
hack bromides, and yet it is very appealing in its own way, is it not? ... It has been 
consistently delivered with a manly tone of conviction, even aggressiveness; with a 
firm-jawed, non-sissy Texas style of pronunciations that Poppy never really mastered; 
and with a facial and whole bodily posture of earnestness that has got to make our 
hearts go out to the guy: he's really, really attempting to grasp things–whatever they 
are–with his whole being.116 
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Despite winning the popular vote, Vice President Al Gore suffered in the comparison to 
Bush’s earnestness. According to Silverstein, Gore’s speeches, “written and delivered like 
policy memoranda,” failed to convince enough people he had the “fire–in–the–belly” that 
indicates a morally directed drive.117 Perhaps Gore’s campaign picked up on this construction 
of their candidate and, akin to Obama’s effort to assert his authorship, motivated one of 
Gore’s speechwriters to go to great pains before the Vice President’s 2000 party nomination 
acceptance speech to note that Gore was “literally, truly and unquestionably’ the author of 
the acceptance speech.”118 
While President George W. Bush was not superb at large-scale oration, he excelled at 
face-to-face encounters. He was not particularly good at using the teleprompter, though he 
did improve with practice.119 Bush was best when he was using plain language and 
interacting with people in less formal settings. This communication practice formed a strong 
element of his rhetorical reputation and affected the ways his speech acts were made sense 
of. For example, Pamela Geller, of the conservative website Atlas Shrugs, spoke on Sean 
Hannity's television show about President Barack Obama, “He took 25 teleprompters with 
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him to Europe. Twenty-five. Did you ever see Bush with a teleprompter ever? He was a 
plainspoken man.” Hannity then responded, “He did use it when—during the State of the 
Union. But he didn't carry it everywhere. He used his notes, like Reagan used his notes and 
Clinton.”120 Packed into this example are several aspects that point toward the ambivalence 
of scripted speech. Geller implies that we can glean something about Obama’s character 
based on the number of teleprompters he traveled with, and that Bush, in contrast, 
demonstrated the virtue of being “plainspoken” by not using the device. For Geller, 
plainspoken is a device-free condition. Hannity’s response compounded this by implying that 
Bush only used the device for the State of the Union address, and otherwise simply used 
“notes.” In this final turn we see a hierarchy between devices, with “notes” as the tool of the 
virtuously plainspoken man. Bush’s reputation and rhetorical practice amplified his style as a 
pattern of low-tech communication. This style had clear effects on his reception as a frank 
speaker.  
The height of Bush’s presidential rhetoric is a moment when his voice is taken to 
have arisen from his soul without the mediation of political strategy. When journalist Howard 
Kurtz stages the scene in his writing, he imagines that Bush “grabbed the bullhorn,” as if it 
lay on the ground, and he was inspired to speak with it. This prototypical rhetorical 
performance is a speech he gave when he visited Ground Zero.121 Only three days after 9/11, 
the World Trade Center towers lay smoldering as rescue workers searched in vain for 
survivors. Using a bullhorn seemingly taken from the fire chief he stood next to, Bush 
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addressed those gathered. He began speaking, using no script but moving between familiar 
expressions, “I want you to know that America today… America today is on bended knee…” 
As he spoke, it became clear that, even with the bullhorn, his audience was having trouble 
hearing him. The President continued and seemed to rush through his thoughts as he paid 
respect to those affected by 9/11. As a chorus of complaints swelled from the out-of-earshot, 
Bush raised his voice and retorted, “I can hear you” to cheers and applause. Responding to 
the audience’s enthusiasm, he continued, “I can hear you, the rest of the world hears you, and 
the people… and the people that knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon.”122 
What might, in even a slightly different situation, pass into the dustbin of history’s 
unscripted, spontaneous moments in public speech has instead come to symbolize the 
epitome of authenticity—what Jeff Zeleny referred to as “one of the most iconic moments of 
his presidency.”123 As Kurtz summarizes, “George W. Bush had a breakthrough moment 
when he grabbed the bullhorn amid the rubble of ground zero.”124 
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Low-Tech Form and Significance  
 Earlier I remarked that Americans have developed a lexicon of mediation such that 
some technologies appear to facilitate immediacy. Let us consider what such low-tech speech 
would entail in terms of technological form and cultural significance. Voice is central to the 
cultural imaginary of the bullhorn because it is a technology for amplifying the human voice. 
There has been, since the birth of public speaking, interest in amplification. The earliest 
forms involve the manipulation of physical space such as the creation of an amphitheater or 
the manipulation of acoustic space in the creation of a conical megaphone still used today by 
male cheerleaders in sporting events.  
Mladen Dolar identifies a salient story that illustrates key themes of voice and 
technological form. Austrian inventor Wolfgang von Kempelen toured Europe in the 1780s 
with two devices: a thinking machine and a speaking machine. The thinking machine was 
presented as a champion chess-playing automaton (but the large interworkings of the 
machine most likely hid a very skilled dwarf). The visible design was of a Turkish puppet 
holding a hookah and sitting before a chessboard. The speaking machine was a complex 
system for mechanically replicating human speech. Similar to a bagpipe, it included a 
wooden box, bellows, and a complex series of valves. Dolar observes a crucial distinction 
between Kempelen’s devices that parallels the teleprompter and the bullhorn: one attempts to 
conceal what the other reveals.125 The difference between the chess automaton and the 
speaking machine is that the automaton was “constructed in such a way as to appear as 
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human-like as possible… while the speaking machine was as mechanical as possible: he did 
not try to hide its mechanical nature; on the contrary, it exhibited it conspicuously.”126 
This story illustrates several features of voice germane to this chapter. As a 
communication medium, voice focuses attention on the speaking subject. Dolar notes that 
voice is a medium of expression that “implies a subjectivity which expresses itself.”127 As a 
result, a persistent theme for voice is origin. Where is this voice coming from? Is it 
legitimate? Is it as it appears? Additionally, voice situates the subject firmly in the interior of 
a body, and voice tends to imply the authenticity of the body (e.g., when a person finds his or 
her true voice.)128 Thus, the bullhorn draws attention to the speaking subject and his or her 
agency.129 
Having introduced Dolar’s distinction regarding voice, we can better understand the 
drive to distance Bush from the teleprompter and the reason his supporters would instead 
align him technologically with notecards. That his preferred mnemonic device would matter 
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signals voice-based assumptions about how notecards as a communication technology would 
reflect virtue by mediating his speech differently from that of a teleprompter. Ari Fleischer, 
former White House press secretary to President George W. Bush, while discussing his view 
that President Obama uses the teleprompter too often, admitted that Bush used one on 
occasion but usually only for especially important speeches and that his “standard style” was 
“little 5-by-8 cards.”130 The notecard is a decidedly lower technology, and the aesthetic of 
low-tech speech maintains the audience attention not on the artifice of speech, but the voice 
of speech. As Dolar reminds us, voice invokes notions of intentionality.131 Bush’s quips with 
his bullhorn and notecard-aided speeches “mean something” because the bullhorn and 
notecard signify his intentional vocalization—his intention to say something that originates 
in his interior.  
Yet the bullhorn and notecard, as low-tech mediators of voice, escape a critique of 
their materiality. As Dolar explains, voice is a “vanishing mediator,” wherein “the voice is 
the material support of bringing about meaning, yet it does not contribute to it itself.”132 
Bush’s notecards work like the bullhorn; both technologies are understood not as mediators 
but as intermediaries. They are naturalized to the extent that it is assumed they do not 
influence the message but carry it like empty conduits.133 
                                                            
130 Rucker, “Republicans Mock.” 
131 Dolar, Voice, 14. 
132 Ibid., 15. 
133 Here, I draw from the notions of conduits and black boxes in Actor Network Theory. 
Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, 
Clarendon lectures in management studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
  115 
One effect of low-tech style’s vocal symbolism is the embrace of anti-intellectualism. 
The very notion that Bush was stupid while Gore was smart perpetuates an overly-simplistic 
ideology of eloquence wherein ordinary speech is associated with conservative speakers and 
high style is associated with intellectually elite liberals. If Bush was thought to be ignorant, 
Gore was thought to be intellectually elitist. Bush's reputation was so widespread that a 
cottage industry of books about “Bushisms” sprang up.134 Bush’s many errors of speech were 
generally taken to indicate one of two character traits depending on one’s impression of the 
man: either he lacked thoughtfulness and was terribly stupid, or he possessed sincerity and 
was willing to speak without careful control. What unifies these interpretations of Bush’s 
flubs is that they reveal what is true about him. 
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The low-tech style also contains an anti-high tech discourse. Speakers are celebrated 
for the signification of being free from technological control. This is an echo of the rhetoric 
of anti-rhetoric described in Chapter Two. While use of a teleprompter draws conservative 
ire, not using a teleprompter is cited as reason to celebrate a speaker. New Jersey Governor 
Chris Christie, for example, has a reputation for an unscripted speaking style. Steve Ayscue 
pondered how Christie would negotiate using the device and his frank style at the 2012 GOP 
Convention, “Don't be shocked if [Christie] picks up the TelePrompTer and crashes it to the 
stage like a Townsend guitar at a Who concert.” Outlets such as the right-wing Daily Caller 
made a point of mentioning that Condoleezza Rice did not use the device when she addressed 
the Convention, instead using notes and speaking extemporaneously. They cited her as “the 
only speaker of the convention thus far to take the podium without the assistance of a 
teleprompter.”135 Conservatives emphasized her “barn-burner speech”.136 A number of 
accounts from the convention, conservative and not, highlighted Rice's non-use of the 
prompting device.137 This absence of a prompting device indicates that the anti-high tech 
impulse lends credibility to speakers who are taken to be free from the control of a script. 
It is in light of what the low-tech style offers that we can return to the context of the 
2012 presidential election and the GOP candidates’ near-fascination with Obama’s 
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teleprompter. Seeking to unseat Obama, candidates in the 2012 GOP primary went out of 
their way to distance themselves from the teleprompter. As mentioned earlier, Santorum 
argued that the device should be illegal, while Perry explained away his many gaffes by 
saying that he was not a teleprompter candidate. Herman Cain used a straight talking cowboy 
in a commercial to lambast Obama as the teleprompter-reliant slick-talker, and one of the 
most recurrent attacks came from Newt Gingrich whose stump speech included a joke about 
Obama's mechanical dependence. Gingich, in contrasting their styles of speech, embraced the 
debate form and challenged Obama to seven Lincoln-Douglas style debates, “if he wants to 
use a teleprompter, then it would be fine with me. It has to be fair.”138 
These examples illustrate a central effect of embracing immediacy as an anti-
technological style in political discourse. The persuasiveness of the low-tech style emanates 
from the notion that the technology of a written script separates the audience from the voice 
of the speaker. Parlaying voice as central to a technological style has the effect of 
discouraging ideological critique. Ironically, it is the misplaced desire to recover voice from 
the script that stifles the politics of public speech. Preoccupied with the ethical force of 
sincerity, we are unable to notice when “voice” is mobilized as an ideological strategy. 
Setting aside the question of its ontological location, the case of the bullhorn illustrates how 
prevailing treatments of political speech in U.S. public culture mobilize a particular notion of 
voice as sincere expression that staves off the radical potential of acknowledging the ethical 
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and affective implications of voice. The ideology of unscripted speech and its attendant 
notion of political agency function to evacuate the politics of voice. 
Conclusions 
The teleprompter and the bullhorn provide a way to think about how artifice is 
concealed in contemporary presidential rhetoric and the effects of failing to conceal the art of 
rhetoric. In the high-tech cases of Romneybot and teleprompter, attention to artifice 
undercuts the naturalized ēthos of the ordinary speaker. Discourse critiquing Romney and 
Obama borrow from the register of the uncanny and describe their speech in ways akin to 
ventriloquism wherein the origin of voice is uncertain. While it is difficult to quantify how 
much each critique “worked” against the respective candidate, it appears that the 
technological critique was more debilitating to Romney. Assuming that it is the case, 
rhetorical technique can explain the difference. Despite what one might say about Obama’s 
use of the teleprompter and what his use signifies about his character, the fact remains that he 
is quite good at using the device. As Dolar reminds us, voice is not universally embraced; it 
can also pose a danger in controlled settings.139 The ambivalence of flubs illustrates this well 
and with some, such as Perry’s “oops moment,” shows how apprehending voice can still 
undercut the ēthos of a speaker.  
As a paired heuristic, the teleprompter and the bullhorn examples suggest several 
implications for this dissertation’s goal of understanding the effect of favoring speech that we 
consider immediate. In particular, this chapter provides three crucial insights for 
understanding public deliberation and political campaigns. We notice the role of 
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intentionality for our understanding of agency, the relation of anti-intellectualism and the 
rhetoric of non-rhetoric, and the changing conditions of publicity.  
First, this chapter has demonstrated that a central element of concealment is 
intentionality. The question of intention for the critic is, how do we judge orators if they did 
not intend to express themselves a particular way? Here the flub of speech can decrease the 
culpability of a speaker. The notion that leads to the valorization of unscripted speech is that, 
because it was not scripted, it was more natural. In the example of the teleprompter, it is 
thought that the presence of a script ironically signals a rejection of the intention to signify. 
Because the speech has been written beforehand, the speaker avoids expressing what would 
naturally be voiced and signals instead the intention to manipulate the audience with their 
persuasive wiles. The bullhorn, in contrast, evokes the ethical dimensions of voice and, like 
the chess-playing automaton, displays a technical object only to demonstrate the power of its 
interiority.  
This notion of intention relates to agency. A simple observation helps to relate the 
fetish of unscripted speech and a fantasy of rhetorical agency to U.S. public culture: speakers 
who conceal their artifice are celebrated as agents of political life. The appearance of technê 
reminds audiences in contemporary U.S. public culture of the artifice of public speech when 
it disrupts the widely held fantasy of communication agency: that ideal rhetorical agents are 
willing and able to express themselves without filter. Lundberg and Gunn outline the fantasy 
of rhetorical agency as being seated securely in the rhetorical agent who possesses the 
potential for transcendent communication.140  
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The question of strategy and technique forces us to think more broadly about the 
category of intention. Technê is not only intentionally applied techniques. The question of 
intention is necessary but insufficient for rhetorical critique. When we acknowledge the 
performativity of rhetoric, we are better able to appreciate the ways in which speech 
incorporates highly intentional, strategic acts with unconscious disclosure. We need not pick 
one or the other but must understand for rhetorical literacy that constructedness does not 
denote only intentional content.  
 Second, both technologies of speech examined in this chapter cause us to reflect on 
the relation of intellectual virtue and moral virtue. Specifically, how the anti-intellectualism 
that works in tandem with anti- and non-rhetorics reflects the collapsing together of 
intellectual and moral virtue. In the teleprompter example, we see the way that intelligence, 
rather than a positive character trait, can have a negative effect on a speaker’s  ēthos by 
undercutting the moral virtue of ordinariness. In a lose-lose scenario, Obama is appraised as 
intellectually elite and incapable of speaking in ordinary terms or as intellectually inferior 
and incapable of speaking in ordinary terms. In the bullhorn example, we see the strategic 
deployment of stupid sincerity. The priority of populism in U.S. political culture lies at the 
root of both technological figurations. The conservative movement has been effective at 
articulating intellectualism with the elite side of the populist struggle. Addressing the Value 
Voters Summit in 2012, for example, former Senator and darling of the conservative 
movement Rick Santorum told his conservative audience that they will “never have the elite, 
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smart people on our side.”141 The glee with which he and others cede intelligence to the 
opponent illustrates the power of the populist articulation. Conservative discourse has named 
and condemned the sin of sounding smart. Speech craft, even eloquence itself, has been 
rendered the dark mark of the intellectually elitist liberal. 
 The treatment of Bush as an unmediated truth teller allows for this strategy of 
concealment. While George W. Bush went to very prestigious schools, including Phillips 
Academy, Yale University, and Harvard Business School, his friends knew that he was 
“rigorously anti–intellectual, deeply suspicious of gratuitous intellectualism, which 
opponents sometimes misread as a lack of intelligence.”142 His ascent to the presidency 
illustrates at the very least a proficiency in a certain kind of social intelligence and honed 
skills at immediacy. As Bush remarks of his school days, “I wasn't exactly an Ivy League 
scholar,” he once told a reporter, “what I was good at was getting to know people.”143 His 
rhetorical corpus, far from a low point of presidential oratory, is akin to Plato’s skill at 
                                                            
141 Rosie Gray, “Rick Santorum: Conservatives Will Never Have ‘Smart People On Our 
Side,’” BuzzFeed (blog), September 15, 2012, http://www.buzzfeed.com/rosiegray/rick-
santorum-says-smart-people-will-never-be-on. 
142 James Moore, Bush's Brain: How Karl Rove Made George W. Bush Presidential 
(Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley, 2003), 159. 
143 Ibid., 160. Karl Rove did take some steps to undercut the notion that Bush was not smart. 
James Moore and Wayne Slater present evidence that Karl Rove sent the conservative 
newspaper the National Review a story about Bush and “his prodigious reading habits,” 
including naming James Q. Wilson's The Moral Sense and On Character, Gertrude 
Himmelfarb's The Demoralization of Society, and Marvin Olasky's The Tragedy of American 
Compassion. During the 2000 presidential election, Gov. Bush would walk through the cabin 
of the campaign plane, in view of reporters, carrying a large volume of history about the 
Civil War or a biography of a Founding Father. While Bush always maintained an anti-
intellectual flair, he also always maintained a visible interest in learning about American 
history, particularly aspects steeped in patriotic nostalgia, Ibid., 136.  
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concealing his rhetorical craft. Underneath his many Bushisms is a savvy politician who 
promulgated an original and indelible domestic and foreign policy. 
Finally this chapter allows us to think about what is new in the contemporary 
moment. One difference between now and antiquity is a condition of publicity that is 
illustrated by the example of the hot mic. An exemplar of this, complete with video to 
accompany the microphone, is the “47%” video captured at a Romney campaign fundraiser 
in 2012.144 In Chapter One, I explained that the sincerity demand compels speakers to appear 
sincere through techniques of speech. Speakers face the challenge in light of this demand of 
how to balance the appearance of sincerity with audience adaptation. For Plato such 
adaptation was necessary for ethical communication. However, part of the anxiety about hot 
mic moments is the difference between public and private face that tests the central demand 
for sincerity. After video of Romney’s unflattering comments regarding 47% of Americans, 
the Obama campaign quickly labeled it a “leaked,” “secret” video, “from a closed door 
fundraiser,” that was telling because, “so rarely over the course of this campaign have we 
gotten to hear Mitt Romney say what he believes in such a revealing, unfiltered manner.”145 
                                                            
144 In September of 2012, Mother Jones released 49 minutes of video that was secretly 
recorded during a Romney closed-door $50,000-a-plate fundraising dinner. The camera is 
consistent with that found on most cellular phones and is perched between vases in the back 
of the room. This video was especially damaging because it resonated with the ēthos being 
constructed by the Obama campaign that Romney did not care about ordinary people. 
Romney went into detail about people who do not pay taxes and take responsibility for 
themselves. Perhaps it would have been less damaging as a public policy speech unhidden 
from view. As it was, Romney did not know it was being recorded suggesting that he was 
speaking without the broader public audience in mind. As is often the response, damage 
control by the campaign was to locate the comment outside of his control as a mistake—a 
gaffe. David Corn, “Full Secret Video of Private Romney Fundraiser,” Mother Jones 
September 18, 2012. 
145 Obama himself brought the video up in one of the debates, making sure to mention that 
Romney’s comments here “behind closed doors,” Luke Johnson, “Obama Attacks Mitt 
Romney's ‘47 Percent’ Comments In Presidential Debate,” HuffPolitics (blog), 
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“I can't speak to Governor Romney's motivations,” Obama mentioned in an interview, “what 
I can say is that he has signed up for positions, extreme positions… And whether he actually 
believes in those or not, I have no doubt that he would carry forward some of the things that 
he's talked about.”146 Saying one thing to a room of investors and another on the stump 
illustrates that public speech is crafted for effect rather than welling forth from the soul. 
Campaigns tend to respond to these moments by claiming that the comments were errors of 
speech that do not reflect what the candidate believes. This response frames the speech as out 
of the speaker’s control and distances the speaker from some of the ethical backlash.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Huffingtonpost.com, October 16, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/16/obama-
47-percent-debate_n _1972349.html. 
146 Ryan Reilly, “Obama: Romney Locked Into 'Extreme Positions' Even If He Doesn't 
Believe Them,” Talking Points Memo (blog), August 25, 2012, 
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/obama-romney-locked-into-extreme-positions-even-
if-he-doesn-t-believe-them. 
  
 
CHAPTER 4: DIALOGUE, DELIBERATION, AND THE DENIAL OF TECHNIQUE 
 
In a June 14, 1997 speech to the graduating class of the University of California, San 
Diego, President Bill Clinton argued that in order to get beyond the problems of race, the 
nation needed to have a conversation.1 He announced a plan titled, “One America in the 21st 
Century: The President's Initiative on Race” (PIR) in order to foster public discussions about 
race.2 As an example of what practitioners would variously call dialogue or deliberation, 
Clinton’s vision was to facilitate communicative encounters across the nation that would 
stimulate Americans to think deeply and talk together about a public issue of common 
concern. Despite the fact that it sparked discussion about issues of race, many held Clinton's 
gesture toward dialogue to be only a political platitude. Accounts of the public dialogue in 
major media outlets focused on the role of artifice: were predetermined policy decisions 
being concealed by the appearance of dialogue?3 Was Clinton trying to distract the voters 
                                                            
1 President Clinton's “One America Initiative” came at a time when race was by no means a 
sleeping giant. Quite to the contrary, 1990's U.S. culture was rife with racial struggle. The 
L.A. riots, Black church bombings, the O.J. Simpson trial, and the dragging death of James 
Byrd in Jasper, Texas are just a few examples. 
2 “Toward One America: A National Conversation on Race,” U.S. Society & Values 2, no. 3 
(1997), U.S. Information Agency, http://www.4uth.gov.ua/usa/english/society 
/ijse0897/ijse0897.pdf. Clinton appointed an advisory board headed by famed historian John 
Hope Franklin to guide the various aspects of the Initiative and prepare a report within the 
year. 
3 Several mainstream media accounts drew attention to the PIR’s artifice. Howard Kurtz 
lamented that one event was “billed as an effort to engage the country in a frank dialogue on 
race relations” but took the form of a “closed-door meeting with only blacks invited.” 
“Cabinet Secretary Hosts Blacks-Only Event,” Washington Post, December 7, 1997. Steven 
Holmes cited unnamed critics that “say the board's desultory beginning even raises the 
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from the unfolding Monica Lewinski scandal?4 That scandal only highlighted the critiques of 
artifice already at play because it suggested an unsavory motive for the Clinton 
administration to focus on an inportant domestic issue. Attention was paid to who was 
selected to be on the initiative’s board and what their political predilections were. Clinton’s 
attempt at a national dialogue on race failed, in large part, because he failed to conceal the 
artifice of his rhetorical labor. I will demonstrate in this chapter that all public deliberation 
relies upon the concealment of rhetorical technê to be effective.  
Clinton’s call for public discussion echoes a more general tendency toward dialogue 
and conversation as alternatives to bargaining, antagonism, or outright fighting. For example, 
William Keith has documented the twentieth-century shift toward discussion in the United 
States.5 It has become an American commonplace to condemn vitriolic, polemic, and 
otherwise divisive communication as having a negative effect on the public's ability to 
deliberate (even as those kinds of communication persist). An exemplar of this commonplace 
is the often-used admonishment to “disagree without being disagreeable.”6  
In the realm of political theory, “deliberative democracy” marks a normative model 
of communication processes to underwrite democracy. For political theorists such as 
Benjamin Barber, the quality of deliberation in a given society distinguishes the quality of its 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
question of whether the White House is using the panel to duck, rather than confront, the 
country's thorny racial issues.” “Critics Say Clinton Panel About Race Lacks Focus,” New 
York Times, October 12, 1997.  
4 Presidential scandals were one reason that Carcasson and Rice cite for the PIR’s failure. 
Carcasson and Rice, “Promise and Failure.” 
5 Keith, Democracy as Discussion. 
6 For example, see “Obama Defends Choice of Rev. Warren at Inauguration: ‘We Can 
Disagree Without Being Disagreeable,’” Think Progress (blog), December 18, 2008, 
http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2008/12/18/33898/obama-defend-warren/. 
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democracy.7 Amy Guttmann and Dennis Thompson characterize deliberative democracy as a 
focus on the justification of decisions. As a form of government, “free and equal citizens 
(and their representatives) justify decisions in a process in which they give one another 
reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching 
conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the 
future.”8  
The deliberative model of democracy is an alternative to the aggregate, interest-based 
model of democracy. The aggregate model assumed that in the context of pluralism and 
social complexity, social unity and shared meaning was not possible. Instead, the closest 
approximation of public opinion and a general preference by the public was the extent to 
which the public could influence governance. By maintaining a descriptive posture and 
muting any normative evaluation of democratic practices, the aggregate model of democracy 
avoided the difficult theoretical problem of justifying the evaluation of culturally specific 
practices through the seemingly innocuous proposition that public opinion overcame the 
challenges of plurality by providing an average of voters’ preferences.  
Deliberation is an alternative to aggregate models that harnesses communication 
practices to legitimize democracy through the meaningful participation of citizens. But more 
than legitimizing democratic society, deliberation appears to promise to ameliorate 
democracy. Advocates of deliberation advance it as a means of reducing or refiguring 
                                                            
7 For Barber, “talk” sets apart strong and weak forms of democracy; it fills the role that 
Aristotle noted of logos as separating the work of humans from that of animals. Strong 
Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2003), 174.  
8 Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 7.  
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conflict stemming from inequality, cultural or ideological difference, and complexity.9 In 
democratic theory, “deliberative democracy” describes normative procedures consisting of 
strategies for fostering ethical communication that, more than better decisions, result in better 
relationships thought to be more immediate because the procedures foster connectedness 
among participants. 
The terms “dialogue” and “deliberation” are used in a variety of ways by 
practitioners. Practitioners, such as those represented by the National Coalition of Dialogue 
and Deliberation (NCDD), tend to imply that dialogue and deliberation are modes of 
communication that are distinguished primarily by purpose.10 Some exemplar methods of 
dialogue and deliberation include World Café, Open Space Technology, Victim-Offender 
Mediation, Compassionate Listening, Citizens Jury, Consensus Conferences, Study Circles, 
and Appreciative Inquiry. NCDD categorizes methods of facilitation according to four 
central purposes: exploration, conflict transformation, decision-making, and collaborative 
                                                            
9 James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1996), 2; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1996), 4, 8, 14, 20. A central force that enables deliberation to amend democracy 
is the public sphere. As a deliberative space, it stabilizes democratic society by reducing 
conflict through the fair evaluation of competing claims, irrespective of social status. The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 132-33. 
Habermas lauds the stabilizing effect of a general will that is shared by citizens because he 
holds that it will reduce conflict that would otherwise stem from individuals in pursuit of 
their own strategic interest. Ibid., 131. Accordingly, deliberation is an alternative to 
bargaining, in which individuals work to secure their individual interest rather than a shared 
interest. Deliberative theory tends to view bargaining as a limited, short-term solution that 
fails to provide the stability of a collective will. Between Facts and Norms, 140, 65-70, 76-
83. Similarly, Benjamin Barber laments the reduction of democratic talk to the “hedonistic 
speech of bargaining,” preferring the broader scope of conversation. Strong Democracy, 174. 
10 The NCDD functions as a clearinghouse and network for practitioners who employ over 
twenty discrete methods to foster immediacy in groups large and small, in order to explore 
issues, transform conflict, make decisions, and work together.  
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action.11 The primary difference between dialogue and deliberation is that dialogue is 
exploratory while deliberation is more formal and seeks some form of closure, such as a 
decision.12 In the context of small groups, deliberation is an inclusive process of people 
reasoning together in order to solve a problem.13 The core purpose of dialogue and 
deliberation in the context of U.S. public culture is to think deeply and communicate 
interactively about important matters of common interest. In general, proponents of dialogue 
and deliberation frame their practices as correctives for real or perceived distance among 
citizens and between citizens and their government.  
While both dialogue and deliberation have different meanings for the advocates of 
various facilitation methods, one common principle is the practice of distinguishing dialogue 
and allied forms of deliberation from more adversarial modes of communication.14 In 
                                                            
11 National Coalition for Dialogue & Deliberation, “Engagement Streams Framework,” 
(2010), 2. In the exploration category, people are encouraged to learn about themselves, their 
community, or a particular issue at hand. They are encouraged to suspend assumptions and to 
create a special form of conversation that focuses on openness and listening. In the conflict 
transformation category, the emphasis is on resolution of conflicts and improved 
relationships. The focus is on trust that creates a healthy space. In the decision-making 
category, the goal is to produce decisions that reflect widespread assent. The focus is on fair 
representation of the issue, and knowledgeable, thoughtful consideration of options. Finally, 
the collaborative action category seeks to empower groups to solve problems and to work 
together to find appropriate solutions. The focus is on generating new ideas and planning the 
implementation of action together. Ibid., 3. 
12 For example, see Rick Ross, “Skillful Discussion,” in Bridges Not Walls: A Book About 
Interpersonal Communication, ed. John Stewart (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 624. 
13 Stephanie Burkhalter, John Gastil, and Todd Kelshaw, “A Conceptual Definition and 
Theoretical Model of Public Deliberation in Small Face-to-Face Groups,” Communication 
Theory 12, no. 4 (2002).  
14 A fault with this distinction is that deliberation can and often does have an adversarial 
component and adversarial modes of communication, such as debate, can also have 
deliberative components. See Douglas Ehninger, "Debating as Critical Deliberation," 
Southern Speech Journal 24 (1958).  
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particular, debate is almost universally used as an antipode for proponents of dialogue and 
deliberation.15 Akin to the broader moral privilege of communication that is purportedly not 
mediated, dialogue and deliberation are constituted through the work of negation: whatever 
their differences, modes of dialogue and deliberation are not debate.16 As the prototypical foil 
for good deliberative practice, debate is accused of sacrificing connection and understanding 
for victory through the forced choice provided by a limited adversarial frame whereas 
dialogue and deliberation are described as natural alternatives to debate. According to this 
argument, participants in dialogue and deliberation seek out the methods that turn away from 
the desires for conquest characteristic of debate. Dialogue and deliberation are constituted as 
negations of debate while debate is figured as bad artifice that only appears to provide the 
deliberation necessary for democracy. As a result, dialogue and deliberation are, by 
implication, either good artifice or non-artificial and more capable of ameliorating 
democracy. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, though, facilitated dialogue is not the 
negative of debate; all public deliberation is exactly as artificial and dependent upon 
technical skill.  
The primary difference between debate and dialogue, in terms of technique and the 
appearance of artifice, is that debate often involves an explicit demonstration of skill because 
the formal parameters are foregrounded. Most basic definitions of debate characterize it 
                                                            
15 For example, see Ross, 624. For Ross, on one end of the spectrum is “raw debate” and on 
the other is “dialogue.”  
16 Given that debate foregrounds artifice, it is no surprise that it suffers this similar fate to 
rhetoric. As Robert Hariman observes, discourses are often ranked by demonstrating they are 
not mere rhetoric. “Status,” 40.  
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fundamentally as a formal argumentation practice.17 Debates generally feature two or more 
sides that all share a central proposition. Each side advocates a distinct position. While 
positions might not be mutually exclusive, participants in a debate play distinct roles, such as 
the “affirmative” and the “negative.” Intercollegiate policy debate, a highly formalized 
version of debate practice, involves massive amounts of research once transported in stacks 
of plastic tubs, carried from room to room of a college campus during a tournament (portable 
computers have made the plastic tubs obselete). As debate theorist and coach Gordon 
Mitchell explains, such contests resemble a “movie-length Federal Express commercial or an 
auctioneering competition gone bad.”18 This particular iteration of debate only emphasizes 
the artifice that is common to debate: explicit rules, special vocabulary, and often an attention 
to timing and the format of turn-taking.  
The negative attributes that proponents of dialogue and deliberation position 
themselves against culminate in a case against debate. For Louise Diamond of The Institute 
for Multi-Track Diplomacy, dialogue “means we sit and talk with each other... talking 
together all too often means debating, discussing with a view to convincing the other, arguing 
for our point of view, examining pro’s and con’s. In dialogue, the intention is not to advocate 
but to inquire; not to argue but to explore; not to convince but to discover.”19 The NCDD 
defines dialogue as “a process that allows people, usually in small groups, to share their 
                                                            
17 “Debate.” Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 13 Sept. 2013. 
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/debate>. “debate, n.1”. OED Online. 
September 2013. http://www.oed.com/ 
18 Gordon R. Mitchell, Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science and Politics in Missile 
Defense Advocacy (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2000), p. xvi.  
19 “What is Dialogue? Definitions from Leaders in the Field,” National Coalition for 
Dialogue & Deliberation, http://ncdd.org/rc/item/1501.  
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perspectives and experiences with one another about difficult issues we tend to just debate 
about or avoid entirely.”20 Returning to President Bill Clinton’s attempt to foster racial 
dialogue, a number of dialogue groups advised the PIR and produced a dialogue guide that 
claims debate is oppositional while dialogue is cooperative; debate has winning as a goal 
while dialogue seeks to find common ground; debate “involves a countering of the other 
position without focusing on feelings or relationship and often belittles or deprecates the 
other person” while dialogue “involves a real concern for the other person and does not seek 
to alienate or offend.”21 Finally, Kim Pearce claims that “dialogue is an alternative pattern of 
communication to: argument, criticism, debate, name calling, and influence peddling.”22 
The last chapter explored the demand placed upon speakers to conceal the artifice of 
their speech. This chapter will address efforts to use communication to achieve democracy. 
In the field of dialogue and deliberation, seemingly natural deliberation that is facilitated (as 
opposed to that which occurs without intervention) requires active concealment and denial of 
technique. Deliberation that seems natural refers to behavior that, instead of appearing 
artificial and technical, is innate, untutored, and essential. To invoke a natural category of 
deliberation imagines behavior that would proceed if people had not been socialized to 
behave otherwise. The pursuit of natural deliberation thrusts a dilemma onto facilitated 
deliberation: how can the intervention of facilitation proceed without introducing mediation 
through technique? Good deliberation must appear to provide close connection between 
participants without artifice. This demand on communication for the concealment of artifice 
                                                            
20 Ibid.  
21 “Toward One America.” 
22 Kim Pearce, Making Better Social Worlds: Engaging in and Facilitating Dialogic 
Communication (Redwood City, CA: Pearce Associates, 2002), 17. 
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produces the idea of unmediated speech. As a result, we will see the denial of technique and 
the assertion of methods that claim to be natural and without rhetorical artifice. In contrast to 
the foregrounding of form in debate, dialogue features less explicit metacommunication and 
the parameters of a discussion are more often implicit; one’s techniques are more likely to be 
subtle and to appear natural or even seem invisible.23  
The pursuit of natural deliberation is used in this chapter to describe the process by 
which dialogue is privileged in contrast to other forms of deliberation. While not all practices 
of dialogue erase technique, this chapter will focus on those that position dialogic 
communication as a natural form of human interaction that promises to allow participants to 
escape (or at least evade) ideology, status, and other barriers to ethical and effective 
deliberation. Seeking impossibly unmediated deliberation romances immediacy, embraces a 
fantastical notion of communication agency that amounts to a dream of perfect 
communication. Perfect communication is not possible because deliberation always relies on 
skill and technique.  
After a description of dialogue as a site of the pursuit of natural deliberation, this 
chapter presents two examples of facilitation in order to illustrate how facilitators describe 
the practice of their craft. From the outset, the methods examined in this chapter are quite 
different, each emanating from a different end of the dialogue and deliberation continuum 
(Open Space Technology (OST) is less formal while National Issues Forums (NIF) is more 
formal and decision-oriented). OST begins without any written agenda while NIF structures 
                                                            
23 A diverse set of traditions use various terms to refer to techniques that are not apparent. 
Zen practice (as we will see echoed in Open Space Technology) is full of references to the art 
of doing nothing, and the Italian Court was obsessed with the aforementioned performance of 
nonchalance (sprezzatura). On the Zen technique of non-technique, see Alan Watts, The Way 
of Zen (New York: Pantheon, 1957).  
  133 
interaction with prefigured topics and questions. Although these methods represent two ends 
of the facilitation spectrum and reflect different types of deliberation, they share some 
common aspects. First, they are both forms of deliberation as opposed to exploratory forms 
of dialogue. As such, they promise a final product: a decision, a new design, a shared vision, 
etc. Second, they both rely upon the concealment of their artifice. OST conceals technique 
through the themes of simplicity, voluntary action, and ordinariness while NIF uses 
questioning, naming, and framing to conceal its work.  
When appeals for dialogue and deliberation are heeded, the results can be profound—
transforming individuals and communities and improving decisions.24 One of the primary 
benefits of dialogue is that it encourages encounters with difference. Leslie Baxter explains 
that a dialogic perspective places difference at the center of human experience.25 The dialogic 
perspective provides a beneficial theorization of difference because, rather than conflict in 
need of reconciliation or assimilation, difference can also involve positively valenced 
functions such as individual growth, autonomy, stimulation, and strength.26 However, when 
the communication techniques of dialogue succeed, it is not by eschewing artifice and 
forging primordial connections between people. Rather, dialogue and dialogic forms of 
                                                            
24 For anecdotal evidence of the effectiveness of dialogue and deliberation, see “Case Studies 
& Stories…,” National Coalition for Dialogue & Deliberation, 
http://ncdd.org/rc/item/category/case-studies-stories.  
25 Leslie A. Baxter, “Communication as Dialogue,” in Communication as—: Perspectives on 
Theory, ed. Gregory Shepherd, Jeffrey. St. John, and Theodore G. Striphas (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage, 2006), 102.  
26 L. A. Baxter and L. West, “Couple Perceptions of Their Similarities and Differences: A 
Dialectical Analysis,” Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 20 (2003); J. T. Wood et 
al., “Dialectic of Difference: A Thematic Analysis of Intimates' Meanings for Differences,” 
in Interpretive Approaches to Interpersonal Communication, ed. K. Carter and M. Prisnell 
(New York: SUNY Press, 1994). 
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deliberation function through the concealment of rhetorical artifice. As a practice of civic 
engagement, public deliberation of all kinds relies on technical skills and rhetorical 
techniques. According to Bill Keith, one topos of democratic deliberation has been how to 
best teach deliberation as a technê of civic life.27 We need to understand the mediating effects 
of deliberation for democracy in order to understand the production of the values that today 
are articulated to democracy. Both in terms of what is valued and how it is affiliated with 
democracy, and how it comes to be the crux of what we do when we are being democratic 
citizens.  
Dialogue, Deliberation, and Debate for Democracy 
Democratic deliberation is most closely associated with the proceduralist account of 
Jürgen Habermas28 Habermas seeks a noncoercive method for engaging from radically 
different value-orientations yet culminating in consensus, which he considers a necessary 
precondition for rational democratic life. A major component of the deliberative model is the 
requirement that an audience accept the task of determining the reasons required to support a 
given claim (needless to say, not every claim is challenged to provide such support).29 When 
a speech act fails to gain tacit assent, discourse is the process by which competing claims are 
adjudicated through a deliberative process. Hence, public deliberation carries the persistent 
                                                            
27 Keith, Democracy as Discussion, 5.  
28 Structural Transformation; Theory of Communicative Action; Between Facts and Norms. 
Habermas's work is significant here because it is an exemplar of the proceduralist account of 
deliberation. This is most frequently the type that is critiqued in political theory. Such an 
approach seeks the conditions necessary for an ideal procedure of democracy and then 
defends why those will produce good decisions. Bohman, Public Deliberation, 16-17.  
29 This is communicative action as opposed to strategic action. Habermas, Theory of 
Communicative Action, 96-97; ibid., 94-101; Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 24.  
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threat of being called to give a public account of the supporting reasons for a given claim. 
Public deliberation is a transformative process because accepting this public orientation 
modifies the claims that are made. For example, claims might be couched in personal 
experience that is unimpeachable whereas a more universal claim would be more subject to 
challenge.  
According to Chantal Mouffe, the deliberative approach to democracy assumes that if 
our procedures are deliberative, we can reach forms of agreement that are rational and 
democratically legitimate.30 People are allowed to disagree, agree on a decision, or agree that 
a decision is good enough to provisionally accept at the time, so the agreement on a course of 
action does not imply unanimity; deliberation can “work” and still maintain divisions. 
Proponents of purportedly natural deliberation, however, suggest that deliberation fails to 
ameliorate democracy when it fails to foster immediacy and instead introduces or exacerbates 
unnatural distance between citizens. Proponents of dialogue and deliberation often invoke 
examples of artifice in order to contrast them with the sincerity of dialogue. In general, these 
examples suggest the appearance of technique, demonstrate artifice, or indicate humanity's 
less than full potential. Richard Johannesen describes the counterpart of dialogue—
monologue—in an explicitly negative and seemingly unredeemable light:  
In monologue the attitude of senders toward receivers is marked by such qualities as 
deception, superiority, exploitation, dogmatism, domination, insincerity, pretense, 
personal display, self-aggrandizement, coercion, distrust, self-defensiveness, and 
viewing the Other as an object to be manipulated…. Audience feedback is used only 
to further the speaker's purpose; an honest response from receivers is not wanted or is 
precluded. Often choices are narrowed and consequences obscured.31 
                                                            
30 Chantal Mouffe, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?,” Social Research 66, 
no. 3 (1999).  
31 Richard L. Johannesen, “Attitude of Speaker Toward Audience: A Significant Concept for 
Contemporary Rhetorical Theory and Criticism,” Central States Speech Journal 25, no. 2 
(1974): 96. 
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Dialogue asks much of participants. The inventory of attitudes associated with ideal dialogue 
form an impressive array—and they correspond seamlessly with the demands of democratic 
deliberation. For Johannesen, dialogue is marked by “honesty, concern for the welfare of the 
Other, trust, genuineness, open-mindedness, equality, mutual respect, empathy, directness, 
lack of pretense, non-manipulative intent, encouragement of free expression, and acceptance 
of the Other as a unique individual regardless of differences over belief or behavior.”32 
Reading this list, one is struck by how perfectly it responds to the problems of deliberation. 
Honesty addresses the problem of deceit, encouragement of free expression addresses the 
problem of stifled speech, acceptance regardless of differences addresses the problem of 
pluralism, and so on—at every turn, one recognizes a solution to a shortcoming of 
deliberation. 
Debate, envisioned as the Dark Side of deliberation, is insufficient to the task of 
facilitating democracy primarily because of artifice. Debate may, at times, appear to provide 
reasoned deliberative thinking. However here, debate is to deliberation what rhetoric is to 
truth for Plato; the appearance is a chimera of the real thing. In The Argument Culture: 
Moving from Debate to Dialogue, Deborah Tannen argues against the culture of argument. 
“When you're having an argument with someone,” Tannen writes, “your goal is not to listen 
and understand. Instead, you use every tactic you can think of—including distorting what 
your opponent just said—in order to win the argument.”33 Beyond the attitude of participants, 
                                                            
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 5. This pejorative conception of argument ignores the wealth of argumentation 
theory that demonstrates more than competitive ends. At the heart of argumentation is 
reason-giving. Reducing argumentation to the competition of claims ignores the role of full 
and free public debate that helps constitute civil society and public culture. Beyond victory 
by gaining audience assent, argumentation sharpens the critical thinking and communicative 
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Tannen takes issue with the form that debate takes—the adversarial frame. She claims that it 
encourages artificial positions, lies, distortion, and flattery—all in the trajectory of trying to 
win instead of losing.  
The Pursuit of Natural Deliberation in Facilitated Dialogue 
  This section focuses on dialogue as a mode of deliberative practice and site of the 
pursuit of natural deliberation. I will begin by describing the prescriptive approach to 
theorizing dialogue and then I will discuss three common themes from the diverse body of 
dialogue theory that are implicated in the work of concealment: dialogue is envisioned as 
spontaneous, immediate, and responsive. Finally, I will pose the problem of facilitation as a 
practice that simultaneously denies and enacts concealment in dialogue.  
Dialogue is a notoriously slippery term and is, not surprisingly, unevenly theorized.34 
In the field of communication studies, the shift toward dialogue involves two distinct 
approaches: descriptive and prescriptive. It is the prescriptive approach to theorizing, 
practicing, and facilitating dialogue that tends to pursue unmediated forms of deliberation.35 
It is prescriptive because it privileges dialogue above forms of communication taken to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
skills of participants. Colbert and Biggers, “Why Should We Support Debate.”; Keefe, Harte, 
and Norton, Introduction to Debate; William Semlak and Donald Shields, “The Effect of 
Debate Training on Students Participation in the Bicentennial Youth Debates,” Journal of the 
American Forensic Association 13 (1977); Alfred Snider, “Speech Communication Must be 
Emphasized in American High Schools: A Survey of Empirical Findings,” The Rostrum 
(January 1993).  
34 See Ronald C. Arnett, “Situating a Dialogic Ethics: A Dialogic Confession,” in The 
Handbook of Communication Ethics, ed. George Cheney, Steve May, and Debashish Munshi 
(New York: Routledge, 2011), 50. 
35 On the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive approaches to dialogue, see John 
Stewart and Karen Zediker, “Dialogue as Tensional, Ethical Practice,” Southern 
Communication Journal 65, no. 2-3 (2000): 225-27. In the field of communication studies, 
the descriptive work tends to follow that of Mikhail Bakhtin and the prescriptive work of 
Martin Buber. 
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monological. For example, the implication of Floyd Matson and Ashley Montagu’s 
characterization of dialogue as a revolution in the study of communication privileges 
dialogue in intellectual and ethical terms. In contrast to the earlier technological revolution, 
which was “predominantly a practical and mechanical matter,” the revolution of dialogue 
provides a more “humane” theory of communication.36 Matson and Montagu argue that 
dialogue departs from earlier approaches to communication by focusing less on means and 
more on ends such as self-discovery, communion with others, the formation of community, 
and so on.37 These ends are almost exclusively viewed in positive, ethical terms while 
monological communication is seen as unethical. Krippendorff, for example, describes 
dialogue as the “most noble form of human interaction.”38 For Matson and Montagu, 
dialogue is an alternative to monological, linear communication directed at strategy and 
control.39 Johannesen suggests, “Dialogue is held to be more fully human, humane, and 
facilitative of personal self-fulfillment than is monologue.”40 Finally, as Kim Pearce 
formulates it, sincerity as a way of being is part of the spirit of dialogue.41 Participants in 
dialogue, instead, seek understanding, connection, and make themselves present to each 
other. 
                                                            
36 Floyd W. Matson and Ashley Montagu, eds., The Human Dialogue: Perspectives on 
Communication (New York: Free Press, 1967), 2, 6.  
37 Ibid., 10. 
38 Klaus Krippendorff, “On the Ethics of Constructing Communication,” in Rethinking 
Communication, ed. Brenda Dervin, et al. (Newbury Park: Sage, 1989), 94. 
39 Matson and Montagu, The Human Dialogue: Perspectives on Communication. 
40 Johannesen, “Attitude of Speaker Toward Audience,” 96. 
41 Pearce, Making Better Social Worlds, 14. 
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In communication theory of dialogue, the work that seeks to naturalize deliberation is 
often inspired by Martin Buber’s prescriptive approach in contrast to the more descriptive 
approach of Mikhail Bakhtin.42 For Buber, dialogue is an ethical posture that one assumes 
when one “really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular beings and 
                                                            
42 See Dialogue (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004); Baxter, “Communication as Dialogue.”; 
Ronald C. Arnett, Communication and Community: Implications of Martin Buber's Dialogue 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986); Kenneth N. Cissna and Rob 
Anderson, “Communication and the Ground of Dialogue,” in The Reach of Dialogue; 
Maurice S. Friedman, The Confirmation of Otherness, in Family, Community, and Society 
(New York: Pilgrim Press, 1983); Ronald C. Arnett, “A Dialogic Ethic 'Between' Buber and 
Levinas: A Responsive Ethical 'I',” in Dialogue; Kenneth N. Cissna and Rob Anderson, 
“Public Dialogue and Intellectual History: Hearing Multiple Voices,” in Dialogue; Richard 
L. Johannesen, “The Emerging Concept of Communication as Dialogue,” Quarterly Journal 
of Speech 57, no. 4 (1971).  
In addition to Martin Buber, Carl Rogers features prominently in notions of genuineness and 
authenticity found in contemporary conceptions of dialogue. Rogers was an important figure 
in the development of psychotherapy and his writings form a major basis for work on 
dialogue in communication studies. Rogers is very much a common source for people like 
Ken Cissna and Rob Anderson. For example, in their edited collection Rogers is included. 
One of the main commonalities or principles that Rogers observes in positive therapeutic 
change is the genuineness of the therapist. This is a revealing stipulation. Rogers writes, “the 
therapist should be, within the confines of this relationship, a congruent, genuine, integrated 
person. It means that within the relationship he is freely and deeply himself, with his actual 
experience accurately represented by his awareness of himself. It is the opposite of 
presenting a façade, either knowingly or unknowingly.” Carl R. Rogers, “The Necessary and 
Sufficient Conditions of Therapeutic Personality Change,” in The Reach of Dialogue, 130. 
Of note is that Rogers’ most important work is his 1951 book, Client-Centered Therapy. 
Rogers illustrates how being genuine entails presenting their real self as opposed to a façade. 
This means that the therapist is not employing artifice but simply presenting their true self. 
In contrast, Mikhail Bakhtin provides the basis for much of the descriptive work on dialogue. 
His emphasis was on the study of language. Rather than something to achieve, dialogue was 
a condition of human discourse. While he acknowledged everyday examples of dialogue, he 
also used the term to refer to less immediate encounters, such as written exchanges among 
academics, which might span vast distances of time and space. What makes these dialogues 
is a condition of address. “The utterance is addressed not only to its own object but also to 
others' speech about it. ... Even the slightest allusion to another's utterance gives the speech a 
dialogic turn.” Speech Genres and Other Late Essays (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1986), 94. For a general account of Bakhtinian dialogue for communication studies, see 
Baxter, “Communication as Dialogue.” 
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turns to them.”43 A central component of Buber’s work is the objectifying shift found in his 
modes of human relation: I-Thou and I-It. For Buber, dialogue marks a distinction between 
these two primordial human orientations. “The basic word I-Thou can only be spoken with 
one's whole being. The basic word I-It can never be spoken with one's whole being.”44 This 
distinction in orientation strikes down to the core of presence. For Ken Cissna and Rob 
Anderson, the move toward I-Thou brings the “sincere caring” of dialogue, “rather than a 
primary focus on just winning or losing.”45 This concern for the Other, as opposed to the 
competitive drive, is enabled by the shift away from the objectifying “I-It” relation. 
Anderson, Cissna, and Arnett indicate this when they write, “dialogue… keeps 
communicators more focused on mutuality and relationship than on self-interest, more 
concerned with discovering than with disclosing, more interested in access than in 
domination.”46  
The prescriptive account of dialogue is part of a more general naturalization of 
deliberation as a means to ameliorate democracy. There is an effort to insinuate dialogue as 
communication that is so direct as to lack mediation altogether. Representing this effort 
through the work of Buber is Abraham Kaplan in “The Life of Dialogue.” Kaplan explains, 
“there is a certain kind of communication which we all know... let me call it ‘communion’ 
instead of communication.”47 He argues that in communion, there is a direct relationship 
                                                            
43 Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Roland Gregor Smith (London: Routledge, 
1954), 19.  
44 Martin Buber, I and Thou, ed. Walter Arnold Kaufmann (New York: Scribner, 1970), 1.  
45 Cissna and Anderson, “Communication and the Ground of Dialogue,” 14. 
46 “Introduction,” 2. 
47 Abraham Kaplan, “The Life of Dialogue,” in The Reach of Dialogue, 38. 
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between human beings that is unmediated, “it is as though the human beings are put directly 
into contact with one another.”48 Kaplan concedes, “although in a strict sense there are, of 
course, many mediating processes, somehow they do not have the significance in communion 
which they have in communication.”49 Kaplan uses the examples of a friend hugging you 
when you are grieving and eye contact that quickly assumes romantic meaning. He notes that 
no words are exchanged in these moments, but “two human beings, for those brief moments, 
have become just one.”50  
What this valuation of presence misses is that presence is tied to ēthos as it is derived 
from rhetorical persona. We never have direct access that enables us to judge, with certainty, 
if someone is paying attention to us; we can only infer it from external signs. Abraham 
Kaplan uses the well-worn distinction between talking with and talking at someone.51 But 
what does this distinction reveal? It does not signal a direct, unmediated connection; it 
indicates different modes of mediating “presence,” judged by an audience based on available 
information. When Kaplan exemplifies communion with the idiom, “keep in touch with me,” 
he fails to apprehend that such a trope is used to recover the dream of communion, not to 
reflect its achievement. 
First, spontaneous dialogue is conceptualized as an emergent practice; it is creative 
and spontaneous without being fully intentionally directed. Resembling the improvisational 
quality of a jazz pianist, dialogue is imagined to be interactional and ephemeral—depending 
                                                            
48 Unlike transmission, wherein “the human beings appear only at the termini.” Ibid., 39. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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on a particular moment at the intersection of numerous causal forces.52 As such, dialogue 
represents the creation of something new. Situated “between” persons, the dialogic encounter 
is not fully controlled by any agent.53 The constitutive spontaneity of dialogue requires that 
facilitation conceal its work; if the work of facilitation is not concealed, then the dialogue 
will not appear spontaneous as the facilitator fumbles with notecards and reads questions that 
force the discussion as opposed to appearing to naturally emerge from the interaction. As 
Anderson asks, “How do we deal theoretically with the essentially unplanned nature of 
meaningful moments of connection that may be accidental, serendipitous, ineffable, even 
ephemeral, but nevertheless relationally crucial?”54 The answer has come in the proliferation 
of dialogue practitioners who attempt to facilitate moments that are otherwise unplanned and 
serendipitous.  
 In addition, dialogue tends to be associated with a quality of immediacy wherein the 
self is made present to the other. This requires what Henry Johnstone termed “self-risk” 
because if one is open-minded enough to be present to another, then one is open to being 
changed as a result.55 This characteristic is thought to be qualitatively different from other 
                                                            
52 According to Cissna and Anderson, dialogue assumes that speech is present and that 
participants in dialogue “create communication that is, to a large extent, unscripted and 
unrehearsed.” Cissna and Anderson, “Communication and the Ground of Dialogue,” 14.  
53 For Bohm, dialogue is the creation of something new through interaction. The problem of 
communication is made productive because the gap between the self and other that generates 
a gap in response makes something new and then is responded to itself. This unpredictability 
produces unanticipated consequences. David Bohm, On dialogue (New York: Routledge, 
2004). 
54 Rob Anderson and Kenneth N. Cissna, “Fresh Perspectives in Dialogue Theory,” 
Communication Theory 18, no. 1 (2008): 3. 
55 Henry W. Johnstone, Validity and Rhetoric in Philosophical Argument (University Park, 
PA: Dialogue Press of Man & World, 1978); Keith, 180.  
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forms of communication, even dyadic “conversation” in which individuals might exchange 
statements yet never achieve much presence. Each is speaking and hearing, but there is little 
of the listening described in dialogue theory. More than temporal and spatial immediacy, 
dialogue is aligned with a spiritual or metaphysical something-more presence of immediacy. 
As Cissna and Anderson explain, one central characteristic of dialogue is an immediacy of 
presence that is antithetical to strategic planning.56 Cissna determines that participants in 
dialogue are “available” and “relatively uninterested in orchestrating specific outcomes or 
consequences.”57 Kaplan describes this aspect of dialogue: “If I am really talking with you, I 
have nothing to say; what I say arises as you and I genuinely relate to one another. I do not 
know beforehand who I will be, because I am open to you just as you are open to me.... self 
and other are now so intertwined that we need new conceptual frameworks, new categories to 
describe what is happening.”58  
  Finally, dialogue is presumed to be responsive. Central to the process of dialogue is 
responsiveness via questioning that is understood to be distinct from statements, which are 
the usual response in debate. Walter Ong, in The Presence of the Word, argues that it is 
response that allows dialogue to produce new and undetermined knowledge, “it moves from 
determined points of departure toward an undetermined goal, for in dialogue the utterance of 
each individual is decided not merely by the individual himself but by the preceding remark 
of the interlocutor to whom his remark is a reply.”59 Questions, as generative of response, are 
                                                            
56 Cissna and Anderson, “Communication and the Ground of Dialogue,” 14. 
57 Ibid., 13.  
58 Kaplan, “The Life of Dialogue,” 40. 
59 Walter J. Ong, The Presence of the Word (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 300-
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central to numerous methods of facilitation.60 As Harrison Owen explains, “questions create 
space as opposed to statements, which make for closure.”61 Carol Hwoschinsky regards 
questions as central to the practice of Compassionate Listening, “Strategic questions can be 
helpful to steer the person to the subject we have come to hear: namely, their personal 
experience of the situation they are in.”62 As Kim Pearce suggests when a participant is 
telling a story, a facilitator should ask questions when parts are underdeveloped in order to 
“help” them tell a better story.63 Rather than telling them their story is incomplete, the 
facilitator asks questions until she or he is satisfied with the story being told. 
Facilitation 
The degree to which dialogue relies on concealment is heightened in the context of 
facilitation. Facilitated public dialogues are held in order to contribute to better deliberation 
on a matter of shared interest. It is often hoped that innovative solutions will emerge from a 
public dialogue. Facilitation is a problem for those who associate a lack of mediation with 
naturalism in deliberation because it threatens to undermine the spontaneity, immediacy, and 
responsiveness of dialogue.64 Because this chapter will demonstrate that dialogue, like debate 
or any other form of public communication, relies upon concealment of artifice to produce its 
                                                            
60 Christopher July Phillips, Socrates Café: A Fresh Taste of Philosophy (New York: Norton, 
2001), 1-35; Andrea Cohen, Practicing the Art of Compassionate Listening (Indianola,WA: 
The Compassionate Listening Project, 2011), 46-52. 
61 Harrison Owen, The Power of Spirit: How Organizations Transform (San Francisco: 
Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2000), 74. 
62 Carol Hwoschinsky, Listening With the Heart: A Guide For Compassionate Listening (The 
Compassionate Listening Project, 2001), 75. 
63 Pearce, Making Better Social Worlds, 44. 
64 Arnett, “Situating a Dialogic Ethics: A Dialogic Confession,” 51.  
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persuasive effects, facilitation is a useful domain to examine. It is in facilitation, rather than 
in unplanned dialogic encounters, that we should expect to notice the work of concealment in 
highest relief. This section will describe the problem of facilitation for dialogue and turn to 
two seemingly divergent methods of facilitating dialogic deliberation: Open Space 
Technology (OST) and National Issues Forums (NIF).  
The National Issues Forum (NIF), focused on decision-making, is usually formatted 
as a single, two-hour meeting. In coordination with the Kettering Foundation, NIF focus on 
how public issues are identified and rhetorically invented for forum audiences. NIF have a 
rigorous process of “naming and framing” issues as discrete choices to be discussed using 
formal written guides and trained facilitators. In contrast, Open Space Technology (OST) is 
an application of self-organizing principles of organizational transformation usually held 
over several days. Participants, guided by a shared purpose, explore and collaborate in self-
guided teams. In terms of the NCDD's Engagement Streams Framework, NIF and OST are 
different approaches, but both forms of public deliberation attempt to leverage the power of 
dialogue through the concealment of artifice.  
Open Space Technology 
That Harrison Owen prefers the title “discoverer” to “inventor” of OST is a revealing 
bit of minutia. He maintains that this method of group discussion has always existed in social 
life because it is part of human nature.65 In terms of the NCDD's Engagement Streams 
Framework, OST is focused on exploration and collaborative action. OST requires that there 
is a necessary, urgent, and complex issue in the balance and that there must be passion, 
                                                            
65 Owen describes the aspects of Open Space, such as the bulletin Board and the marketplace, 
as universal and natural phenomena that link humans (Harrison Owen, “Expanding Our 
Now: The Story of Open Space Technology,” Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 
http://site.ebrary.com/id/10315436.) 
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conflict, and diversity in people and points of view.66 As its name suggests, a central figure 
of OST meetings is an open space—in the middle of a circle of chairs facing each other. 
When participants arrive at a meeting place, such as the company’s warehouse, it has been 
reconfigured to feature this open space. In the middle of the circle of chairs there is only a 
blank flip chart. Participants will also notice a nearly blank wall to the side with a few Post-It 
notes. They are asked to suggest topics for discussion and work together to schedule and 
combine sessions. 
Upon this apparently austere setting is staged a deliberative practice that works to 
conceal its staging. Open Space is, for Owen, akin to a natural state that we must retrain 
ourselves to practice. Owen states that the driving force of OST is “the primal power of self-
organization.”67 Open Space does not include attention to training people how to deliberate. 
Rather, OST attempts to untrain how people have come to insert structure and control in 
deliberation. Owen is very clear that there ought not be any limits on discussion; facilitation 
in OST is a practice of actively working to appear as if little is being done.68 As Owen 
describes, “Come to a circle, take a deep breath, create the bulletin board, open the 
marketplace, and go to work. It really is that simple.”69  
                                                            
66 Harrison Owen, Open Space Technology: A User's Guide (San Francisco, CA: Berrett-
Koehler Publishers, 2008), 16. 
67 Ibid., xiii. 
68 Most of what the facilitator does occurs before the meeting, such as helping to design the 
invitation, meeting with hosts, selecting the purpose, and so on. Immediately before the 
meeting, Owen likes to perform a deep meditation that enables him to be fully present at the 
opening of the meeting. During the breakout sessions, he reads and takes naps. Ibid., 62-63.  
69 Ibid., 6. 
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Since Open Space Technology began in the 1980s, there have been thousands of 
meetings in at least 124 countries involving millions of people. Groups range in size from 5 
to 2000. They are used to help design products, create strategic visions, organize 
communities, renew organizations, and so on.70 There has been an annual conference, an 
Open Space on Open Space (OSonOS), every year since 1992. Open Space appears to be 
well liked by participants; there is an abundance of positive anecdotes shared by OST 
facilitators and reported in Owen’s books.71 Some results are minor, but influential, and 
reflect the effect of practicing a different technique of deliberation.72 
Each Open Space features an invitation that participants respond to by coming to the 
meeting. The invitation is a crucial aspect of OST, and facilitators write entire guidebooks on 
how to design an invitation that, without mandating attendance, will gain the highest 
voluntary turnout possible.73 In keeping with the general “less is more” approach, Owen and 
other OST facilitators suggest that the invitation should be very simple, say very little about 
the method of OST, and emphasize that only those who wish will come together for a stated 
purpose. For example: 
                                                            
70 Ibid., 6-7. 
71 For example, Owen tells the story of a gathering for the National Education Association in 
which the evaluation, scale of 1 to 10, averaged a 9.3. What is more generally claimed is that 
participants in open space feel that the experience was positive. Ibid., 7. 
72 For example, Owen tells the story of Bank Of Montreal (BOM) executives who, after an 
Open Space event, decided that even regular meetings should be held in a circle without a 
table. Owen, “Expanding Our Now,” 57. 
73 Michael Herman, “Open Space Technology: An Inviting Guide,” (2006, 
http://www.michaelherman.com/publications/inviting_guide.pdf). 
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An invitation from facilitator Douglas D. Germann, Sr. Available at www.openingspace.net  
 
While there is no training for participants, there is what Owen describes as the “Four 
Principles and One Law,” although as Harrison Owen says, it is “never to be taken with total 
seriousness.”74 Owen suggests that facilitators post the Four Principles on a wall in the 
meeting room: 
• Whoever comes is the right people 
• Whatever happens is the only thing that could have 
• Whenever it starts is the right time 
• When it's over, it's over75 
 
                                                            
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
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Finally, The Law of Two Feet is written onto a sign and posted in the meeting room as well: 
“If, during our time together, you find yourself in any situation where you are neither 
learning nor contributing, use your two feet and go to some more productive place.”76 This 
law is intended to keep people actively participating and encourages people to think of their 
presence as voluntary. 
 Owen naturalizes his technique by turning to an African culture that he considers to 
be outside of the modern lessons that we must unlearn.77 In the 1960’s Owen travelled to a 
small West African village (in present day Liberia) where he noticed a group holding a multi-
day festival with little overt or obvious planning. As Owen writes, “I do not claim to have the 
whole answer to the mystery of the Balamah but at least part of their secret lay in the fact that 
the village (like all West African villages) was laid out in a circle, with an open space in the 
middle.”78 This experience led Owen to wonder how this manner of being together might be 
adapted to other groups. The Open Space method that he subsequently developed mirrors the 
aforementioned aspects central to dialogue; it is characterized by the appearance of 
spontaneity, immediacy, and responsiveness.  
A Spontaneous Breath  
While observing the Balamah tribe, Owen noticed that their celebration tended to 
have a breath-like rhythm. “The circle came alive with ceremony, speeches, and above all 
                                                            
76 Owen, User's Guide, 95. 
77 There is a wealth of scholarship available to support a strong critique of the notion that 
Owen’s observations in Africa demonstrate a primitive, natural, non-technological, pre-
modern way of life. Suffice to say that Owen relies upon his colonial gaze in order to see the 
Balamah as being without technique. See Talal Asad, ed., Anthropology & the Colonial 
Encounter (London: Ithaca Press, 1973); Renaat Devisch and Francis B. Nyamnjoh, eds., 
Postcolonial Turn: Re-Imagining Anthropology and Africa (Netherlands: Langaa, 2011). 
78 User's, 5; See Expanding, 23-5.    
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dance,” he writes. “Intensity rose to a peak, and then peaked again, until at last it ebbed as 
villagers flowed outward to their homes.... and just as no planning committee is required for 
respiration, none was needed in Balamah either.”79 Owen argues that this exemplifies the 
“magic” of self-organization, wherein “structure is constantly in the process of formation, 
adjusting to the changing environment, and control is exercised from the most appropriate 
point.”80 Owen's theory of self-organization assumes that artifice can be removed and that 
modern humans can be returned to a natural state of organic chaos.81 This account ignores the 
communicative work that enables organization, including self-organization. Owen claims, 
“community is not something you have to work on, train for, or design. It just happens as a 
natural phenomenon.”82 His assumption is that humans' natural state is communal, and 
divisions are our creation and tend to dominate.83 
While Owen rejects artifice in favor of seemingly natural processes, he is aware of 
the need to create a certain appearance while performing as a facilitator. While Open Space is 
articulated with spontaneity, this is paradoxically achieved through a careful plan. In the 
context of a method of facilitating dialogue that promises to emerge organically, the presence 
of the Four Principles, written beforehand and governing the interaction to emerge, might 
seem counterintuitive. Owen claims that they are descriptive and not prescriptive. Displaying 
his keen awareness of creating an effective appearance of unrehearsedness, he assumes an 
                                                            
79 Ibid.  
80 Owen, The Power of Spirit, 122. 
81 Ibid., 18. 
82 Ibid., 122. 
83 Ibid., 123. 
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unscripted performative posture when he tells participants about these principles. “As nearly 
as possible,” he writes “without seeming trite or cute, I present the principles in an offhanded 
way, as something that people might find helpful to keep in mind.”84 
Immediate Presence  
His experience in Africa also prompted Owen to reflect on how the circle shape 
allowed the Balamah to be present to each other. Owen writes, “My experience tells me that 
the circle is the fundamental geometry of open human communication. A circle has no head 
or foot, no high or low, no sides to take; in a circle, people can simply be with each other—
face-to-face. After all we do not have a square of friends, and on a cold winter's night it is 
nice to be part of the family circle.... genuine, open, free communication tends to occur only 
at a minimum. Circles create communication.”85  
Presence is a key aspect of facilitating Open Space.86 As Owen explains, “it turns out 
to be less a question of doing than of being.”87 The ideal form of the facilitator is, for Owen, 
“totally present and absolutely invisible.”88 The facilitator must “[be] the truth” by 
“reflecting an essential, powerful, and good humanity in the way one is.”89 This concept of 
                                                            
84 Ibid. 
85 Owen, User's Guide, 5. The circle is a common theme found in facilitated dialogue. 
Charles Garfield, Cindy Spring, and Sedonia Cahill, Wisdom Circles: A Guide to Self-
Discovery and Community Building in Small Groups (New York: Hyperion, 1998); The 
“study circle” was a signifiant part of the Chautauqua Movement in the United States. Keith, 
218-23. 
86 Owen refers to the Four-Fold Way of Angeles Arrien when he describes what is necessary 
to be authentically present while facilitating and Open Space. 
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid. 
89 Owen, User's Guide, 61. 
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truth telling echoes the appearance of sincerity in dialogue more generally as Owen 
describes, “when human beings are in the presence of one who tells the truth, they feel no 
separation between saying and doing.... To stand in the presence of the truth is to understand, 
in very immediate terms, one's strengths and weaknesses. Not a word of external judgment 
need be spoken.”90 
Responsive 
Finally, Owen noticed two other mechanisms in the life of the Balamah that were 
used to organize their affairs and exchanges among each other: the community bulletin board 
and the village marketplace. “Both mechanisms are so ancient and ingrained in the human 
experience that explaining the rules is unnecessary. Of course if the village marketplace has 
not been a part of your experience, a shopping mall will do.”91 It is the magic of self-
organization that Owen lauds—structure that emerges from the group as a task is performed. 
The structure, as a result, is thought to be responsive to the group, their needs, and abilities. 
“That structure may be hierarchical, a network, circular, some other shape, or hardly any 
shape at all, but its sole justification for existence is that it works. And when it doesn’t work, 
let it go and allow another structure to appear in its place. Under the conditions of self-
organization, structure happens all by itself, every time.”92 
The notion that Open Space is self-organizing and, as a result, built upon being 
responsive to participants leads Owen and practitioners to eschew the notion of technique. In 
this way Open Space is an anti-technique technique of group communication. While it is 
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92 Owen, The Power of Spirit, 124. 
  153 
known as a technology, the term is jocular to some degree. He admits that it is a technê in 
some respects, but is unwilling to fully embrace the notion of technology and technique. 
Owen explicitly states, “this is not a ‘cookbook technology.’”93 Nevertheless, Owen 
delineates a plethora of preparatory and facilitative actions. He even goes so far as to provide 
verbatim transcripts of what to say but notes “this is not about learning your lines. Take what 
I have to offer and make it your own with whatever modifications suit your own personal 
style.”94  
The OST Technique 
Despite attempts to conceal its artifice and deny the application of technique, OST 
employs specific techniques for effective deliberation. These techniques produce the positive 
effects of deliberation while producing the appearance of ordinary, non-technique. In this 
section, I describe how OST style is organized around simplicity, agency, and ordinariness.  
First, OST is designed to be simple by doing as little as possible.95 Owen describes 
the style as, simply, to “be.”96 “The more done, the less accomplished. It is necessary to be 
physically on hand, be fully present, be the truth, and then get out of the way. As the world 
would see it, the ultimate facilitator will do nothing and remain invisible.”97 The goal of 
                                                            
93 Owen, User’s Guide, 55.  
94 Ibid.  
95 OST is not the only method of Dialogue and Deliberation facilitation that employs such a 
“less is more” approach. For example, Future Search employs a “hands-off intervention” 
indicated by the slogan, “Don’t Just Do Something, Stand There.” Marvin Ross Weisbord, 
Future Search: An Action Guide to Finding Common Ground in Organizations and 
Communities (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 2000), 155. 
96 Owen, The Power of Spirit, 106. 
97 Owen, User’s Guide, 62.  
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creating time and space for the group requires that the facilitator conceal the work they do in 
order to appear invisible. The process is described in very simple terms. There is a sort of 
spectacle of what is considered simple. “When the people arrived, it was clear that this was 
not business as usual. To begin with, there was no advance agenda. People knew only when 
the meeting would start, when it would end, and that somehow (as yet undefined) they would 
accomplish the task before them.... What they found were two large concentric circles of 
chairs, with nothing in the middle and a blank space of wall behind.”98 Open Space seems 
very simple, and it is designed to appear this way.99 The invitation says very little, and 
stimulates people's imagination and leverages the persuasive power of the enthymeme. 
“OST, for those unfamiliar with the approach, is simplicity itself. Groups of people sharing a 
common concern for a complex issue are invited to sit in a circle, identify the relevant sub-
issues by posting them on a bulletin board, work out the time and space arrangements for 
their discussions in a market place setting – and then go to work. There is no prior training, 
or ‘warm-up activities,’ little obvious facilitation, and for all pretenses and purposes, the 
whole thing runs all by itself.”100 
Second, from the Law of Two Feet implying the simplicity and effectiveness of 
individual action to the emphasis on voluntary attendance, OST romances agency. The Law 
of Two Feet is a mechanism for emphasizing the presumption of agency. “All too often we 
sit politely, getting angrier and angrier, as our time is being wasted….How much better it 
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would be simply to go on our way and do something useful.”101 The assumption is that when 
people are provided freedom and there is a crisis, their voluntary assertion of agency will 
allow their voice to be manifest and heard. There is the appearance of voluntary self-
selection.102  
In the world of Open Space, where passion and responsibility are the essential 
ingredients, a command from a superior does not go very far. There is a more 
important word: volunteer. Voluntary self-selection for people who care is the only 
useful ticket of admission to an Open Space. Being a volunteer is the prime 
prerequisite for the full expression of passion and responsibility, and only fools 
volunteer for something they neither understand nor care about.103 
  
The focus on voluntarism allows coercive participation to remain concealed. Owen writes of 
an Open Space held at a new cellular phone company in Venezuela. TELCEL was 
experiencing such rapid growth that there was rampant confusion and frustration. Every 
employee was invited to come to the Open Space, but no additional compensation was 
offered. Of the 263 employees, 252 attended.104 Owen views this number as proof that 
voluntary self-selection can yield high participation. It is also plausible that workers felt 
compelled to come even without being paid. It is difficult to attribute cause in such cases, 
particularly if the absence of monetary compensation is the only distinction between coercive 
and voluntary attendance.  
Finally, there is an effort to draw attention away from the artifice of Open Space by 
displacing attention onto ordinariness. Owen recognizes that if there is too much attention 
paid to the process of Open Space, suspicion can be aroused. He notices, for example, that 
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there is suspicion when a consultant tells a wary client to “trust the process.” Instead, he 
advises OST practitioners and clients to “trust the people.”105 He reports that there is less 
suspicion with this turn of phrase. In accordance with this effort to place attention on the 
voice of the people in his guide to Open Space, Owen spends several pages discussing where 
to place the computers. He suggests not hiding the computers because this could create 
suspicion. Instead, they should be placed in plain sight so that everyone could see who is 
writing what and how the proceedings are constructed.106 Rather than the proceedings being 
produced outside of view, where no one can see them, Owen recommends showing the 
computers where people are typing and recording the meeting. 
 Similarly, Owen tends to use handwritten signs. The “Four Principles and One Law” 
is written by hand on the wall, and Owen likes to write, “prepared to be surprised” and post it 
as well. Although the signs are not replaced frequently (or at all), Owen uses the low-tech 
technique of handwriting in order to make the signs appear more ordinary. He notes that this 
procedure reinforces the notion that “this occasion is a working situation—no-frills, just 
people with a common concern gathering to get something done.”107 In addition, Owen 
claims that the handwritten signs function to render Open Space the purview of ordinary 
people. The handwritten signage helps to “build the case that anybody with a good head and 
good heart can do it. Open space is not something that takes a large budget, an army of 
support staff, and weeks of advance preparation. Anybody can do it, any time they want to, 
even if they are small in number with little time available. By the conclusion of the gathering 
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it should be obvious to all that open space is, in fact, the people's technology.”108The signs 
play another role in the concealment of artifice by functioning as a hidden teleprompter of 
sorts for the facilitator.109 Owen advises new facilitators to place the signs on highly visible 
walls in the order of the Open Space's progression thereby assisting the facilitator if they 
forget what to say or do next; all they need to do is look up at the wall, off into the distance, 
and they will see what is next in the process. 
National Issues Forums 
The National Issues Forums Institute (NIFI) promotes a method of deliberation that 
uses guided public forum discussions. National Issues Forums (NIF) is a nonpartisan network 
of civic, educational, and professional organizations and individuals that seek to promote 
public deliberation.110 In terms of the NCDD's Engagement Streams Framework, NIF is 
focused on decision-making. NIF states that it is motivated by “the simple notion that people 
need to come together to reason and talk—to deliberate about common problems.”111 Forums 
are organized around a shared text known as an issue book that includes questionnaires that 
are sent back to NIF for a nation-wide report on the outcomes of the forums. The Kettering 
Foundation, a partner organization created by NIFI, assists in producing these books, 
corresponding moderator guides, and short videos intended to initiate the discussion. Before 
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the forum, NIF forum hosts distribute issue books that describe a public issue and the major 
choices for addressing it. Forums range in size from several people to hundreds speaking face 
to face about the issue and the (usually three) designated options.112 As of 2008, about 4000 
organizations were using NIF materials, and close to one million issue books had been sold 
or distributed.113 In addition, as of 2008, organizations in 32 countries were putting the NIF 
approach into practice for their own local and national issues.114 
Every year, NIFI and Kettering identify major issues of public concern. Issue books 
are generated that give an overview of the problem and identify about three general 
approaches. When a local group, such as a school, civic group, or other community 
organization wishes to host a forum, it selects from NIFI and Kettering produced materials, 
including the aforementioned issue books as well as short videos and signage for the event. 
After each forum, participants are asked to complete a questionnaire that is sent back to the 
NIF national office. Results are compiled into an annual report summarizing the outcomes of 
the deliberations.115  
The issue books are intended to structure the deliberation that will occur at 
subsequent forums by providing a “broad range of choices” for citizens to consider.116 This 
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notion of a broad range is meant to traverse the partisan and ideological spectrum. Citizens 
are then able to consider the “pros and cons” of each choice in what the NIF refers to as a 
“public dialogue.” Each issue book describes a specific issue and provides several choices or 
approaches that can be taken on this national public policy. Each choice is designed by NIF 
to reflect widely held concerns and underlying principles. The NIF issue books purposefully 
do not identify individuals or organizations with partisan labels.117 Experts on the issue 
review issue books for accuracy and balance.118  
Public deliberation that follows their framework, according to Kettering, produces 
better decisions. First, by providing a structure for policymakers and officeholders to hear the 
public’s voice(s), NIF forums help policy reflect the will of the people, and may even 
provide policymakers with solutions that they did not consider before.119 “As participants 
take in the experiences of others,” the “Naming and Framing” report suggests, “they tend to 
redefine the problems that confront them. Their understanding of the problems broadens, 
becoming more comprehensive and nuanced. And this enhanced understanding leads people 
to identify political actors and resources that haven't been recognized before. New, 
innovative ways of solving a problem can emerge.”120  
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In addition, deliberative forums such as the ones offered by NIF are thought to 
improve the quality of participants’ thinking. The idea is that while participants might “hold 
sharply different opinions and beliefs,” in this deliberative form, “they discuss their attitudes, 
concerns, and convictions about each issue and, as a group, seek to resolve their conflicting 
priorities and principles. In this way, participants move from making individual choices to 
making choices as members of the community.”121 By understanding different points of 
view, participants better understand their own beliefs and what it will require to solve a 
complex problem. Ultimately, it is hoped that this type of forum will help individuals 
appreciate different points of view and move toward consensus decisions. 
Kettering acknowledges that practicing deliberation helps one be more effective, yet 
deliberation is thought of as, “a natural act, not a skill only possessed by experts. In fact, 
people around the world have made difficult decisions together since the dawn of recorded 
history.”122 The NIF-style deliberation is conceived of as an everyday practice, what people 
do “over work breaks, at the grocery store, and at the lunch counter.”123  
Kettering acknowledges that this sets up a double bind between natural practices and 
skillful techniques. Kettering understands deliberation as a natural skill but recognizes that 
without what they call “naming and framing,” deliberation is not as fruitful. Aware of the 
problem of appearing too technical, Kettering designs the issue books to strike a balance in 
terms of the amount of information regarding how to deliberate: “Too much information can 
discourage people from conducting forums. Deliberation seems like neurosurgery or 
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something only an outsider can do.”124 Nevertheless, Kettering wants to avoid “suggesting 
that collective decision-making is easy or that practice can’t help people become more 
proficient at it.”125 They can get out of this double bind by understanding deliberation as a 
technê of democracy. It is both everyday and special. 
The NIF Technique 
If an NIF forum moderator requests a starter kit, they are provided with a glossy, pre-
printed poster with the forum guidelines that can be displayed for all to see: 
Everyone is encouraged to participate. 
No one or two individuals dominate. 
The discussion will focus on the choices. 
All the major choices or positions on the issue are considered. 
An atmosphere for discussion and analysis of the alternatives is maintained. 
We listen to each other.126  
 
A central aspect of the NIF technique is an attempted naturalization. The technique produces 
the appearance of ordinary, technique-free discourse. In terms of the aforementioned 
distinction between debate and dialogue in terms of metacommunication, the NIF technique 
actively suppresses questions about process. In this section, I describe how this NIF 
technique is organized around choices and questions. Kettering positions its “choicework” in 
contrast to superficial debate that is conceived of as bad artifice that conceals while good 
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deliberation reveals.127 “People may try to make decisions by debating facts alone. Facts are 
essential, yet they are often used as surrogates for the less tangible things we value. People 
battle over facts when their differences are over what should be. Consequently, they never 
deal with the real source of their disagreements; these remain in the background, only to 
reemerge later.”128 When the ground rules of NIF forums are discussed, facilitators are 
encouraged to distinguish the forum from a debate. The 2002 forum guide regarding 
terrorism reads, in capital letters, “Make clear that the Forum is not a debate.”129 Later, the 
process is described using the rhetoric of non-rhetoric. “The forum process helps people to 
see issues from different points of view; participants use discussion to discover, not persuade 
or advocate.”130 The hope, it seems, it that when presented with an issue in the framework 
provided by Kettering, participants will engage each other outside of the partisan framing 
that they might be more accustomed to.  
As a method of facilitation, NIF relies upon the moderator to execute its technique. 
Consider the role of the moderator as described in moderator guides: 
• Give an overview of the process and why choice work is needed.131 
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• Ask probing questions to reveal stakes of issues and choices.132 
• Encourage participants to direct q/a at each other.133 
• Remain neutral.134 
 
Unlike OST’s self-description, NIF explicitly claims that the moderator is critical to the 
success of the forum. The “Working Through” pamphlet claims that, based on the 
culmination of thousands of NIF forums over 25 years, there are three typical obstacles that 
prevent a successful forum, and they all relate to a failure by the forum's facilitator.135 The 
first is when a facilitator does not maintain neutrality and attempts to influence a decision. 
The second is when the facilitator is too permissive and loses focus on the task. Third, and 
the most common, is when the facilitator or a few participants dominate the conversation and 
“disrupt the person-to-person exchange of stories and opinions that make public deliberation 
work.”136 Problems can also arise if there is too much effort at covering all options with 
equal time and when there is a lack of rich interpersonal interaction that keeps the forum 
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spontaneous.137 The foundation suggests that a machine-like review of options is not 
deliberation.138 
One of the central aspects of the NIF approach is the use of questions to guide the 
deliberation. Moderator guides suggest the use of “natural curiosity” and an interest in 
understanding diverse viewpoints to “ask questions that probe the underlying motivations of 
each choice, the trade-offs that might require, and the willingness of the participants to 
recognize them.”139 Before the forum, moderators should prepare questions to ask and 
possible issues that might be raised. In the moderator guide for terrorism, it is noted, “words 
and phrases about war, terrorism, Islamic religious organizations, and law enforcement 
procedures may have different meanings and elicit various responses in different people.... 
To keep the deliberations on track, most moderators find it helpful to consider ahead of time 
the basic, broad questions about each approach that need to be addressed.”140 The moderator 
books suggest questions to ask regarding each approach.141 While the guidebooks note that 
other questions will emerge based on what participants say, it is interesting to note that at 
least some of the questions a moderator would ask have been scripted ahead of time.  
Kettering and NIFI describe the NIF process around the concepts of naming and 
framing. Several books and other publications distributed by the Kettering Foundation 
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describe this process, most notably, “Naming and Framing Difficult Issues to Make Sound 
Decisions.”142 A large part of the focus in naming is avoiding partisanship. The options found 
in NIF Issue Books are Kettering's attempt to place a given issue within a nonpartisan 
framework. Rather than one option or two predictable partisan options (e.g., a Democratic 
Party option and a Republican Party option), Kettering attempts to provide the “full range of 
options” for citizens to consider.143 NIF pays close attention to protecting its nonpartisan 
status and explicitly distances itself from advocacy in its promotional materials.144 Words 
that are not articulated to political parties or movements are used. “By intention, issue books 
do not identify individuals or organizations by partisan labels, such as Democrat, Republican, 
conservative, or liberal,” the 2002 issue guide on terrorism explains, “the goal is to present 
ideas in a fresh way that encourages readers to judge them on their merit.”145  
Kettering uses what they view as primal motives that unite us socially in order to 
name a problem. They explicitly appeal to a less mediated form of communication, appearing 
to have the process of naming and framing allow them to transcend ideology. “Naming a 
problem in terms meaningful to citizens isn't simply describing it in everyday language.”146 
Kettering compares these needs to Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs.147 As the “We 
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Have to Choose” pamphlet explains in more detail, the names that people give problems 
reflect concerns that are valuable to almost everyone. “We all want to be free from danger, 
secure from economic privatization, free to pursue our own interests, and treated fairly by 
others—to mention a few of our basic motives.”148 These core needs are assumed to be more 
fundamental than ideological, interest-based positions.  
In addition, Kettering reflects awareness that using “professional descriptions” may 
lead citizens to be less active because the problem is then associated with a type of 
intellectualism or professionalism.149 For example, “people tend to think of drug abuse in 
terms of what they see happening to families and how it influences young people, not in 
terms of police interdiction of the drug trade.”150 Here, public policy regarding police action 
must be couched within terms that are relevant to the citizens who will deliberate.  
In rhetorical terms, this process of naming is a process of invention that also relies on 
concealment. However, Kettering couches the process within and with appeal to a natural 
and primordial humanism. Appeals to Maslow and his hierarchy of needs means that they 
seek to name the problem in a manner that transcends ideology and, more fundamentally, 
rhetoric, and instead exploits an implied ontological stream of meaning and value.151  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
security, are met. Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (New York: J. Wiley 
& Sons, 1999). 
148 Kettering Foundation, “Naming and Framing,” 5. 
149 Kettering Foundation, “We Have to Choose,” 23. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid., 24. To extend the metaphor from Star Wars, if debate is the Dark Side of the Force, 
then this is the Jedi’s virtuous appeal to the Force. 
  167 
Finally, the NIF and Kettering technique of naming and framing involves the denial 
of technique. From the outset of the report on naming and framing, for example, Kettering 
directly states: “These are not special techniques.”152 Instead, it describes a natural 
developmental process of moving from naming to framing.153 As people discuss a problem, 
they become more comfortable with how it is being named and tend to move toward thinking 
about what solutions can be applied: 
The ways of presenting issues that are described here are not specially designed 
processes. In fact, what the foundation is reporting reflects what can occur in 
everyday life. Take the matter of describing a problem that needs attention. People do 
that in conversations while waiting for a bus or sitting in a restaurant. These 
conversations revolve around ordinary questions: what's bothering you? Why do you 
care? How are you going to be affected? When people respond to these questions, 
they are identifying what is valuable to them.154  
 
In the Kettering report, “We Have to Choose: Democracy and Deliberative Politics,” the 
distinction is made between deliberation as a special technique and a natural act. The report 
refers to the challenge of “the perception that NIF-type deliberation is a special technique or 
methodology and that it requires special skills.”155 Unlike other forms of democratic 
deliberation that require “skilled moderators to get the desired results,” the report explains, 
“NIF-type deliberation is different; it is designed to replicate the naturally occurring 
deliberation that was going on when the Mayflower Compact was being made. It is best 
suited to stimulating organic deliberative practice and culture.”156 In the 2006 Kettering 
                                                            
152 Kettering Foundation, “Naming and Framing,” 4. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Kettering Foundation, “We Have to Choose,” 6. 
156 Ibid. 
  168 
report, “Engaging Citizens: Meeting the Challenges of Community Life,” deliberation is 
again depicted as a natural phenomena. “Deliberation doesn't require any special skill; it is a 
natural act. Citizens deliberate on personal matters all the time with family and friends. And 
people are attracted to deliberative decision making because their experiences and concerns 
count as much as professional expertise and data.”157  
In addition to concealing by portraying deliberation as natural, Kettering works to 
conceal how complex deliberative processes can be. The “We Have to Choose” report 
reveals how the tension of technique vs. natural act implicates pedagogy:  
The distinctive qualities of deliberation and the ease with which it is confused with 
other forms of political discourse suggest the need for a formal curriculum on the 
nature of choice work and the skills that moderators should have…. Yet creating such 
a curriculum can give the impression that deliberation is an elite skill or technique. 
On the other hand, if deliberation is presented as a natural act, the immediate question 
is why it needs to be explained at all.158  
 
Similarly, the “Engaging Citizens” report suggests a struggle to avoid the “impression that 
deliberation is a special process requiring highly trained and skilled moderators, which is 
obviously the opposite of a public practice.”159 In this way, it becomes clear that part of the 
“public” in public deliberation, according to Kettering, is a rejection of skill and specialized 
training.  
The denial of technique is staged upon the distinction of “practices” and 
“techniques.” The “We Have to Choose” report refers to a distinction made between 
practices and techniques. Echoing Alasdair McIntyre, the report claims that the distinction 
                                                            
157 Kettering Foundation, “Engaging Citizens: Meeting the Challenges of Community Life,” 
21. 
158 Kettering Foundation, “We Have to Choose,” 7. 
159 Kettering Foundation, “Engaging Citizens,” 21. 
  169 
involves the intrinsic value of a practice while a technique is employed for utilitarian 
reasons.160 This differentiation is then used to position democratic deliberation in a favorable 
light since, according to the report, “democratic practices are genuine practices.”161 The 
distinction between practices and techniques is raised and featured prominently in a 2011 
Kettering report by Derek Barker and associates. They claim that a deliberative forum is part 
of larger community practices rather than a technique for a particular public issue.162 
According to Barker et al., regarding deliberation as a technique—”a specific methodology 
for the purposes of discrete events”—restricts the study of deliberation by focusing too much 
attention on moderators and conveners as the critical actors of deliberation.163 Barker et al. 
provide an example, when making the case that some conceptualize deliberation as 
technique, from Gastil and Levine who write, “good deliberation is not self-generating. ...In 
practice, a small group of self-selected leaders must actually organize any process.”164 On the 
other hand, Barker, and indeed Kettering more generally, wants to insinuate the work of NIF 
into the less formal, more organic deliberative practices of everyday life. What is curious 
about this assertion is that the notion of the everydayness and non-technique of NIF persists 
into the description of their practices as not special techniques when the process of putting 
together an issue book is obviously a highly specialized technique. The manner in which 
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Kettering identifies deliberation as practice or technique seems to explicitly locate the NIF’s 
deliberation as technique. However, NIF and Kettering seem to want to secure the benefits of 
NIF as a community practice that is focused on citizens as opposed to trained moderators and 
one that is local as opposed to dealing with mainstream national issues.165 
Conclusions 
Examining OST and NIF allows for an understanding of how the naturalization of 
deliberation requires that artifice be concealed. In the example of Open Space, discouraging 
attention to the method of facilitation diminishes attention to artifice. Under the cloaks of 
simplicity, voluntarism, and ordinariness, discourse about how to facilitate an Open Space 
meeting encourages practitioners to imagine that discourse emerges naturally from the 
meeting as opposed to emerging partly because of the techniques they have employed. In the 
case of NIF, the denial of technique is more explicit. With elaborate discussion materials, 
NIF must explicitly distance the work they do from specialized technique in order to gain the 
mantle of natural deliberation. Both methods seem to generate useful deliberative encounters 
that may help groups examine issues and generate good decisions even as they apply 
techniques of rhetorical artifice.  
Taken together, this divergent set of facilitation methods poses several implications 
for this dissertation's goal of understanding the effect of favoring speech thought to be 
immediate. In particular, this chapter provides three crucial insights for understanding how 
public deliberation aids in the production of the values that are articulated to democracy 
today. We notice the technique of denying technique, the depoliticizing effect of naturalizing 
deliberation, and the ethical problem of vaunting authenticity.  
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 First, this chapter demonstrates how the denial of technique is itself a technique of 
facilitated deliberation. It is crucial that we recognize deliberation, including facilitated 
dialogue, as a technical skill that benefits from training. This training is required for ethical 
and effective results. For example, Owen claims that OST runs on individuals’ passion and 
responsibility, but there is no instruction regarding how this responsibility should be 
practiced.166 In the absence of a new ethical framework for responsible communication, it 
should be expected that participants would fall back onto the same communicative habits that 
might have necessitated the Open Space in the first place.   
 The drive to render communication that is unmediated requires that all signs of 
artifice be erased or sufficiently concealed. This leads to a figuration of communication that 
is anti-rhetorical or at least non-rhetorical. For example, John Stewart claims that the turn 
toward dialogue is located in the turn away from “rhetorical sensitivity.”167 Jeanine 
Czubaroff, in observing that dialogue has not taken off within rhetorical studies, claims that 
rhetoricians are “quick to point out real-world realities of power, rights, and interests that 
encourage unilateral, strategic modes of communication in which genuine dialogue is seldom 
evident.”168 Both of these statements suggest that dialogue is an alternative to a technical 
application of strategy and that such work epitomizes rhetoric. The problem is that dialogue 
                                                            
166 Owen, User's Guide, 23. 
167 John Stewart, “Foreword,” in The Reach of Dialogue, viii. 
168 Jeanine Czubaroff, “Dialogue and the Prospect of Rhetoric,” Review of Communication 
12, no. 1 (2012): 46. Because rhetoric is associated with the strategic, and dialogue is without 
or beyond strategy, rhetoricians are otherwise occupied. It is less clear how she views 
dialogue as relating to what she refers to as the real-world realities of power, rights, and 
interests. 
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traffics in the “real-world realities of power” and any suggestion otherwise is produced by 
the concealment the power circulating through dialogue.   
 Even more than the denial of rhetoric, the pursuit of unmediated communication 
requires a broader rejection and denial of technique itself. Technique, in the frame of such 
denial, appears as a trace of artifice to be rid from the communicative process. One reason for 
this is that some view the application of a technical method as a contradiction with dialogue’s 
status as spontaneous and open-ended.169 Richard Johannesen explicitly states that dialogue 
is a communication attitude or orientation more than it is a specific method or technique.170 
Barrett suggests that applying a technique is a less reflective practice than dialogue, which is 
sincere. And take, for example, the way that Cissna and Anderson locate the role of 
genuineness and authenticity in dialogue, “participants assume that the other is speaking 
from experienced—not hypothetical, self-consciously strategic, fantasized, or deceptive—
positions.”171 They assume that speaking from experience stands in opposition to fantasy, 
strategy, and deception. 
Second, there is a depoliticizing effect when deliberation is naturalized. In the case of 
Open Space, Owen claims that his method creates equality because everyone, no matter her 
or his position in the group, is on the same level. As feminist and other critics of public 
                                                            
169 Nola J. Heidlebaugh, “Invention and Public Dialogue: Lessons from Rhetorical Theories,” 
Communication Theory 18, no. 1 (2008): 36.; Stewart and Zediker, “Dialogue as Tensional, 
Ethical Practice,” 229. Hammond et al., 2003: 139. 
170 Johannesen, “Attitude of Speaker Toward Audience,” 96.  
171 Cissna and Anderson, “Communication and the Ground of Dialogue,” 15. 
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sphere theory have successfully argued, this procedural norm does not remove status, it hides 
it, making it more difficult to address.172  
Beyond the concealment of status, there is a related problem inherent in the 
denigration of debate. The adversarial frame of competing ideas foregrounds conflict while 
facilitated dialogue—at least implicitly—discourages it. This may give rise to a 
communicative condition wherein decorum leads participants to use particular idioms and 
styles that conceal claims as questions and persuasion as invitation. In this state, an unspoken 
standard of communication literacy would reward those participants able to represent their 
views and interests in the appropriately invitational style. In the example of NIF, there is an 
explicit attempt to transcend the partisan politics of the moment in order to translate public 
issues into timeless, human issues like security and freedom. The issue guides, if timely, 
pertain to hotly contested issues without reference to the partisan arguments circulating in 
public culture and certainly in the minds of citizens who chose to attend the forum. As a 
result this naturalizes certain frames for issues as timeless and apolitical. According to field 
reports from forum meetings, participants follow the ascribed decorum and say very little 
about the partisan politics of an issue. While NIF and Kettering interpret this as transcending 
partisanship and successfully processing an issue in more fundamental terms, it may also be 
evidence of silenced arguments and claims that have been translated into questions.  
Finally, there is an ethical problem when authenticity is vaunted. Personal stories and 
rhetorical questions help to evade the ethics of publicity. Public deliberation is constituted, in 
part, through the possibility that one will be called to account for the validity of claims being 
                                                            
172 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1992), 118-21.  
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made using reasoning that are publicly accessible. Recourse to personal experience and the 
seemingly open-endedness of questions would allow subjects to evade the demand to account 
for the validity of one’s claims. One way that both OST and NIF facilitation guides seek to 
produce persuasive effects while keeping rhetorical labor concealed is by mobilizing what 
Charles Taylor refers to as the ethics of authenticity.173 Deference to sincerely held beliefs—
what Owen calls “passion”—and personal values and needs that NIF seeks to elicit often 
silences critique. A sincere argument is valued above a sound one. The widely held idea that 
everyone is entitled to their own opinion means that without an adversarial frame, 
participants in a communication encounter are less disposed to rigorously engage a given 
claim. Kettering’s brochure on difficult decisions explains, “NIF forums have seldom, if 
ever, been plagued by disruptive behavior.... Many in the NIF deliberations have said that 
they welcomed opportunities to talk about hot topics frankly because they could exchange 
opinions without being personally attacked. Forum participants have given high marks to 
meetings where they could express strong views without others contesting their right to their 
beliefs.”174 There is no doubt that National Issues Forums benefit participants. At the very 
least they encounter other individuals and learn about a given issue. This may be, however, at 
the expense of developing skills for testing and ultimately rejecting claims. 
                                                            
173 Charles Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 14.  
174 Kettering Foundation, “Working Through Difficult Decisions,” 5-6.  
  
 
CHAPTER 5: POSTSCRIPT 
As an alternative to the “problem” reponse to the artifice of democratic speech, I have 
suggested a conception of artifice as a necessary precondition of public communication. 
Thought of this way, advocates can begin the work of making good artifice—ideally as 
Isocrates might call for: both moral and effective. This investment that Isocrates 
demonstrated in crafting better communication was an alternative to the Platonic conception 
of perfect communication that came to dominate Western philsophy. It echoes in John 
Dewey’s pragmatism that was its own critical alternative to philosophy that had become too 
divorced from the prudence demanded by the problems of the public. Throughout his long 
career, John Dewey remained faithful to the ideal of democratic speech. On the occasion of 
his 80th birthday, Dewey reflected on the public role of creative intelligence,  
What is the faith of democracy in the role of consultation, of conference, of 
persuasion, of discussion, in formation of public opinion, which in the long run is 
self-corrective, except faith in the capacity of the intelligence of the common man to 
respond with commonsense to the free play of facts and ideas which are secured by 
effective guarantees of free inquiry, free assembly and free communication?1 
 
I share Dewey's and Isocrates’ investment in creative intelligence to improve social 
conditions through public speech forms. American Democracy’s original slogan represents 
the free movement of individuals toward some sort of unity: E Pluribus Unum. The demos, 
as a modern public, emerges through multiple forms of address. No single form of speech is 
capable of bringing together diverse opinions and perspectives. This “bringing together” 
                                                            
1 John Dewey, “Creative Democracy,” in The Later Works, 1925-1953, ed. Jo Ann Boydston 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 227. 
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occurs through cooperative discussion and appreciative listening, but it also occurs through 
dissonance and dissent, through debate and bargaining, through raised voices and silenced 
polemics. Democratic speech is not reducible to unmediated discourse or an ethic of 
transparency between citizens as they communicate; it relies on a number of different forms 
of mediation.  
As I have shown, despite the rich history of its citizens crafting rhetorical artifice, 
American democracy is simultaneously a history of the demand for speech that is unmediated 
by artifice. This demand limits the democratic potential of public communication. In fact, 
intentional resistance to a claim to unmediated speech has animated the rhetorical tradition 
from its earliest manifestations. This is what drove Isocrates to champion writing as a means 
for the careful balancing of the prudently possible and the morally desirable; he recognized 
that, when doing more than praising bumblebees and salt, eloquence requires the mediation 
of rhetorical form and design.2  
More recent examples bear out the wisdom of Isocrates’ approach. As I have shown 
in the preceding chapters, even a claim to the primacy of unmediated speech both produces 
and conceals a wide range of artificial means of mediation. In the example of contemporary 
U.S. political campaigns, the fixation on unscripted speech leads to elaborately staged events 
that are designed to appear spontaneous. The pretense of spontaneity offers visual 
demonstrations of a candidate's attempt to relate to ordinary people by ducking into a local 
diner and grabbing a beer with a few locals (and a gaggle of advisors and international 
media). Though these demonstrations represent one possibility for democratic deliberation 
the fact that they conceal the conditions of their artifice reflects a lack of Dewey's “faith in 
                                                            
2 On bumblebees and salt, see chap. 2, n. 119. 
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the capacity of the intelligence of the common man.”3 Likewise, without naming it as such, 
contemporary deliberative technologies like Open Space and NIF proffer a variety of 
techniques to elicit forms of communication that allow participants to think more deeply 
about an issue and to share perspectives, but not to rigorously engage and challenge each 
other’s views and statements. As Harrison Owen describes, the free exchange of ideas, 
insofar as it puts participants in the presence of the truth, is rigorous enough, “not a word of 
external judgment need be spoken.”4 
A better response to rhetorical artifice would begin with the idea that all forms of 
public communication are artificial. That is, all public speech is constituted through 
rhetorical artifice. Thus, rejecting rhetoric is impossible in contexts of democratic speech. 
Even in the most concealed exercises of trope and the least visible applications of form lies 
the performed relation of a rhetor and an audience. The rhetoric of non-rhetoric is a deft 
strategy for displacing the suspicion of speech. Such a rhetoric conceals artifice so 
thoroughly as to deny the possibility of craft altogether. It is witnessed in the posture of 
informative speaking, the trust of spontaneity, and the cult of sincerity. As such, the demand 
for sincere speech perpetuates the dream of the non-rhetorical by rewarding rhetors that 
conceal their craft. Together, the rhetoric of non-rhetoric and the sincerity demand help to 
accomplish persuasive effects under the banner of non-persuasive discourse. A rhetor may 
offer an alternative to the artificialness of rhetoric, however this still manages to enter into 
the rhetorical economy of ēthos by exchanging the claim of sincerity for the currency of 
moral virtue. 
                                                            
3 Ibid. 
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Of course, the dual strategies of concealment entailed in the rhetoric of non-rhetoric 
and a claim to sincerity are not new. We first witnessed this in the case of classical Athens 
(ca. 508 – 322 BCE). Plato and Isocrates took divergent approaches to reconciling the artifice 
of speech, the latter embracing artifice and celebrating rhetoric. Plato denigrated rhetoric, yet 
used the rhetoric of non-rhetoric to achieve persuasive effects when imagining Socrates 
defending himself at trial by assuring his jury that he would speak without ornamentation and 
would merely speak the truth.5 In a more contemporary case, we witness this strategy 
insinuated into anxieties over material technologies as Mitt Romney begins a news 
conference by proclaiming, “I don't have a text written. … I don't have a teleprompter here. 
… I just want to talk to you…”6 In the case of facilitated dialogue, the demand for 
naturalness forced facilitators to invent eloquent techniques for denying technique. In each 
preceding chapter, whenever speech was being valued for being more direct, we witnessed 
the rhetoric of non-rhetoric at work. 
The artifice that conceals technique allows speakers to appear less mediated. 
Technique, in the frame of such denial, appears as a trace of artifice to be expunged from the 
communicative process. This is seen in the progression of the three speeches of Plato’s 
Phaedrus. Plato implies that it is not until rhetorical technê is stripped away that Socrates is 
able to give the finest speech through sincerity. A similar strategy manifests in present-day 
proponents of dialogue who view technical methods as contradictory to open-ended and 
spontaneous dialogue. The problem with a technical treatise, Cissna and Anderson imply, is 
when so-called “answer merchants” and “instant experts” want to improve any human 
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6 Mitt Romney, “Speaks about the Economy.”  
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relation by “just practicing a few simple techniques.”7 This is a limited view of technique as 
a standard method that is applied formulaically. Returning to the Greek origin, technê, 
recovers more than intentionally applied methods in technique. As practical knowledge 
oriented toward craft production, this sense of technique is human action that incorporates 
individual intention and cultural tradition; it is passed down even as it is reinvented in 
successive iterations. This resonates with Isocrates’ defense of rhetoric exactly because it 
was a craft that, when properly honed, could be applied in new ways to respond to contingent 
situations. To reject rhetoric because it is steeped in technique is to conflate craftiness with 
craft-ness. Affirming technique as technê orients the critic away from intention or avowal to 
the actual performance of speech.8  
   Beyond the concealment of technique, there is also a claim to technique and a 
featuring of technology that works to conceal a broader condition of mediation. Rejecting the 
appearance of artifice in the name of technique leads to a figuration of communication that 
aspires to the non-rhetorical and makes it more difficult to fully engage democratic speech. 
In the differential reception of the teleprompter and the bullhorn, the aspiration for the non-
rhetorical is seen in the privilege of the low-tech ēthos even as a speaker is surrounded by 
technological devices (e.g., a bullhorn) and overt processes of mediation (e.g., set pieces and 
news crews). In the case of facilitated deliberation, dialogue is figured as a turn away from 
rhetoric’s technical application of strategy for instrumental ends even as “technique” and 
“technology” are occasionally featured. For example, the National Coalition for Dialogue & 
                                                            
7 Rob Anderson, Kenneth N. Cissna, and Ronald C. Arnett, “The Self Region: Voices at the 
Boundary,” in The Reach of Dialogue, 179.  
8 See Sterne, “Communication as Techné,” 93. 
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Deliberation (NCDD) describes the various “techniques” of dialogue and deliberation.9 And 
Owen’s practice is, after all, termed “Open Space Technology.” The term “technology” was 
not part of the original conception. He concedes that a strict definition makes the term 
appropriate, “there is a techne (technique) involved in order to produce an intended result. 
But that is stretching to say the least.”10 Owen claims that calling Open Space a “technology” 
is “playful” and “not to be taken too seriously.”11 The fact that this term is used with a wry 
jocularity illustrates the lived tension of facilitators and the technical basis of their practice. 
Owen, echoing Cissna and Anderson above, explicitly states, “this is not a ‘cookbook 
technology.’”12 What these cases reveal are different facets of the same rhetorical problem: 
the strategies used to conceal rhetorical artifice allow for gains in terms of ēthos and the 
demand for direct forms of communication at the expense of a critical rhetoric sufficient for 
democratic life. I will now briefly consider these gains and losses in turn.  
 The concealment of artifice serves specific rhetorical ends. Some of the examples of 
the preceding pages illustrate the use of eloquent rhetoric to flatter an audience into assent. 
However, more importantly, they also illustrate strategies by which a rhetoric that appears 
non-rhetorical creates numerous possibilities for democratic speech. Some of these 
                                                            
9 “Engagement Streams,” 1. The NCDD framework is based largely on the “social 
technologies” of Patricia Wilson. “Deep Democracy: The Inner Practice of Civic 
Engagement.” Fieldnotes: A Newsletter of the Shambhala Institute 2 (2004). Wilson’s work, 
in turn, draws from practitioners such as Allan Kaplan, who describes his work as rejecting 
“the conventional instrumental or technicist way in favour of a methodology which embraces 
the full complexity and ambiguity of social transformation.” Development Practitioners and 
Social Process - Artists of the Invisible, Community Development Resource Association, 
http://www.cdra.org.za 
10 Expanding, 21.  
11 Ibid., 22.   
12 Owen, User’s Guide, 55.  
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possibilities are related to the forging of necessary social fictions. Proceeding in the 
subjective form “as if” our public peers are the persons that their personas suggest helps to 
advance the broader interest of democratic conversation by encouraging a charitable reading 
of public speech and preventing an unending cycle of critique that fails to advance an 
affirmative alternative. It is easy to notice artifice but harder to proceed and engage the 
public question at hand. 
There is an ēthos effect that is made possible by concealment. In antiquity, this was 
most clearly represented by the virtue of parrhesia because it avoided flattery and spoke truth 
despite the danger. This ēthos effect is seen in the rhetorical metamorphosis of Bill Clinton as 
he learned to “feel your pain.” There is also a paradoxical ēthos effect wherein artifice is 
rendered less visible by making parts of it more visible. This is seen in efforts to draw 
attention away from the artifice of Open Space by displacing that attention onto ordinariness. 
Owen suggests that facilitators not hide the computers that will be used to record the 
proceedings and to use low-tech handwriting in order to make the signs appear more 
ordinary. Similarly, while the bullhorn is a visible symbol of technological mediation and 
impersonal communication, it focuses audience attention on the amplification of the 
speaker’s voice, unlike the teleprompter that draws attention to the presence of a written 
script. When attention is drawn to ordinariness or the speaker's voice, the consequence for 
ēthos recalls Plato’s fear: the distinction between actual and apparent virtue is less visible 
insofar as there is not the perception that the speaker is manipulating the audience for 
persuasive effect. The distinction between persona and person has disappeared.  
While technê of concealment serve certain rhetorical and democratic ends, there is a 
cost. The status quo response to the problem of artifice also entails certain drawbacks 
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common to each of the sites under investigation in this study. First, ethical critique is 
displaced by the embrace of purportedly unmediated communication because concealment of 
artifice functions in tandem with a the erasure of communicative agency. When 
communication is regarded as emerging without artifice, the ēthos effect is that artistic proofs 
are transposed into an inartistic ones. Rather than attending to the choices that a speaker 
made in public address, choices are erased and the ethics of voice are made paramount. With 
a sole focus on “public address” as opposed to “discourse which addresses publics,” Raymie 
McKerrow reminds us, there is a danger that analysis will center on the agent as opposed to 
the symbol.13 The requisite agency to speak is the focal point under conditions of 
concealment and so we encounter highly romantic discourses of brave speakers and earnest 
citizens. It is the heroic posture of Socrates returning for one final, climactic speech. It is the 
cinematic cliché wherein the character tears up the script and speaks from the heart. It is the 
expectation in Open Space, that good participants will exercise the Law of Two Feet to find 
their voice elsewhere.  
When we presume the artifice of speech, we are more attenuated to the creative 
choices made in constructing a given appeal. For Isocrates, attending to the political 
implications of speech was essential. While Plato attempts to transcend the scene of Athens, 
Isocrates embraces it. Training in rhetoric was important for Isocratean education because 
citizens must make contextually bounded judgments without the certainty and stability of 
epistēmē. This attention to the construction of public messages is lacking in the low-tech 
ēthos of the bullhorn. In that example, we notice how the presumption of voice reduced 
attention to ideology and foregrounded the sincerity of the speaker. This is akin to the 
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technique of NIF. In that approach to facilitating deliberation, the work of crafting issue 
books is not taken to be relevant to the discussion of the ensuing issue. There is an explicit 
attempt to translate public issues into non-partisan terminologies to avoid partisan political 
debate. 
 Plato rejected writing, in part, because it was public. In his radically anti-democratic 
impulse, Plato shunned the stranger sociality of speaking as if any member of the public is 
listening; he preferred to tailor his address to individuals in personal, intimate communicative 
exchanges. The affiliated binaries of natural/artificial and personal/public have persisted 
since Plato and weaken the critical potential for public moral argument.14 Audiences demur 
when confronted with a rhetor who “speaks from the heart.” Thus, when NIF solicits 
“personal values” as opposed to “public values” it is shifting the deliberation away from 
publicly available reasons to the terrain of sincere individualism. The move from public, 
often partisan, values and reasons to personal ones is caught up in the sincerity demand and 
the mistaken notion that the interior self is natural and that the virtuous subject confesses 
their personal truth.15 Even though the  personal is as artificial as the public as a source of 
moral argument, because they are naturalized, personal values tend to face less critical 
scrutiny. When public arguments are cloaked by the deadening effect of sincerity, the public 
becomes persons and everyone is entitled to their own, personal opinion. This loss is felt as 
participants are less disposed to critically engage a given argument.16 This fact is not lost on 
                                                            
14 G. Thomas Goodnight, “The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument: A 
Speculative Inquiry Into the Art of Public Deliberation,” Argumentation and Advocacy 48, 
no. 4 (2012): 205.  
15 See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 (New York: Vintage, 1990), 59-60.  
16 This can provide a subversive inventional resource, as in the example of Cindy Sheehan, a 
mother and anti-war activist who leveraged her personal grief for public moral argument. 
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political campaign strategists. G. Thomas Goodnight notes, “as arguments grounded in 
personal experience (disclosed by average opinion) seem to have greatest currency, political 
speakers present not opinions but personalities.”17 
 Because all public speech is rhetorical, even at the height of concealment, speech is 
amenable to rhetorical criticism. We should question the assumption that certain kinds of 
speech are more immediate than other forms of communication, and that less mediation is 
necessary for ethical communication. Instead, communication research and teaching should 
consider what communicative resources are provided by different appearances of mediation. 
Further study of artifice in deliberation would encourage conceptions of dialogue and debate 
as something other than polar opposites: as differing modes of speaking together. By 
pluralizing the modes of communication available to theories of democratic speech, we are 
better able to consider public problems. As John Dewey argues in The Public and Its 
Problems, the central problem of the public is poor “methods and conditions of debate, 
discussion and persuasion.”18 Dewey remained faithful in the ideal of democratic 
deliberation, but always maintained that the right conditions were required in order to 
generate good decisions. 19 Almost a century later, we are faced with a demand for sincere 
speech and a rhetoric of non-rhetoric that threatens to narrow the practice of democratic 
speech.
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Yet, as Billie Murray illustrates, the personalization of Sheehan’s advocacy also enabled 
critics to separate it from public engagement. "For What Noble Cause: Cindy Sheehan and 
the Politics of Grief in Public Spheres of Argument." Argumentation & Advocacy 49, no. 1 
(2012): 8.  
17 “The Personal, Technical, and Public,” 206. 
18 208. 
19 John Dewey, Later Works 14, 227. 
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